Commission Decision (EU) 2025/2433of 29 July 2025on the aid scheme SA.51501 (2021/C) (ex 2019/NN) (ex (2018/N) implemented by Czechia in favour of large enterprises active in primary agricultural production(notified under document C(2025) 5149)(Only the Czech version is authentic)

(141) The Commission therefore considers that aid would facilitate an economic activity, in that it would facilitate the competitiveness and resilience of the agricultural primary production.

7.2.2.2.

Incentive effect (moment of the application submission)

(142) The second ground for opening the formal investigation related to the condition of aid presenting incentive effect, specifically in relation to the moment of the submission of the aid application

Recital 67, 2nd indent of the opening decision.

. The Commission had doubts whether under the scheme the applications would be submitted before the start of works (see also recital 94).

(143) The Commission recalls that pursuant to point (70) of the 2014 Guidelines and point (50) of the 2023 Guidelines, wherever work or activity has already started prior to the aid application by the beneficiary to the national authorities such aid does not present an incentive for the beneficiary.

(144) Pursuant to point 35(25) of the 2014 Guidelines and point 33(57) of the 2023 Guidelines, start of works on the project or activity means the earlier of, either the start of the activities, or the construction works relating to the investment, or the first legally binding commitment to order equipment or employ services or any other commitment that makes the project or activity irreversible.

(145) The Czech authorities responded to these doubts by providing a detailed explanation of the procedure related to the insurance contracts (recitals 113 to 122).

(146) The Czech authorities explained that the insurance coverage for a relevant year requires the beneficiary to pay the annual insurance premium. Without an annual payment covering an upcoming year, coverage for that year is forfeit. Prior to the payment of the insurance premium, an enterprise does not make the legally binding commitment that would make the annual insurance irreversible.

(147) The Czech authorities submitted that in the absence of aid an undertaking insured in one year does not necessarily take the insurance for a next year. Therefore, each annual insurance must be seen as a separate project. It cannot be inferred from the existence of an annual insurance in one year that an undertaking will continue with the contract in the next year (recital 113).

(148) The Commission takes note that the conclusion of the contract does not automatically impose the obligation of paying the annual insurance. The Commission considers that after the conclusion of the insurance contract, farmers are under no obligation to pay an annual insurance and have the discretion to choose to take the insurance for a given year or not by either paying the insurance premium or not. In such circumstances, the decisive moment for assessing the incentive effect of the aid is indeed the moment of the payment of annual insurance premium and not the moment when a contract, which has an automatic extension clause, is concluded (recital 112).

(149) The Commission therefore considers that the aid provides an incentive for farmers to take out the annual insurance which they may not undertake without the aid. Further, the Czech authorities confirmed that no aid would be granted to a beneficiary that had paid the annual insurance premium prior to the aid application (recital 121).

(150) The Commission therefore agrees with the Czech authorities that the moment of payment of annual insurance premium must be considered as start of work on a project or activity and not the moment when the insurance contract is concluded.

(151) Pursuant to point (47) of the 2023 Guidelines, the scheme has an incentive effect if it changes the behaviour of undertakings in such a way that they engage in additional activity contributing to the development of the sector, in which they would have normally not engaged in without aid or would have engaged in a different or restricted manner.

(152) Pursuant to point (48) of the 2023 Guidelines, State aid measures which are simply intended to improve the financial situation of undertakings but which in no way contribute to the development of the sector, and in particular aid which is granted solely on the basis of price, quantity, unit of production or unit of the means of production are considered to constitute operating aid which is incompatible with the internal market. Furthermore, by its very nature, such aid is also likely to interfere with the mechanisms regulating the organisation of the internal market.

(153) Pursuant to point (50) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission considers that aid does not present an incentive for the beneficiary wherever work on the relevant project or activity has already started prior to the aid application by the beneficiary to the national authorities.

(154) Pursuant to point (51) of the 2023 Guidelines, the aid application must include at least the applicant’s name and the size of the undertaking, a description of the project or activity, including its location and start and end dates, the amount of aid needed to carry it out and the eligible costs. In addition, pursuant to point (52) of the 2023 Guidelines, large enterprises must describe in the application the situation without the aid, which situation is referred to as the counterfactual scenario or alternative project or activity and submit documentary evidence in support of the counterfactual described in the application. This requirement does not apply to municipalities that are autonomous local authorities with an annual budget of less than EUR 10 million and fewer than 5000 inhabitants. Pursuant to point (53) of the 2023 Guidelines, when receiving an application, the granting authority must carry out a credibility check of the counterfactual scenario and confirm that the aid has the required incentive effect. A counterfactual scenario is credible if it is genuine and relates to the decision-making factors prevalent at the time of the decision by the beneficiary regarding the project or activity concerned.

(155) In the opening decision, the Commission expressed doubts that the national legal basis complied with point (70) of the 2014 Guidelines, which is identical to point (50) of the 2023 Guidelines. As concluded in recital 150, the Commission considers that in the case at hand the moment of the start of work on the project or activity is the payment of the annual insurance premium.

(156) The Czech authorities confirmed that the scheme sets out the condition of the aid application being submitted by aid beneficiaries before the start of work or activity (recital 29 and 150). The application has to include at least the applicant’s name and the size of the undertaking, a description of the project or activity, including its location and start and end dates, the amount of aid needed to carry it out and the eligible costs (recital 30). Large undertakings also must submit the counterfactual scenario or alternative project or activity and submit documentary evidence in its support (recital 31).

(157) The aid can be granted for the costs of insurance premium (recital 21). Thus, it would not subsidise the costs of an activity that an undertaking would have incurred in any event and will not compensate for the normal business risk of an economic activity and it was not intended to simply improve the financial situation of undertakings.

(158) On that basis, the Commission concludes that the scheme presents an incentive effect.

7.2.2.3.

No breach of relevant provisions and general principles of Union law

(159) Pursuant to point (61) of the 2023 Guidelines, if a State aid measure, the conditions attached to it, including its financing method when the financing method forms an integral part of the State aid measure, or the activity it finances entails a violation of relevant Union law, the aid cannot be declared compatible with the internal market.

(160) The conditions of the scheme are set out in accordance with the applicable Union legislation. There is no indication that the proposed aid or the conditions attached to it would entail any violation of the relevant provisions and general principles of Union law. Therefore, the Commission finds that point (61) of the 2023 Guidelines is complied with.

(161) Pursuant to point (62) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission will not authorise State aid which is incompatible with the provisions governing the common organisation of the market or which would interfere with the proper functioning of the common organisation. There is no indication that the proposed aid would be incompatible with the provisions governing the common organisation of the market or would interfere with the proper functioning.

(162) Pursuant to point (63) of the 2023 Guidelines, State aid cannot be declared compatible with the internal market where the award of aid is subject to the obligation for the beneficiary undertaking to use national products or services. The scheme does not provide for such an obligation.

(163) Pursuant to point (64) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission will not authorise aid for export-related activities to third countries or to Member States which would be directly linked to the quantities exported, aid contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods, or aid to establish and operate a distribution network or to cover any other expenditure linked to export activities. The scheme does not provide for such types of aid.

7.2.2.4.

Conclusion

(164) The Commission therefore considers that the scheme would facilitate the development of the agricultural primary production activity.

7.2.3.

Negative condition: the aid must not unduly affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest

(165) Pursuant to point (67) of the 2023 Guidelines, by its very nature, any aid measure generates distortions of competition and has an effect on trade between Member States. However, in order to establish if the distortive effects of the aid are limited to the minimum, the Commission verifies whether the aid is necessary, appropriate, proportionate and transparent.

(166) Pursuant to point (68) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission then assesses the distortive effect of the aid in question on competition and trading conditions. The Commission will then balance the positive effects of the aid with its negative effects on competition and trade. Where the positive effects outweigh the negative effects, the Commission will declare the aid compatible.

7.2.3.1.

Need for State intervention

(167) Pursuant to point (70) of the 2023 Guidelines, State aid can achieve an objective of common interest if it is targeted towards the correction of market failures.

(168) The Commission notes that the Czech authorities explained that the scheme seeks to achieve a higher level of security for agricultural businesses against unforeseen damages by making insurance coverage widely available throughout the agricultural sector. The scheme therefore aims to motivate farmers to take out the insurance to better manage the occurrence of risks and crisis events.

(169) The Commission considers on that basis that the State intervention would lead to insurance widely being available to the farming sector, which may be otherwise confronted with high insurance prices. Therefore, the Commission considers that point (70) of the 2023 Guidelines is complied with.

(170) Pursuant to point (71) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission considers that the market is not delivering the expected objectives without State intervention concerning those aid measures which fulfil the specific conditions laid down in Part II of the 2023 Guidelines. The Commission notes that the scheme fulfils the specific requirements laid down in Section 1.2.1.6. of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines (recitals 197 to 206). Therefore, in accordance with point (71) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission considers that there is a need for State intervention.

7.2.3.2.

Appropriateness of the aid

(171) Pursuant to point (72) of the 2023 Guidelines, the proposed aid measure must be an appropriate policy instrument to address the concerned policy objective. The Member State must demonstrate that the aid and its design are appropriate to achieve the objective of the measure at which the aid is targeted.

(172) The objective of the scheme is to support farmers in insuring their activities against unforeseen risk and crisis events in order to improve competitiveness of the farms. Thus, the Commission considers that the scheme does contribute to the overall competitiveness and resilience of the agricultural sector. The Commission therefore concludes that the scheme is an appropriate policy instrument for achieving those objectives.

Appropriateness among alternative policy instruments

(173) As provided for in point (73) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission considers that aid granted in the agricultural and forestry sector which fulfils the specific conditions laid down in the relevant Section of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines is an appropriate policy instrument.

(174) The scheme fulfils the specific requirements laid down in Section 1.2.1.6 of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines (recitals 197 to 206). Therefore, it is an appropriate policy instrument.

(175) Point (74) of the 2023 Guidelines does not apply in the present case, as the operations eligible for aid are not co-financed under the Czech CAP Strategic Plan (recital 36).

Appropriateness among different aid instruments

(176) Pursuant to point (75) of the 2023 Guidelines, aid may be granted in various forms. However, the Member States should ensure that the aid is granted in a form that is the least likely to distort trade and competition.

(177) Pursuant to point (76) of the 2023 Guidelines, where a specific form is set out for an aid measure as described in Part II of the 2023 Guidelines, such form is considered to be an appropriate aid instrument for the purpose of those Guidelines. The applicable rules are those of Section 1.2.1.6. of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines, which does not set out a specific aid form.

(178) Under the scheme, the aid can be granted to farmers as a direct grant (recital 14), which the Czech authorities consider as the most appropriate form for supporting insurance premium costs.

(179) The purpose of the scheme is to compensate farmers for the insurance premium costs. The Commission agrees that direct grants are the most suited form where aid has compensatory purpose. On this basis, the Commission concludes that the scheme fulfils point (76) of the 2023 Guidelines.

7.2.3.3.

Proportionality of the aid

(180) Pursuant to point (83) of the 2023 Guidelines, aid is considered proportionate if its amount per beneficiary is limited to the minimum needed for carrying out the aided activity. Pursuant to point (84) of the 2023 Guidelines, for aid to be proportionate, the amount of aid should not exceed the eligible costs, with some exceptions. Pursuant to point (85) of the 2023 Guidelines, in order to ensure predictability and a level playing field, the Commission applies maximum aid intensities.

(181) Pursuant to point (86) of the 2023 Guidelines, if the eligible costs are correctly calculated and the maximum aid intensities or maximum aid amounts set out in Part II of the 2023 Guidelines are respected, the criterion of proportionality is deemed to be fulfilled.

(182) Pursuant to point (87) of the 2023 Guidelines, the maximum aid intensity and aid amount must be calculated by the granting authority when granting the aid. The eligible costs must be supported by documentary evidence which should be clear, specific and contemporary. For the purposes of calculating the aid intensity and the eligible costs, all figures used must be taken before any deduction of tax or other charge. VAT is not eligible for aid, except where it is not recoverable under national VAT legislation.

(183) Aid granted on the basis of the scheme would not exceed 65 % of the eligible costs (recitals 22 and 25). This aid intensity respects the maximum allowed aid intensity for the insurance premium aid, set out in point (411) of the 2023 Guidelines.

(184) The eligible costs do not include the VAT (recital 34).

(185) Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Czech authorities confirmed that the eligible costs would be correctly calculated by the granting authority when granting the aid (recital 33).

(186) The Commission therefore concludes that the aid is proportionate.

7.2.3.4.

Cumulation of aid

(187) Pursuant to point (103) of the 2023 Guidelines, aid may be granted concurrently under several schemes or cumulated with ad hoc aid, provided that the total amount of State aid for an activity or project does not exceed the aid ceilings laid down in the 2023 Guidelines.

(188) Pursuant to point (104) of the 2023 Guidelines, aid with identifiable eligible costs may be cumulated with any other State aid, as long as those aids concern different identifiable eligible costs. Aid with identifiable eligible costs may be cumulated with any other State aid, in relation to the same eligible costs, partly or fully overlapping, only if such cumulation does not result in exceeding the highest aid intensity or aid amount applicable to this type of aid under the 2023 Guidelines.

(189) The Commission notes that the Czech authorities confirmed that aid under the scheme cannot be cumulated with aid from other local, regional or national sources or Union funds or with de minimis aid or ad hoc aid covering the same eligible costs (recital 32).

7.2.3.5.

Transparency

(190) Pursuant to point (112) of the 2023 Guidelines, Member States must ensure the publication of the information listed in that point in the European Commission’s transparency award module or on a comprehensive State aid website at national or regional level.

(191) The Czech authorities confirmed that the transparency conditions would be met. They committed to ensure the publication in the European Commission’s transparency award module of the full text of the scheme and its implementing provisions or legal basis, the identity of the granting authority and the identity of the beneficiaries which would receive individual aid award exceeding EUR 60000 (recital 37). The Czech authorities committed to amend the scheme to comply with the new rules, which entered into force on 1 January 2023. Under these rules, the threshold for individual aid which must be published, has been lowered to EUR 10000. On the basis of the commitment of the Czech authorities to take the appropriate measures, the Commission considers that the Czech authorities ensure that the transparency requirements related to individual aid awards, as set out in point (112) of the 2023 Guidelines would be respected.

(192) Pursuant to point (114) of the 2023 Guidelines, such information must be published after the decision to grant the aid has been taken, must be kept for at least 10 years and be available for the general public without restrictions. The Czech authorities confirmed that these requirements would be fulfilled (recital 37).

7.2.3.6.

Avoidance of adverse negative effects on competition and trade

(193) Pursuant to point (117) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission identifies the market(s) affected by the aid, taking into account the information provided by the Member State on the product market(s) concerned, that is to say the market(s) affected by the change in behaviour of the aid beneficiary. In assessing the negative effects of the aid measure, the Commission will focus its analysis of the distortions of competition on the predictable impact the aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas has on competition between undertakings in the product market(s) affected.

(194) Pursuant to point (118) of the 2023 Guidelines, if the aid is well targeted, proportionate and limited to the net extra costs, its negative impact is softened and the risk that it adversely distorts competition is more limited. Further, the Commission establishes maximum aid intensities or aid amounts. The aim is to prevent the use of State aid for activities where the ratio between the aid amount and eligible costs is to be deemed very high and particularly likely to be distortive. In general, the greater the positive effects the aided activity is likely to give rise to and the higher the likely need for aid, the higher the cap on aid intensity.

(195) In the present case, aid under the scheme can be granted for the costs of insurance premium (recital 21). In accordance with point (118) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission considers that the negative impact of such aid is limited, because the aid is well targeted towards its objectives (recital 172) and proportionate (recital 186).

(196) The Commission therefore concludes that the scheme would not lead to undue distortions of competition and trade.

7.2.3.7.

Specific conditions of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines

(197) In the case at hand, Section 1.2.1.6 (Aid for the payment of insurance premiums) of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines is applicable.

(198) Pursuant to point (403) of the 2023 Guidelines, Section 1.2.1.6 of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines applies to undertakings active in the primary agricultural production. This condition is fulfilled, as only large enterprises active in agricultural primary production are eligible (recital 15).

(199) Pursuant to point (404) of the 2023 Guidelines, the aid must not constitute a barrier to the operation of the internal market for insurance services. In particular, the aid must not be limited to insurance provided by a single insurance company or group of companies nor be made conditional on the insurance contract being taken out with a company established in the Member State concerned. The scheme complies with these conditions (recital 27).

(200) The scheme does not include reinsurance, therefore point (405) of the 2023 Guidelines is not applicable.

(201) Pursuant to point (406) of the 2023 Guidelines, the eligible costs are the costs of insurance premiums for insurance to cover the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, adverse climatic events which can be assimilated to a natural disaster, animal diseases, plant pests and invasive alien species, the removal and destruction of fallen stock and damage caused by protected animals, as referred to in Sections 1.2.1.1, to 1.2.1.5 of the 2023 Guidelines, and by other adverse climatic events or damage caused by environmental incidents.

(202) Aid under the scheme can be granted for the payment of insurance premiums covering damage caused by natural disasters, adverse climatic events, plant pests and animal disease (recitals 1 and 20). Therefore, the scheme complies with point (406) of the 2023 Guidelines.

(203) Pursuant to point (407) of the 2023 Guidelines, the insurance may compensate only the cost of making good the damage referred to in point (406) of the 2023 Guidelines and may not require or specify the type or quantity of future production. This condition is fulfilled (recital 26).

(204) The scheme does not cover insurance premiums for insurance against losses caused by environmental incidents. Therefore, points (408) and (409) of the 2023 Guidelines are not applicable.

(205) Pursuant to point (411) of the 2023 Guidelines, the aid intensity must not exceed 70 % of the cost of the insurance premium. In respect of aid for the removal and destruction of fallen stock, the aid intensity must not exceed 100 % of the cost of the insurance premium as regards insurance premiums for the removal of fallen stock and 75 % of the cost of the insurance premium as regards insurance premiums for the destruction of such fallen stock.

(206) Aid under this scheme can be granted up to 65 % of the eligible costs (recitals 22 and 25). Therefore, the maximum allowed aid intensity, set out in point (411) of the 2023 Guidelines, is complied with.

7.2.3.8.

Weighing up the positive and the negative effects of the aid

(207) Pursuant to point (134) of the 2023 Guidelines, the Commission assesses whether the positive effects of the aid measure outweigh its identified negative effects on competition and trading conditions. The Commission may conclude on the compatibility of the aid measure with the internal market only where the positive effects outweigh the negative ones.

(208) Pursuant to point (136) of the 2023 Guidelines, as part of the assessment of the positive and negative effects of the aid, the Commission will take into account the impact of the aid on the achievement of the general and specific objectives of the CAP set out in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, that aim to foster a smart, competitive, resilient and diversified agricultural sector, support and strengthen environmental protection, including biodiversity, and climate action and to contribute to achieving the environmental and climate-related objectives of the Union and to strengthen the socio-economic fabric of rural areas.

(209) Further, pursuant to point (137) of the 2023 Guidelines, in principle, due to its positive effects on the development of the sector, the Commission considers that where an aid fulfils the conditions and does not exceed the relevant maximum aid intensities or maximum aid amounts, laid down in the applicable Sections of Part II of the 2023 Guidelines, the negative effects on competition and trade are limited to the minimum.

(210) The scheme fulfils the requirements of Section 1.2.1.6. of Part II. of the 2023 Guidelines (recitals 197 to 206), including the relevant maximum aid intensity (recital 206).

(211) Moreover, the pursued objectives are consistent with the general and specific objectives set out in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115, that aim to foster a smart, competitive, resilient and diversified agricultural sector ensuring long-term food security and support and strengthen environmental protection and to contribute to achieving the environmental objectives of the Union (recital 36).

(212) Therefore, the Commission concludes that the positive impact of the scheme outweighs its negative effects in terms of distortions of competition and impact on trade between Member States.

7.2.4.

Conclusion with regard to the compatibility of the scheme

(213) Considering the above, the Commission concludes that the scheme facilitates the development of an economic activity and does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. Therefore, the Commission considers that the scheme is compatible with the internal market based on Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU as interpreted by the relevant provisions of the 2023 Guidelines.

7.3.

Lawfulness of the individual aid

(214) In its opening decision, the Commission referred to the market information obtained during the preliminary examination of the scheme, which indicated that aid had already been granted to some large enterprises for the payment of insurance premiums covering damage caused by natural disasters, adverse climatic events and plant pests or animal disease respectively to crops and livestock. The preliminary examination revealed that the granting authority had in fact erroneously classified some beneficiaries as SMEs at the moment of granting the aid

Recital 57 of the opening decision.

. Consequently, it had erroneously granted to those companies aid under the block-exempted scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA), which was limited to SMEs.

(215) As regards such classification as SMEs, the Czech authorities submitted comments set out in recitals 100 to 110.

(216) Below, the Commission addresses Czechia’s comments regarding the interpretation of the notion of SMEs and assesses the lawfulness of the individual aid.

7.3.1.

As regards the interpretation of the notion of SMEs

(217) In the opening decision, the Commission disagreed with the granting authority’s evaluation, considering that it had been done on purely formal grounds, i.e. by exclusively checking the formal fulfilment of the criteria defining an SME, without taking into account the economic reality and case law principles set out in recitals 58 to 61 of the opening decision.

(218) The consideration outlined by the Commission in the opening decision was based on its interpretation of Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER, as explained in recital 61 of the opening decision. The Commission specified that its interpretation has been based on the case law of the Union Courts guided by the principle of effet utile.

(219) In their submission, the Czech authorities made it clear that in the implementation and the ex-post administrative verification of the block-exempted scheme, they did not consider as large enterprises those beneficiaries which had become large enterprises following a merger or an acquisition having taken place less than two years before the granting date of aid. The Czech authorities considered such beneficiaries as SMEs for the two consecutive accounting periods, which followed the aid granting date and granted them aid on the basis of the block-exempted scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA) (recitals 100 to 110).

(220) With regard to the arguments presented by Czechia in relation to the interpretation of Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER (recitals 98 to 111), the Commission reiterates its position explained in detail in the opening decision

Recitals 53 to 61 of the opening decision.

.

(221) The Commission recalls that according to point (35)(14) of the 2014 Guidelines and point (33)(36) of the 2023 Guidelines, large enterprises are undertakings not fulfilling the criteria laid down in Annex I to the ABER.

(222) Pursuant to recital 39 of the ABER, the underlying reason of exempting SMEs from the notification requirement of Article 108(3) TFEU is that SMEs play a decisive role in job creation and, more generally, act as a factor of social stability and drive the economy. However, their development may be limited by market failures, leading to SMEs suffering from typical handicaps. SMEs often have difficulty in obtaining capital or loans, given the risk-averse nature of certain financial markets and the limited collateral that they may be able to offer. Their limited resources may also restrict their access to information, notably as regards new technology and potential markets. To facilitate the development of the economic activities of SMEs, this Regulation should therefore exempt certain categories of aid in favour of SMEs from the notification requirement of Article 108(3) of the Treaty.

(223) Recital 40 of the ABER explains that the definition of an SME used for the purpose of that Regulation is based on the definition laid down in Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC

Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj).

, in order to eliminate differences that might give rise to distortions of competition and to facilitate coordination between different Union and national initiatives concerning SMEs as well as for reasons of administrative clarity and legal certainty.

(224) Pursuant to Article 2(1) of Annex I to the ABER, the category of SMEs is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.

(225) Pursuant to Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER, where, at the date of closure of the accounts, an enterprise finds that, on an annual basis, it has exceeded or fallen below the headcount or financial ceilings stated in Article 2 of that Regulation, this will not result in the loss or acquisition of the status of medium-sized, small or microenterprise unless those ceilings are exceeded over two consecutive accounting periods.

(226) The Union Courts confirmed in their case law that the definition of a SME must be interpreted strictly, as the advantages afforded by the SME status are in most cases (in particular in the area of State aid) exceptions to general rules

Judgment of the Court of 27 February 2014 in case C-110/13 HaTeFo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:114, paragraph 32.

. It is necessary to remove from that qualification of SMEs groups of enterprises whose economic power may exceed that of genuine SMEs, even if they formally meet the criteria laid down in the SME definition

See, in particular: judgment of the Court of 24 September 2020 in case C-516/19 NMI Technologietransfer, ECLI:EU:C:2020:754, paragraphs 31-34; judgment of the Court of 29 April 2004 in case C-91/01 Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:244 paragraphs 31, 50-54; judgment of the Court of 27 February 2014 in case C-110/13 HaTeFo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:114, paragraphs 34 and 39; judgment of the Court of 14 October 2004 in case T-137/02, Pollmeier v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2004:304, paragraphs 61-62.

. According to the case law, it must also be ensured that the SME definition is not circumvented by purely formal means

Judgment of the Court of 29 April 2004 in case C-91/01 Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:244, paragraph 50; judgment of the Court of 27 February 2014 in case C-110/13, HaTeFo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:114, paragraph 33.

.

(227) The Union Courts further confirmed that only enterprises that suffer from the handicaps typical of an SME should be entitled to the advantages deriving from that status

Judgment of the Court of 27 February 2014 in case C-110/13 HaTeFo, ECLI:EU:C:2014:114, paragraph 33, judgment of the Court of 29 April 2004 in case C-91/01, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:244, paragraph 50.

. As such, the Commission considers that if an enterprise does not suffer from the handicaps typical of an SME, such an entity should not be recognised as an SME.

(228) In paragraph (91) of its judgment in case T-745/17, to which the Czech authorities referred in their submission (recital 110), the General Court found in substance that the Commission should have experienced doubts as to whether an enterprise falling below the SME thresholds foreseen at Article 2 of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 at the time of granting the aid could be considered as an SMEs despite having been linked to a large undertaking during the two previous accounting periods.

(229) The situation in the present case is the reverse of that in case T-745/17. At the time the individual aid was granted, the beneficiaries exceeded the SME thresholds set out in Article 2 of Annex I to the ABER. The SME thresholds were exceeded as a result of a lasting change in their ownership structure which occurred during the accounting period preceding that of the granting of the individual aid. The interpretation of Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER Regulation submitted by the Czech authorities to the effect that those beneficiaries should retain their SME status for two years following the date of the change in their ownership structure would be contrary to the spirit of Article 4(2), which aims to ensure that only enterprises that suffer from the handicaps typical of an SME should be entitled to the advantages deriving from that status.

(230) It would be against the effet utile principle to provide such a flexibility for enterprises that exceed the SME thresholds on a lasting basis as a result of a change in ownership. The purpose of the flexibility provided for in Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER has been to ensure that enterprises that experience growth and temporarily exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 2 of that Annex can retain their SME status. Thus, it seeks to ensure legal certainty for those SMEs which are active in highly volatile markets. However, the change in a company ownership following a merger or acquisition introduces a structural change which is not subject to volatility of a market or economic growth.

(231) In light of this reasoning, the Commission considers that the flexibility provided for in Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER must be limited to situations where the SME ceilings are exceeded on a temporary basis (unless those ceilings are exceeded over two consecutive accounting periods’).

(232) The driving principle for the Commission’s interpretation has been a need to ensure that only enterprises that suffer from the handicaps typical of an SME are entitled to the advantages deriving from that status and that the measures intended for SMEs genuinely benefit enterprises for which size represents a handicap and not those which belong to a large group and which therefore have access to funds and assistance not available to competitors of equal size but which do not belong to a large group.

(233) Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER therefore cannot be understood as meaning that a SME which due to an acquisition or a merger becomes a large enterprise could still automatically benefit from the SME status for two consecutive accounting periods

(234) The Commission therefore does not agree with the interpretation of the Czech authorities that the two-year grace period applies generally to all cases in which the SME ceilings are exceeded, regardless of the underlying reason. An enterprise does not continue to be a SME and does not face the same problems (access to resources, technology, etc.) when due to a merger or acquisition, it becomes part of a large enterprise, and, consequently, exceeds the SME thresholds on a lasting basis.

(235) Likewise, the Commission does not agree with the standpoint of the Czech authorities that the case law referred to in recital 59 of the opening decision must limited to Article 3 of Annex I to the ABER (recital 107). While that case law may have been issued specifically in relation to so-called linked enterprises, in view of the Commission this does not alter or restrict the general relevance of the effet utile principle. The Commission therefore considers that it must be seen as generally governing the implementation of the SME definition, in particular given that the Union Courts have encouraged in their rulings the application of the 'spirit' of the SME definition (e.g. … with a view to ensuring that only those enterprises which really need the advantages accruing to SMEs from the different rules or measures in their favour actually benefit from them

Judgment of the Court of 29 April 2004 in case C-91/01 Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:244, paragraph 50; judgment of the Court of 14 October 2004 in case T-137/02, Pollmeier Malchow, ECLI:EU:T:2004:304, paragraph 61.

).

(236) Further, Czechia submits that while the contents of a legal rule may be clarified by interpretation, the interpretation may not misconstrue law whose meaning is clear and intelligible. Such a course of action would risk producing an unacceptable lack of certainty in legal transactions (recital 106).

(237) In this regard, the Commission recalls that according to the case law of the Union Courts, any legal text should be interpreted in accordance with its wording (literal interpretation) but also with due consideration to the intention of the legislator when adopting the text. The Commission has explained

Recommendation 2003/361/EC, recital 12.

that the objective of the SME definition is to ensure that support measures are granted only to those enterprises that genuinely need them. Since the SME definition applies across the policies, programmes and measures that the Commission develops and operates for SMEs, it is important to identify which enterprises truly are SMEs because they require assistance that other enterprises do not. Compared with other enterprises, SMEs are confronted with a unique set of issues, as already explained in recital 222 and that justify specific treatment.

(238) In light of the reasoning given in recitals 221 to 237, the Commission reiterates that Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER does not apply generally and automatically. Instead, it must be first specified which company is relevant for the calculation of the data under Article 2(1) of that Annex and which accounting periods are relevant.

(239) Thus, where an enterprise changed its structure or ownership on a lasting basis following a merger or acquisition and operates under the control (within the meaning of Article 3(3) of Annex I to the ABER) of a large enterprise

See also recital 61 of the opening decision.

at the moment of the granting, such an enterprise must itself be considered as a large enterprise

See also recital 61 of the opening decision.

.

(240) It follows that such enterprise could not benefit from the SME status and that it would not be, therefore, eligible for aid under the block-exempted scheme.

7.3.2.

Individual aid

(241) In the opening decision, the Commission preliminarily considered that the scheme had been implemented already prior to its notification.

(242) During the formal investigation procedure, the Czech authorities explained that no call for submitting applications for aid was open and, therefore, no aid was granted under that scheme.

(243) The Commission agrees with the Czech authorities that the aid referred to in recital 3 cannot be regarded as having been granted under the scheme, since that latter scheme was notified in draft form and was thus not approved by the Commission and in force when the aid was granted.

(244) For the reasons mentioned above at recitals 217 to 240, such aid cannot be regarded as having been awarded on the basis of the block-exempted scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA) either, since it was granted to large enterprises, whereas the scope of the block-exempted scheme was limited to SMEs.

(245) Accordingly, the individual aid referred to in recital 3 was not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and therefore constitutes individual aid within the meaning of Article 1(e) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589

Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj).

.

(246) The formal investigation also revealed that, out of the companies listed in recital 97 above, ZEV Šaratice, a.s. (ZEV Šaratice) was granted the individual aid

ZEV Šaratice, a.s. was granted the individual aid referred to in recital 3 for an amount of CZK 234722 (approximately EUR 9351; exchange rate on 17 January 2018: 1 EUR = 25,371).

, on 17 January 2018. At the date of the aid granted, ZEV Šaratice had to be considered as a large enterprise, as explained below.

(247) It stems from information submitted by the Czech authorities that on 10 February 2017, LUKROM, spol. s.r.o. (LUKROM) became the majority shareholder of ZEV Šaratice, owning 62,52 % of its shares. This share further increased by the end of 2017 through gradual share purchases to 70,2 %. According to the Czech authorities, due to the majority ownership of shares, as from 10 February 2017 the companies ZEV Šaratice and LUKROM became linked enterprises within the meaning of Article 3(3)(a) of Annex I to the ABER.

(248) In their submission, the Czech authorities referred to the judgment of the General Court in case T-745/17 (recital 110). In their view, in that judgment the General Court concluded that Article 4(2) of Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 (GBER) applies even in case of mergers and acquisitions (recital 110).

(249) However, the situation in that case was different from that of ZEV Šaratice in the present case: in case T-745/17, the aid beneficiary became an SME due to the transfer of shares to another company. In the present case, the situation is reversed: the majority of shares of ZEV Šaratice were acquired by a large enterprise, LUKROM.

(250) Indeed, the accounts of LUKROM for 2017 were closed on 31 December 2017. The annual balance sheet total amounted to CZK 2742344000 (approximately EUR 107 million

Exchange rate in December 2017: 1 EUR = 25,647 CZK.

). For the same period, LUKROM’s balance sheet indicated the average number of employees 301, plus 372 employees in other companies included in the balance sheet of this company. These data show that LUKROM was a large enterprise in 2017.

(251) The accounts of LUKROM for 2016 were closed on 31 December 2016. The annual balance sheet total amounted to CZK 2346940 (approximately EUR 86,8 million

Exchange rate in December 2016: 1 EUR = 27,03 CZK.

). For the same period, LUKROM balance sheet indicated the average number of employees 299, plus 375 employees in other companies included in the balance sheet of this company. These data show that LUKROM was a large enterprise also in 2016.

(252) Therefore, the Commission considers that the judgment relied upon by the Czech authorities is not relevant for the purposes of applying Annex I to the GBER in the present case (see also recital 229).

(253) However, as a subsidiary legal analysis, the Commission will apply the same principles as those expressed by the General Court in that judgment.

(254) As set out in paragraph 94 of that judgment, both the national authorities and the Commission must determine precisely the relevant approved accounting period and year for the purposes of the joint calculation of the respective data within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Annex I to the GBER, read in conjunction with Article 3(3) and Article 4(2) of that Annex, and specify which company or companies must be taken into consideration to that end.

(255) In paragraph 93 of that judgment, the General Court further held that it is necessary to also take account of the data of a company, under the control of which the aid beneficiary carried out a substantial part of its economic activities during the considered accounting period.

(256) In application of that judgment to the situation at hand, the Commission assesses the data of ZEV Šaratice and LUKROM jointly. Such a joint calculation takes into account the spirit of Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER, as the General Court stressed in paragraph 94 of the judgment in case T-745/17. Otherwise, the definition of SME would be circumvented based on purely formal means. Indeed, if the analysis of the notion of SMEs were to be done two years before the structural corporate change on each of the parties of the transaction separately, the conclusion would always be an extension of the notion of SMEs which, would go against the need to interpret Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER strictly (recital 230) and in line with its spirit.

(257) As regards the relevant approved accounting period, the two accounting periods preceding the aid granting date were for years 2017 and 2016.

(258) The accounts of ZEV Šaratice for year 2017 were closed on 31 December 2017. The annual balance sheet total amounted to CZK 120286000 (approximately EUR 4,69 million

Exchange rate in December 2017: 1 EUR = 25,647 CZK.

). For the same period, ZEV Šaratice, a.s’ annual report indicated 8 employees.

(259) The accounts of ZEV Šaratice for year 2016 were closed on 31 December 2016. The annual balance sheet total amounted to CZK 120286000 (approximately EUR 4,39 million

Exchange rate in December 2016: 1 EUR = 27,03 CZK.

). For the same period, ZEV Šaratice, a.s’ annual report indicated 9 employees.

(260) As mentioned above at recitals 250 and 251, the accounts of ZEV Šaratice’s linked enterprise (LUKROM) for the two accounting periods preceding the aid granting date reveal that that linked enterprise alone constitutes a large enterprise within the meaning of Annex I to the GBER.

(261) Therefore, in line with Article 2(1) of Annex I to the ABER, at the date of aid grant, i.e. 17 January 2018, ZEV Šaratice was linked to – and thus part of – a large enterprise within the meaning of Annex I to the ABER. Accordingly, ZEV Šaratice was not eligible for aid under the scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA), as such aid was only available to SMEs.

(262) As regards the other companies listed at recital 97 above, the Czech authorities have not explained why these companies were checked, since, according to information provided by the Czech authorities, they were not granted aid for the insurance premium as from 1 January 2018.

7.3.3.

Unlawfulness of individual aid

(263) As the individual aid was granted to large companies, it does not fall under any of the categories of the ABER.

(264) Since that individual aid was neither granted on the basis of any approved scheme, nor could be exempted under the ABER, the Commission therefore confirms its preliminary doubts and finds that the individual aid already granted to large enterprises is unlawful

Recitals 42 and 50 of the opening decision.

.

7.4.

Compatibility of the individual aid with the internal market

7.4.1.

Applicable guidelines

(265) Pursuant to point (656) of the 2023 Guidelines, unlawful aid will be assessed in accordance with the rules in force on the date of granting the aid. Therefore, in this decision the Commission assesses the aid granted before its approval by the Commission on the basis of Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU and, for all the individual aid granted before 1 January 2023 (recital 3), the 2014 Guidelines.

7.4.2.

Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU and applicable guidelines

(266) Under Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU, an aid may be considered compatible with the internal market, if it is found to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

(267) Therefore, in order to be found compatible under Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU, aid must (i) facilitate the development of a certain economic activity or of certain areas (positive condition) and (ii) must not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest (negative condition). These two conditions are cumulative.

(268) The Commission assesses whether these two conditions are fulfilled in the light of the applicable guidelines, which are the 2014 Guidelines. Specifically, in this case, Chapter 3 of Part I (Compatibility assessment pursuant to Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU) as interpreted by the judgment of the Court in case C-594/18 P

Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 September 2020 in case C-594/18 P, Austria v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2020:742.

and Section 1.2.1.6 of Part II (Aid for the payment of insurance premiums) apply.

7.4.3.

As to whether the aid facilitates the development of an economic activity

7.4.3.1.

Identification of the economic activity

(269) The Commission notes that the individual aid was designed to support farmers through risk and crisis events by incentivising them to take out insurance. Insurance is an important tool for the risk and crisis management in farming sector, which is exposed to the frequent occurrence of such events. In this way, the aid supports the primary agricultural production (recital 9).

(270) Pursuant to point (44) of the 2014 Guidelines, aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas should relate closely to the CAP, should be consistent with the rural development objectives referred to in point (10) of those Guidelines and should be compatible with the rules on the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products.

(271) Pursuant to point (46) of the 2014 Guidelines, the Commission considers that measures, implemented pursuant to and in conformity with Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 487, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1305/oj).

and its implementing and delegated acts or as an additional national financing in the framework of a rural development programme, are per se consistent with and contribute to the objectives of rural development.

(272) The present aid was not co-financed under measure the RDP of Czechia, but it was designed in line with the rural development objectives (recital 63).

(273) The Commission therefore considers that aid facilitated an economic activity, in that it contributed to the competitiveness and resilience of the agricultural primary production.

7.4.3.2.

Lack of an incentive effect

(274) Pursuant to point (66) of the 2014 Guidelines, the aid has an incentive effect if it changes the behaviour of undertakings in such a way that they engage in additional activity contributing to the development of the sector, in which they would have normally not engaged in without aid or would have engaged in a different or restricted manner. The aid must not subsidise the costs of an activity that an undertaking would have incurred in any event and must not compensate for the normal business risk of an economic activity.

(275) Pursuant to point (67) of the 2014 Guidelines, unilateral State aid measures which are simply intended to improve the financial situation of undertakings but which in no way contribute to the development of the sector, and in particular aid which is granted solely on the basis of price, quantity, unit of production or unit of the means of production are considered to constitute operating aid which is incompatible with the internal market. Furthermore, by its very nature, such aid is also likely to interfere with the mechanisms regulating the organisation of the internal market.

(276) The aid was granted for the costs of insurance premium (recital 21). Thus, it did not subsidise the costs of an activity that an undertaking would have incurred in any event and will not compensate for the normal business risk of an economic activity and it was not intended to simply improve the financial situation of undertakings.

(277) Pursuant to point (70) of the 2014 Guidelines, the aid does not present an incentive effect for the beneficiary wherever work on the relevant project or activity has already started prior to the aid application by the beneficiary to the national authorities. Pursuant to point 35(25) of the 2014 Guidelines, start of works on the project or activity means the earlier of, either the start of the activities, or the construction works relating to the investment, or the first legally binding commitment to order equipment or employ services or any other commitment that makes the project or activity irreversible.

(278) Pursuant to point (71) of the 2014 Guidelines, the aid application must include at least the applicant’s name and the size of the undertaking, a description of the project or activity, including its location and start and end dates, the amount of aid needed to carry it out and the eligible costs.

(279) In addition, pursuant to point (72) of the Guidelines, large enterprises must describe in the application the situation without the aid, which situation is referred to as the counterfactual scenario or alternative project or activity and submit documentary evidence in support of the counterfactual described in the application. Pursuant to point (73) of the Guidelines, when receiving an application, the granting authority must carry out a credibility check of the counterfactual scenario and confirm that the aid has the required incentive effect. A counterfactual scenario is credible if it is genuine and relates to the decision-making factors prevalent at the time of the decision by the beneficiary regarding the project or activity concerned.

(280) As it stems from recital 67 of the opening decision, as regards the individual aid, the Commission initiated the procedure pursuant to Article 108 (2) TFEU on the ground that aid was granted unlawfully to large enterprises, because of doubts related to (i) the submission of the counterfactual scenario and to (ii) the moment of the application submission (see also recital 8).

(281) Submission of the counterfactual scenario

(282) In their comments on the opening decision, the Czech authorities contested the Commission’s interpretation of Article 4(2) of Annex I to the ABER and claimed that no aid was granted to beneficiaries which would not qualify as SMEs in compliance with the definition laid down in Annex I to the ABER

This comment of Czechia does not concern large beneficiaries from which aid was already recovered, as explained in recital 102 of this Decision.

(recitals 99 to 110).

(283) However, the Czech authorities confirmed that the none of the beneficiaries which had received aid on the basis of the scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA) had submitted a counterfactual scenario (recital 98).

(284) The Czech authorities do not dispute that the scheme SA.49594 (2017/XA) did not lay down the requirement of submitting, ex ante, the counterfactual scenario. Nor did these authorities request that the Commission departs from this requirement set out in the 2014 Guidelines

Recital 47 of the opening decision.

.

(285) Accordingly, the Commission considers that the first ground of the formal investigation has been confirmed, in that the large enterprises that were granted unlawful individual aid had not submitted an ex ante counterfactual scenario proving that the aid presented an incentive effect.

7.4.3.3.

Conclusion on the first (positive) condition set out in Article 107(3), point (c) TFEU

(286) In the absence of a duly established incentive effect, the individual aid at issue cannot be considered to facilitate the development of a certain economic activity or of a certain area.

7.4.4.

Conclusion with regard to the compatibility of the individual aid with the internal market

(287) The individual aid already granted to large enterprises for the payment of insurance premiums covering damage caused by natural disasters, adverse climatic events and plant pests or animal disease respectively to crops and livestock (recital 3) cannot be considered to facilitate the development of a certain economic activity or of a certain area.

(288) Therefore, such individual aid cannot be considered as compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU (as interpreted in the light of the 2014 Guidelines), without it being necessary to examine the second, negative, condition set out in this provision.

1. RECOVERY

(289) According to Article 108(2) TFEU and the established case law of the Union Courts, the Commission is competent to decide that the Member State concerned shall alter or abolish aid when it has found that it is incompatible with the internal market

Judgment of 12 July 1973, Commission v Germany, C-70/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:87, paragraph 13.

. The Union Courts have also consistently held that the obligation on a Member State to abolish aid regarded by the Commission as being incompatible with the internal market is designed to re-establish the previously existing situation

Judgment of 21 March 1990, Belgium v Commission, C-142/87, ECLI:EU:C:1990:125, paragraph 66.

.

(290) In this context, the Union Courts have established that this objective is attained once a recipient has repaid the amounts granted by way of unlawful aid, thus forfeiting the advantage, which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the internal market, and the situation prior to the payment of the aid is restored

Judgment of 17 June 1999, Belgium v Commission, C-75/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:311, paragraphs 64 and 65.

.

(291) In line with the case law, Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 states that 'where negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary (recovery decision). The Commission shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Union law’.

(292) Thus, Czechia is obliged to recover the unlawful and incompatible individual aid (recital 261) from ZEV Šaratice, a.s. and all the other beneficiaries which were large enterprises at the moment such individual aid was granted, unless it fulfilled all conditions of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector (OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1408/oj).

or the application of a general principle of EU law as claimed during the formal investigation. Recovery shall cover the time from the date when the aid was put at the disposal of the beneficiary until effective recovery. The amount to be recovered shall bear interest until effective recovery.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The scheme is compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3), point (c), TFEU.

Article 2

The individual aid already granted to large enterprises for the payment of insurance premiums covering damage caused by natural disasters, adverse climatic events and plant pests or animal disease respectively to crops and livestock was granted in breach of Article 108(3), TFEU and is incompatible with the internal market.

Article 3

1. Czechia shall recover the incompatible aid referred to in Article 2.

1. The sums to be recovered shall bear interest from the date on which they were put at the disposal of the large enterprise beneficiaries until their actual recovery.

1. The interest shall be calculated on a compound basis in accordance with Chapter V of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004

Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/794/oj).

as amended by the Commission Regulation (EC) No 271/2008

Commission Regulation (EC) No 271/2008 of 30 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 82, 25.3.2008, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/271/oj).

.

Article 4

1. In accordance with Article 16 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589, recovery of the aid referred to in Article 2 of that Regulation shall be immediate and effective