Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1050 of 30 May 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of rebars originating in the Republic of Belarus following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Article 14(6) database and questionnaire replies.

201820192020Review Investigation periodVolume of imports from Belarus (tonnes)[72000 – 80000][80000 – 90000][125000 – 140000][200000 – 210000]Index (2018 = 100)100107172268Market share (%)0,6 – 0,80,7 – 0,91 – 1,51,8 – 2,1Index (2018 = 100)100102170248

(60) Imports of the product under review from Belarus more than doubled over the period considered, from 72000 – 80000 tonnes in 2018 to 200000 – 210000 tonnes in the RIP. The market share of the imports from Belarus showed a similar development as the volume of imports and increased significantly every year, from 0,6 % – 0,8 % in 2018 to 1,8 % – 2,1 % in the RIP.

5.3.2.

Average import prices from Belarus

(61) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Article 14(6) database.

(62) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from Belarus developed as follows:

Table 3

Import prices

Source:

Article 14(6) database.

201820192020Review Investigation periodBelarus (EUR/tonne)420 – 440400 – 420345 – 365540 – 570Index (2018 = 100)1009382128

(63) The average prices of imports decreased from 420 – 440 EUR/tonne in 2018 to 345 – 365 EUR/tonne in 2020, but subsequently increased to 550 – 570 EUR/tonne in the RIP. Overall, the increase between 2018 and the RIP was 28 %, representing a price increase of 120 – 130 EUR per tonne. This overall price increase was in line with the general rebar price trend in the Union market.

(64) However, the average import price from Belarus, at CIF level, during the entire period considered was lower than Union producers’ unit cost as described below in Section 5.5.3.1 below.

5.3.3.

Price undercutting

(65) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the RIP by comparing the weighted average import price on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, adjusted for post-importation costs

Post importation cost were established at a level of 2 % in the original investigation.

(including the anti-dumping duty) with the weighted average sales price, adjusted at an ex-works level, of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers in the Union.

(66) The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ turnover during the RIP and showed that the Belarus import prices undercut the prices of the Union industry by 2,5 % – 3 %. Excluding the anti-dumping duty, the Commission established an undercutting at a level of 11,8 % – 12 %.

5.4.

Imports from third countries other than Belarus

(67) The imports of rebars from third countries other than Belarus were mainly from Norway, Russia and Türkiye.

(68) The aggregated volume of imports into the Union as well as the market share and price trends for imports of rebars from other third countries developed as follows:

Table 4

Import volume and market share from other third countries

Source:

Article 14(6) database and questionnaire replies.

Country201820192020Review Investigation periodNorwayVolume (tonnes)9168591068150285148780Index (2018 = 100)10099164162Market share (%)0,90,81,41,3Average price (EUR/tonne)538492448705Index (2018 = 100)1009283131TürkiyeVolume (tonnes)2128541427553873563558Index (2018 = 100)100671830Market share (%)2,11,30,40,6Average price (EUR/tonne)481458381488Index (2018 = 100)1009579102RussiaVolume (tonnes)2544381255222526937237Index (2018 = 100)100491015Market share (%)2,51,20,20,3

Average price (EUR/tonne)503464414625Index (2018 = 100)1009282124Other third countriesVolume (tonnes)19009212987044444206013Index (2018 = 100)1006823108Market share (%)1,81,20,41,9Average price (EUR/tonne)812476441691Index (2018 = 100)100595485Total of all third countries excluding BelarusVolume (tonnes)749069489216258732455588Index (2018 = 100)100653561Market share (%)7,34,52,54,1Average price (EUR/tonne)579471434662Index (2018 = 100)1008175114

(69) During the RIP, the market share of imports from third countries other than Belarus represented 4,1 % of the Union consumption. The import volume decreased substantially in 2020 and increased during the RIP, but did not reach the level of 2019, resulting in an overall decrease in their market share of 3,2 percentage points in the period considered. The average import price increased by 14 % during the period considered. During the RIP, the average import price from third countries other than Belarus was higher compared to the Union industry’s average price (+ 2 %) and higher compared to the average import price from Belarus (+ 17 % – 20 %).

5.5.

Economic situation of the Union industry

5.5.1.

General remarks

(70) The assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(71) As mentioned in recital (14), sampling was used for the assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(72) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of the macroeconomic data provided by the Union producers’ association and data relating to all Union producers contained in the verified questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(73) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(74) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

5.5.2.

Macroeconomic indicators

5.5.2.1.

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(75) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Source:

Verified data provided by the Union producers’ association.

201820192020Review Investigation periodProduction volume (tonnes)11029000118140001120400011201000Index (2018 = 100)100107102102Production capacity (tonnes)16468495174726901757683817350801Index (2018 = 100)100106107105Capacity utilisation (%)67686465Index (2018 = 100)1001019596

(76) Overall, the production volume of the Union industry increased by 2 % during the period considered. The production volume increased by 7 % between 2018 and 2019. During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the production decreased by 5 % in comparison to 2019 and remained the same in the RIP.

(77) The production capacity of the Union industry increased by 5 % during the period considered. The capacity utilisation decreased from 67 % in 2018 to 65 % in the RIP.

5.5.2.2.

Sales volume and market share

(78) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Sales volume and market share

Source:

Article14(6) database and verified data provided by the Union producers’ association.

201820192020Review Investigation periodTotal Sales volume on the Union market (tonnes)9517192102938171005465810507529Index (2018 = 100)100108106110

Market share (%)92959694Index (2018 = 100)100103105102

(79) The sales volume of the Union industry on the Union market increased by 10 % during the period considered. It increased by 8 % between 2018 and 2019 and then slightly dropped by 2 % in 2020, to further increase by 4 % during the RIP.

(80) The market share of the Union industry slightly increased by 2 % during the period considered. It increased by 5 % between 2018 and 2020, but decreased during the RIP.

5.5.2.3.

Growth

(81) The growth in consumption in the Union was 8 % during the period considered. The Union industry benefited from this increase in consumption and even slightly increased its market share by 2 % during the period considered.

5.5.2.4.

Employment and productivity

(82) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Employment and productivity

Source:

Verified data provided by the Union producers’ association.

201820192020Review Investigation periodNumber of employees5507615959995557Index (2018 = 100)100112109101Productivity (tonne/employee)2002191818672015Index (2018 = 100)1009693101

(83) The number of employees fluctuated during the period considered. It increased from 2018 to 2019 by 12 % and then gradually decreased in 2020 and the RIP to a level slightly above the 2018 level. Productivity decreased from 2018 to 2020 by 7 % and increased by 8 % from 2020 to the RIP. During the period considered, productivity increased by 1 %.

5.5.2.5.

Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

(84) The dumping margin established during the review investigation period was significantly above the de minimis level, while the level of imports from Belarus during the review investigation period was 1,9 % of Union consumption.

5.5.3.

Microeconomic indicators

5.5.3.1.

Prices and factors affecting prices

(85) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

Source:

Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

201820192020Review Investigation periodAverage unit sales price in the Union (EUR/tonne)508469424651Index (2018 = 100)1009283128Unit cost of production477438410578Index (2018 = 100)1009286121

(86) The Union industry’s average unit sales price to unrelated customers decreased by 17 % between 2018 and 2020, reflecting the decrease of the unit cost of production. In the RIP, the price increased by 45 % in relation to 2020. The price increase was driven by an increase in the unit cost of production and an increase in demand following the recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic.

(87) Current anti-dumping duties allowed the Union industry to remain competitive with the current level of prices, since, as explained in recital (64), during the entire period considered Union producers’ unit costs were higher than the average import price from Belarus.

5.5.3.2.

Labour costs

(88) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Average labour costs per employee

Source:

Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

201820192020Review Investigation periodAverage labour costs per employee (EUR)41477414344013742622Index (2018 = 100)10010097103

(89) The average labour cost per employee of the Union industry increased by 3 % during the period considered, with a temporary decrease by 3 % in 2020, mainly because of production shutdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

5.5.3.3.

Inventories

(90) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Inventories

Source:

Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

201820192020Review Investigation periodClosing stocks (tonnes)186048181490170626193376Index (2018 = 100)1009892104Closing stocks as a percentage of production10,29,69,69,7Index (2018 = 100)100949395

(91) Inventories increased by 4 % during the period considered.

5.5.3.4.

Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(92) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Source:

Verified questionnaire replies of the sampled Union producers.

201820192020Review Investigation periodProfitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)8,45,04,915,3Index (2018 = 100)1006058183Cash flow (EUR)778709056347606741354068109174968Index (2018 = 100)1008253140Investments (EUR)21227319156472961787008118838367Index (2018 = 100)100748489Return on investments (%)1026951215Index (2018 = 100)1006850211

(93) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The profitability of the Union industry decreased between 2018 and 2020 from 8,4 % to 4,9 %, followed by a sharp increase between 2020 and the RIP to reach 15,3 %. During the RIP the increase in demand, explained by the post COVID-19 economic recovery, allowed the industry to increase its prices at higher rate than the increase of cost of production, which resulted in an increased profitability. The anti-dumping duties in place allowed the Union industry to return to a healthy business situation. Throughout the period considered the profitability of the sampled Union producers was higher than the target profit established during the original investigation (4,8 %).

(94) The investigation showed that the RIP was characterised by exceptional circumstances, linked to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by a fast economic recovery. In particular in 2020, the Union rebar market saw a great perturbation due to COVID, with exceptional volatilities. During the first half of 2020 production was temporarily stopped given the lack of orders. At a later stage, in the second half of 2020 and in the RIP, the profitability of Union rebar producers improved, as demand continued to recover faster than expected. In this regard, the improvement in Union producers’ profitability during the RIP was likely of a temporary nature, as it was mainly due to an exceptionally fast and strong increase of demand which led to higher price levels.

(95) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The trend in net cash flow increased by 40 % fuelled by the profitability but at a lower rate, reflecting again the positive effect of the anti-dumping duties and exceptional circumstances in the RIP described in recital (94).

(96) The level of investment decreased by 11 % over the period considered.

(97) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It decreased between 2018 and 2020 from 102 % to 51 % and increased sharply between 2020 and the RIP. Overall, the return on investments more than doubled during the period considered.

5.6.

Conclusion on injury

(98) Most injury indicators, such as Union sales volume, market share, employment, profitability and cash flow developed positively during the period considered. Though the trend of the indicators such as closing stocks and investments was negative during this period, their absolute levels are satisfactory and did thus not indicate a sign of material injury.

(99) On basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry has recovered from previous injury and did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation during the RIP.

1. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY

(100) The Commission concluded in recital (99) that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the RIP. Therefore, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury caused by the dumped imports from Belarus if the measures were allowed to lapse.

(101) In order to establish whether there is a likelihood of recurrence of injury originally caused by the dumped imports from the country concerned, the Commission examined: (i) the production capacity and spare capacity in Belarus; and (ii) likely price levels of imports from Belarus and their impact on the Union industry’s situation, should the measures be allowed to lapse.

6.1.

Production capacity and spare capacity in Belarus

(102) As indicated in recital (49) above, the spare capacity in Belarus was estimated to be more than 900000 tonnes, which represented more than 8 % of the Union consumption during the RIP. This spare capacity could be used to supply the Union market if the current measures would be allowed to lapse.

6.2.

Attractiveness of the Union market, likely price levels of imports from Belarus and their impact on the Union industry’s situation should the measures lapse

(103) As established in recitals (44) to (46), in terms of size, prices and proximity, the Union market remained attractive to Belarusian exporting producers.

(104) The Commission analysed the price level of Belarusian imports into the Union. The weighted average Belarus import prices, in the absence of anti-dumping duties, were significantly lower than the Union industry prices during the entire period considered. During the RIP imports from Belarus

Should 2 % post importation cost be included price difference would be 11,8 % – 12 % as set out in recital (66).

were 13 % to 15 % lower than Union industry prices. Furthermore, as explained in recitals (64) and (87), the price level of Belarusian imports was even lower than the Union production cost. Consequently, it is likely that, should the measures be allowed to lapse, the Union market would become even more attractive for Belarus.

(105) Likewise, in order to assess the impact of future imports on the situation of the Union industry, the Commission also considered that price levels of the Belarusian exports to third markets would be a reasonable indicator of future price levels to the Union market.

(106) As set out in recital (44) above, the Commission analysed the price level of Belarusian exports to third markets and found these export prices were significantly lower when compared with the Union industry prices (15 %). Therefore, the Union market, in terms of prices, remains very attractive for Belarusian producers.

(107) Considering the above, and if confronted with an increase of low priced imports from Belarus, the Union producers, in an attempt to keep sales volumes and market shares, would be forced to reduce their prices. This would have an impact on the industry’s overall profitability which would deteriorate.

(108) On the other hand, if the Union industry would keep its current price levels, this would have an almost immediate negative impact on its sale and production volume as well as its market share. Moreover, a decrease in production volume would results in an increase of the item costs of production due to reduced benefits of economy of scale. This would further deteriorate the Union industry’s profitability. With a loss of profitability, the Union industry would not be able to carry out necessary investments. Ultimately, this would also lead to loss of employment and risk of closure of production lines.

(109) The product under review is affected by the packages of sanctions against Russia and Belarus, however, as mentioned in recital (47), the current situation cannot be considered of a lasting nature. The Commission found that they cannot have a bearing in its conclusions in this investigation.

6.3.

Conclusion on likelihood of recurrence of injury

(110) On this basis, it was concluded that the absence of measures would in all likelihood result in a significant increase of dumped imports from Belarus at injurious prices and material injury would be likely to recur.

1. UNION INTEREST

(111) In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether maintaining the existing anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the Union as whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers and users.

7.1.

Interest of the Union industry

(112) As stated in recital (99), Union industry has recovered from the injury caused by past dumping. If existing measures were allowed to lapse, the Union industry would likely be faced with increased unfair competition from Belarus producers most likely putting a halt to the on-going recovery of the Union industry.

(113) The Commission therefore concluded that the continuation of the measures would be in the interest of the Union industry

7.2.

Interest of unrelated importers and traders.

(114) As mentioned in recital (15), no importers came forward following the publication of the Notice of initiation and during the investigation. Although it could not be ruled out that the imposition of the measures had a negative impact on their activity, importers were not dependent on Belarus and could source the product under review from other countries, such as Norway and Türkiye. Therefore, the Commission concluded that from the importers’ perspective, there were no compelling reasons not to extend the existing measures.

7.3.

Interest of users

(115) No user came forward following the publication of the Notice of initiation and during the investigation. Therefore, there were no indications that the conclusion reached in the original investigation

Overall, there were no compelling reasons against the imposition of measures on imports of the product concerned from Belarus

were no longer valid and that the maintenance of the measures would have a negative impact on the users outweighing the positive impact of the measures.

7.4.

Conclusion on Union interest

(116) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons of the Union interest against the maintenance of the existing measures on imports of rebars originating in Belarus.

1. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(117) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation or recurrence of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on rebars from Belarus should be maintained.

(118) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(119) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain concrete reinforcement bars and rods, made of iron or non-alloy steel, not further worked than forged, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, whether or not twisted after rolling, containing indentations, ribs, grooves or other deformations produced during the rolling process, currently falling under CN codes ex72141000, ex72142000, ex72143000, ex72149110, ex72149190, ex72149910 and ex72149995 (TARIC codes 7214100010, 7214200020, 7214300010, 7214911010, 7214919010, 7214991010, 7214999510) and originating in Belarus. High fatigue performance iron or steel concrete reinforcing bars and rods are excluded. Other long products, such as round bars, are excluded.

1. The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 10,6 %.

1. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 30 May 2023.

For the Commission

The President

Ursula von der Leyen