Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/265 of 9 February 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye

3.2.2.

Normal value

(216) The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for each sampled cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represent at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales by each sampled exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative.

(217) The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producers with representative domestic sales. The Commission found that sampled exporting producers sold tiles of prime and subprime quality on the domestic market whereas they sold basically solely prime quality for export to the Union. During the production process, after several quality controls, the exporting producers deem ceramic tiles that are of less the perfect quality as subprime quality. These sub-standard tiles were sold at reduced prices. Thus, in order to make a fair comparison with the price to the Union, the Commission considered only domestic sales of prime quality for the calculation of the normal value. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion of sub-standard tiles in its calculations on the grounds that volumes were significant and that it was possible to make adjustments for the differences between subprime versus prime quality products. The Commission dismissed the Hitit Group’s request, absent of any concrete proposal about how such an adjustment could have been made. Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group asked for the inclusion in its dumping calculation of one specific subcategory of products which had been considered by the Commission of subprime quality and was therefore, in line with the above considerations, excluded from the normal value calculation. The request was based on the grounds that the sales volumes of this category of products were significant and that these products concerned prime products. After due analysis of the data provided by the company, the Commission concluded that this subcategory of products qualified as prime products and it therefore accepted the Hitit Group’s request.

(218) The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by each sampled exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of most product types were representative. For each of the three exporters, for some product types that were exported to the Union during the investigation period there were either no domestic sales at all, or the domestic sales of that product type were below 5 % in volume and thus not representative.

(219) The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.

(220) The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if:

(a) the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and

(b) the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production.

(221) In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the investigation period.

(222) The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the investigation period, if:

(a) the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80 % or less of the total sales volume of this type: or

(b) the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production.

(223) The analysis of domestic sales showed that over 60% of all domestic sales of the Vitra Group and over 70 % of all domestic sales of the Hitit Group and the Bien & Qua Group were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was higher than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales during the investigation period or a weighted average of the profitable sales only.

(224) Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested the exclusion from the company’s domestic sales listing of certain sales labelled by the party as export-registered sales in view of their high volume. In view of elements on the file supporting the claim, the Commission accepted to include these sales volumes in the normal value calculations insofar as it could not be established that these sales were eventually exported.

(225) Where a product type was not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation. Where there were no or insufficient sales of a product type of the like product in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market, normal value was either constructed (because the domestic sales price of other sampled producers for that product type could not be disclosed in a meaningful manner without breaching the confidentiality of those producers) or the price of another exporter in the ordinary course of trade was used, and an appropriate non-confidential summary of that information was provided to the interested party concerned.

(226) Normal value was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of each cooperating sampled exporting producer during the investigation period:

(a) the weighted average SG&A expenses incurred by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period; and

(b) the weighted average profit realised by the cooperating sampled exporting producer on domestic sales of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, during the investigation period.

(227) For the product types not sold in representative quantities on the domestic market, the average SG&A expenses and profit of transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market for those types were added. For the product types not sold at all on the domestic market, the weighted average SG&A expenses and profit of all transactions made in the ordinary course of trade on the domestic market were added.

(228) Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group stated that in the calculations certain PCNs had unusually high SG&A and the profit as compared to the company ratios. Considering the additional explanations provided by the party, including mistakes in its reporting, on an exceptional basis and in light of the specific situation of the case, for two PCNs the Commission constructed the normal value on company basis. Following the additional partial disclosure, the Hitit Group asked to disregard the production costs of some tiles, deemed to be unrepresentative. The Commission dismissed the claim, which was based in a new unverified dataset that could not be reconciled with verified data. The Commission disclosed its reasoning in more detail via an individual disclosure only to the party concerned for confidentiality reasons.

(229) Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group contested the inclusion of certain sales transactions in their normal value calculations as they would concern products manufactured outside Türkiye. After having duly assessed the supporting evidence, the Commission accepted the claim and it revised the calculations accordingly.

3.2.3.

Export price

(230) The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or through related importers.

(231) When the product concerned was exported directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation.

(232) When the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG&A expenses, and for profits accruing, based on the profit established in this investigation for unrelated importers (see recitals (429) and (430)).

(233) Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity. The party stated that related companies acted as part of the producers’ exporting network, that all entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place basically only at the premises of the producers. It alleged that the fact that related companies had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with other products did not have any impact of the status of the single economic entity of the group. The Bien & Qua Group claimed as well that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(9) for a related trader located outside the Union with no importing functions.

(234) It is noted that, even if the group would have been a single economic entity (quod non, as concluded in the next section), Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation calls for the Commission to establish the export price on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union. Given how the group organised sales into the Union, it would be unfair to treat in the same way sales that exporting producers channelled to the Union via related importers and direct sales to the Union. The Commission thus concluded that, when the product concerned was exported to the Union through a related importer, it was justified to perform adjustments for SG&A expenses and for profits accruing of the importer as established by Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. As to the adjustments for a related trader outside the Union, the Commission clarified that, contrary to what the Commission had stated in the specific disclosure to the group, the legal basis for the adjustment was Article 2(10)(i), which is in line with the Commission’s practice in other investigations, justified even if the trader would have had no importing functions.

(235) Two of the sampled groups sold negligible volumes of tiles of subprime quality (see recital (217) to the Union. These sales were excluded from the volumes used to establish the export price. This approach was maintained after final disclosure, as noted in recital (217) in fine.

3.2.4.

Comparison

(236) The Commission compared the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers on an ex-works basis.

(237) Where justified by the need to ensure a fair comparison, the Commission adjusted the normal value and/or the export price for differences affecting prices and price comparability, in accordance with Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation. Adjustments were made for transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, customs clearance and assimilated costs, commissions, discounts and rebates.

(238) Following final disclosure, the Hitit Group contested that fact that the Commission had rejected a credit cost adjustment. The Commission dismissed the claim. The Commission rejected the adjustment because the party failed to prove, as requested in Article 2(10) the basic Regulation, that the cost of any credit granted was indeed a factor taken into account in the determination of the prices charged.

(239) During the investigation period, the Hitit Group often exported ceramic tiles to the Union through related traders located in Türkiye. The Commission found that the functions of these related traders were similar to those of an agent as they received a mark-up for their services.

(240) The Bien & Qua Group’s related traders in Türkiye involved in sales to the Union received a mark-up for their services and had functions similar to those of an agent remunerated on a commission basis.

(241) The Commission disclosed further details of these findings via an individual disclosure only to the group concerned for confidentiality reasons.

(242) In light of the above, for all the (groups of) sampled exporting producers, for sales to the Union involving related parties in Türkiye, the export price was adjusted pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The Commission deducted from the export price the SG&A costs of the related party(ies) and the profit described in recital (232) in fine.

(243) Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because the different entities in the group formed a single economic entity.

(244) In the Commission’s view, several factors contradict the claim for a single economic entity for this group. The fact that the Bien & Qua Group entities were economically controlled and managed by the same persons and that verification visits took place mostly at the premises of the producers did not necessarily make the group a single economic entity. The Commission noted that the producers and related traders were based in different locations (with registered offices in places different from those of the related manufacturers) and that the related traders often had unrelated suppliers and/or dealt with products other than the product under investigation. In addition, there were sales departments in different entities, including the manufacturing entities, with different roles. Those related

traders thus could not be said to be operating as the internal sales department of the related producers. These elements, and also taking into account the absence of sufficiently substantiated information allowing for a clear understanding of the arrangements amongst related entities in the Bien & Qua Group (see section 3.2.1.), prevented the Commission from accepting the Bien & Qua Group’s overall claim for a single economic entity.

(245) Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that no deduction of SG&A and profit was warranted under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation because of the Commission’s approach in a recent investigation

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1395 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain corrosion resistant steels originating in Russia and Türkiye (OJ L 211, 12.8.2022, p. 127), recital (126).

, according to which an adjustment under Article 2(10)(i) would be inconsistent with Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation.

(246) The Commission disagreed. First, the Commission noted that, indeed, Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, which determines the normal value, and Articles 2(8) and 2(9) of the basic Regulation, which determine the export price, are worded differently. The fact that export prices are established in a different manner than domestic prices does not in itself give rise to an unfair comparison. Moreover, the party compared incomparable factual situations. The investigation quoted by the Bien & Qua Group refers to a steel service center that was integrated in the production chain of the manufacturer. In light of its operations, that steel service center could not be considered to be carrying out functions similar to those of an agent acting on a commission basis within the meaning of Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The situation was certainly different in the present investigation, with related traders not being integrated in the production chain of the Bien & Qua Group.

(247) Following final disclosure, the Bien & Qua Group claimed that, should the Commission reject the claim for a single economic entity, any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation was unfounded because it created unjustified differences and an unfair comparison of the normal value and the export price. The party added that its sales channels were the same on the domestic and export markets. This last statement contradicted other statements made by the party in early stages of the proceeding

See namely sections D and E of the open versions of the questionnaire replies submitted by the two manufacturers available in t22.001010.

and was found to be incorrect as in the domestic market, the main strategy of the Bien & Qua Group entities was, on the basis of a common price list, to keep a broad base of local dealers. Those dealers had access to the manufacturers’ ERP system automatically in order to place orders. In contrast, in the export market, the order-sale flow differed and manufacturers expected the group’s foreign trade companies to create added value starting from the common price list. The Commission found therefore that the deductions of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation were justified with respect to the export side of the group’s operations.

(248) Finally, the Commission also underlined that, although repeatedly requested, at no point in time during the investigation had the Bien & Qua Group provided clarity on the contractual arrangements that the producers had with the related entities active in selling their products domestically and on the export markets (see also recitals (209)). This lack of information prevented the Commissions from fully assessing the claim that the situation with regard to domestic and export sales would be exactly the same for those traders involved in both sales flows. In any event, the Bien & Qua Group never submitted any information concerning the level and quantification of the adjustment to the normal value; let alone any underlying evidence justifying a concrete level of adjustment.

(249) On that basis, the claim that any deduction of SG&A and profit under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation resulted in an unfair comparison between the normal value and the export price was rejected.

(250) Sampled exporting producers contested the deduction of the profit described in recital (232) in fine on the grounds that the scope of the activities of the parties related to the sampled exporting producers and importers in the Union were different. The Commission deemed that claim unfounded, as the level of the profit was reasonable and consistent with the target profit declared by one sampled group for a Turkish related trader.

(251) Some currency conversion issues were identified. Article 2(10)(j) of the basic Regulation provides that the date of sale should be the date of invoice, and that the date of contract, purchase order or order confirmation might be used if these more appropriately establish the material terms of sale. Consequently, given that during the investigation period the Turkish Lira’s exchange rate fluctuated (and overall fell significantly) strongly against the Euro

From 1 euro = 7,884 Turkish Lira in July 2020, to 1 euro = 10,382 Turkish Lira in June 2021 (i.e., -32 % overall). Sources: The European Central Bank, DG Budget, Pacific Exchange Rate Service.

, the Commission considered that the material terms of sale were settled at the time of the purchase order rather than at the date of invoice. The gap between the customer purchase order and the date of the invoice varied, but was around two months on average.

(252) Following the final disclosure, several parties complained that the above methodology artificially depressed export prices (increasing thus artificially dumping margins) and asked the Commission to consider that the material terms of sale were settled by the date of the invoice. Given the undeniable exchange rate fluctuation of the Turkish Lira against the Euro during the investigation period, the Commission deemed it unjustified to consider that the Union customer paid a price in euro higher than the one frozen at the time of the customer purchase order. The claim, unsupported, was dismissed. Following the final disclosure, the Hitit Group claimed that, should the Commission stick to its approach, it should then account for domestic inflation when establishing domestic prices. In the absence of any concrete proposal on how to proceed, the Commission dismissed the claim.

3.2.5.

Dumping margins

(253) For the sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation.

(254) Following final disclosure, the Vitra Group put forward calculation errors under the sections above. The Commission corrected those errors. The correction resulting in a definitive dumping margin below de minimis for the Vitra Group.

(255) On this basis, the definitive weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

CompanyDefinitive dumping marginHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.0 %

(256) For the non-sampled cooperating exporting producers, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the weighted average margins of the sampled exporting producers, at 9,2 %.

(257) For all other exporting producers in Türkiye, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, that were established on the basis of import statistics from Eurostat (Comext).

(258) The level of cooperation in this case is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 90 % of the total imports in m2 during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission found it appropriate to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers at the level of the sampled company with the highest dumping margin.

(259) The definitive dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows:

CompanyDefinitive dumping marginHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş. Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.4,8 %Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.0 %Other cooperating companies9,2 %All other companies20,9 %

(260) Several parties contested the high dumping margin established for non-sampled exporting producers and called for a reduction of its level via, for instance, ignoring the sampled company with the highest dumping margin, claimed to be unrepresentative. Following the additional partial disclosure, several parties added that establishing the duty for cooperating companies on the basis of findings for the two remaining exporting producers, which together accounted for less than 25% of total Turkish imports, was unfair, unobjective and/or contrary to the general principle of law of proportionality. Some parties stated that the fact that the basic Regulation read that the dumping margin for cooperating parties shall not exceed the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties gave the Commission the discretion to set their duty at a level lower level that the weighted average dumping established with respect to the sampled parties. In this respect, a party proposed a duty of 4,58 % for cooperating companies, i.e. an alternative calculation based on the weight of the two remaining exporters in the sample. The Commission recalled that it had established the duty rate for cooperating non-sampled exporting producers in light with its standard practice and according to the provisions in Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation and that it had no indication that the rate thus calculated was unrepresentative. The claim was therefore dismissed.

(261) The GOT contested the high dumping margins established as compared to other anti-dumping investigations against Türkiye. The Commission recalled that it has established the duty rates on an objective basis, according to the provisions in the basic Regulation. The claim was therefore dismissed.

1. INJURY

4.1.

Definition of the Union industry and Union production

(262) As mentioned in recital (59), the ceramic tiles industry in the Union is highly fragmented. The like product was manufactured by over 300 producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

(263) As further mentioned in recitals (59) and (60), the Union industry was divided into three categories of producers based on their annual production volume: small, medium-sized and large. Large producers represented approximately half of the total Union production (see recital (306)).

(264) The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 1,2 billion m2. The Commission based the production figure on verified information provided by CET. CET collected production volumes from its individual members and national associations. Where such information was not available, CET supplemented the production statistics with data from PRODCOM

Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/prodcom/data/database (last viewed 19 September 2022).

, which where necessary were extrapolated for the first half of 2021 using the manufacturing index published by Eurostat

Available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sts_inpr_q/default/table?lang=en (last viewed 19 September 2022).

.

(265) As indicated in recital (67), the six sampled Union producers represented 6 % of the total Union production of the like product.

(266) Netto and Cortina provided numerous submissions throughout the investigation arguing against the existence of injury, dumping and Union interest in connection with Indian exports into the Union. These are addressed below. Furthermore, they claimed to be Union producers, labelling themselves the Manufacturers from Białystok. However, the investigation revealed that none of these companies had manufacturing activity in the Union; they imported ceramic tiles from their business partners in India. Therefore, they could not be considered part of the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.

4.2.

Union consumption

(267) The Commission established the Union consumption by adding the sales of the Union industry, established on the basis of verified information as provided by CET, and the import volumes. The information on import volumes was sourced from Eurostat (Comext database).

(268) Union consumption developed as follows:

Table 1

Union consumption (m2)

Source: CET, Eurostat, sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodTotal Union consumption785188575811717138814739259834201394Index (2018=100)100103104106

(269) In the period considered, the Union consumption grew continuously. In the investigation period, it was 6 % higher than in 2018. The increase in the Union consumption was served mainly by imports.

4.3.

Imports from the countries concerned

4.3.1.

Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned

(270) The Commission examined whether imports of ceramic tiles originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation.

(271) Save for the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, the margins of dumping established in relation to the imports from India and Türkiye were above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation.

(272) The volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group amounted to [6 – 9 %] of total imports from India in the investigation period, and around [40 – 45 %] of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Lavish Group to prices from the other two sampled exporting producers, non-sampled cooperating exporting producers and the average price of all Indian imports (excluding Lavish) from Eurostat. Based on the information submitted in the sampling forms, the Lavish Group’s average export price was [19 – 22 %] higher than the average export price of the more than 140 Indian exporters that submitted sampling replies. The total export volume of those companies accounted for 84% of all imports from India into the Union (see recital (207)). The group’s CIF export price was [7 – 9 %] higher than the average CIF price of all imports from India and [14 – 16 %] higher than those of the other two sampled exporting producers. Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Lavish Group to the non-sampled exporting producers.

(273) The volume of non-dumped imports from the Vitra Group amounted to over 25 % of total imports from Türkiye in the investigation period, and over half of sampled imports. To establish whether the findings with regard to this company could be extended to all non-sampled imports, the Commission compared the prices of the Vitra Group to the weighted average price of non-sampled cooperating exporting producers as reported in the sampling form.

On this basis, the Vitra Group’s average export price was [18 – 20 %] higher than the average export price of 70 % of the volumes sold by non-sampled Turkish exporters that submitted sampling replies, for which the Commission had no normal value findings. The total export volume of the companies that submitted sampling replies accounted for around 90 % of all imports from Türkiye into the Union (see recital (258)). Therefore, the Commission considered that it could not extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to the non-sampled exporting producers. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GOT and some cooperating exporters contested this conclusion. Some Turkish cooperating exporters asked the Commission to extend the findings of absence of dumping regarding the Vitra Group to them (on the grounds that their sampling replies showed export prices equal or higher than those of the Vitra Group) and/or to non-sampled exporting producers. The Commission dismissed their claims on the grounds explained in section 3.2.5.

(274) The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned, excluding the volume of non-dumped imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group, was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. Market shares in the investigation period were [3,5 – 3,6 %] for India and [4,6 – 4,7 %] for Türkiye

As one of the sampled exporting producers in India and one of the sampled exporting producers in Türkiye were not dumping, their imports were deducted from the total imports and analysed as non-dumped imports. The Commission used the questionnaire replies of the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group to exclude their volumes and values from total exports. For the Vitra Group, the Commission excluded traded products not produced by the group on the basis of verified information for the investigation period. The regulation uses ranges for some figures because otherwise it would disclose confidential data from these sampled exporting producers, as the import statistics at CN level are publicly available.

.

(275) The conditions of competition between the dumped imports from India and Türkiye and between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product were similar. More specifically, the imported products competed with each other and with the ceramic tiles produced in the Union because they were sold through the same sales channels and to similar categories of customers.

(276) Therefore, all the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from India and Türkiye were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination.

(277) Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the cumulative assessment of imports from the countries concerned put India into a disadvantageous position. They pointed out that the prices of Indian imports grew over the period considered while the prices of Turkish imports decreased. The companies further submitted that the increased imports from India only supplemented the insufficient production volume by Union producers. Consequently, they claimed that by cumulating with Türkiye, the effects of Indian imports were overestimated. Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI also opposed the cumulative assessment and recalled the criteria that allowed for cumulation.

(278) The Commission recalled that the volume of Indian imports more than doubled in the period considered. In view of a capacity utilisation, which would have allowed the Union industry to increase their production volume to satisfy the demand in the Union market, the Commission considered that the argument of insufficient production volumes by Union producers was not justified. Furthermore, while the Indian import price rose, it remained below the level of the Turkish import price. Finally, the Commission noted that all criteria laid down by Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met in this proceeding. With regard to the GoI’s statement, the Commission recalled that the criteria for cumulation were met as discussed in detail in recitals (271) to (276). Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

4.3.2.

Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned

(279) The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Comext data. The market share of the imports was established by comparing those imports to the Union consumption determined in line with the explanation described in recital (267).

(280) Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 2

Import volume (m2) and market share

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers

201820192020Investigation periodIndia – import volume[13000000 – 14000000][17000000 – 18000000][22000000 – 23000000][29000000 – 30000000]Index (2018=100)100134167220India – market share[1,7 – 1,8 %][2,2 – 2,3 %][2,7 – 2,8 %][3,5 – 3,6 %]Index (2018=100)100130161207Türkiye – import volume[26000000 -27000000][31000000 – 32000000][35000000 – 36000000][38000000 – 39000000]Index (2018=100)100118135147Türkiye – market share[3,3 – 3,4 %][3,8 – 3,9 %][4,4 – 4,5 %][4,6 – 4,7 %]Index (2018=100)100115130138Total countries concerned – import volume[39000000 – 41000000]48000000 – 50000000][57000000 – 59000000][67000000 – 69000000]Index (2018=100)100124146172Total countries concerned – market share[5 - 5,2 %][6 – 6,2 %][7,1 – 7,3%][8,1 – 8,3%]Index (2018=100)100120141161

(281) Imports from the countries concerned as well as their market share increased steadily over the period considered. Imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 %, which translated into an increase of their market share by 61 %. The Union market share of imports from the countries concerned was [8,1 – 8,3 %] during the investigation period, from [5 – 5,2 %] in 2018.

(282) Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that the increase in Turkish imports was of temporary nature and the additional imports merely replaced Union products as the Union production was temporarily interrupted due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures adopted by the Member States. To support this claim, the GoT compared the volume of exports to the Union in first ten months of 2021 with the same period of 2022. The Turkish exports of ceramic tiles to the Union dropped by approximately 3,5 million m2. The GoT and Sogutsen Seramik reiterated this claim in their comments on the additional partial disclosure.

(283) In this respect, the Commission noted that imports from Türkiye increased continuously throughout the whole period considered while only 2020 was affected by the temporary interruption in the production by Union producers. In addition, the closing stock levels of the Union industry at the end of 2019 were more than sufficient to replace the reduction in production volumes. Finally, increasing Turkish exports of ceramic tiles did not respond to an increasing demand in the Union that could not be served by the Union producers. Rather, the Turkish ceramic tiles industry was under pressure of contracting domestic consumption of tiles during the period considered thus

pushing for exports at what it described as competitive prices

See Türkiye: ceramic tile exports continue to grow in 2020. Available at https://ceramicworldweb.com/en/economics-and-markets/Türkiye-ceramic-tile-exports-continue-grow-2020 (last viewed 19 November 2022). See also The Turkish ceramic tile industry pushes on exports. Avalailable at https://ceramicworldweb.com/en/economics-and-markets/turkish-ceramic-tile-industry-pushes-exports (last viewed 19 November 2022).

. The reduction in exports to the Union in 2022 could not be accepted as a proof of the GoT’s claims as the exports to the Union might have dropped as a consequence of the ongoing investigation. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

(284) The GoT also claimed that the percentage change in the market share between 2018 and the IP only appeared to be high (+42 %) because the market share of Turkish imports was low in the base year.

(285) First, the Commission noted that the evolution of the market share of dumped Turkish imports changed as the Vitra Group was found not to have been dumping after final disclosure. After excluding those volumes, the percentage change in market share of Türkiye amounted to 38%, constituting a significant increase of dumped imports. This increase in the market share is a fact established by the investigation, reflecting the actual change that took place. The Commission disagrees however that the market share of Türkiye was low in the base year. Throughout the period considered, Türkiye was the first third country supplier of the Union, constituting one third of all imports. The increase in terms of volume, amounting to around 12000000 square metres that were found to be dumped, was significant and had an impact in the performance of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission rejected the claim.

(286) Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT noted that the Turkish imports and their market share grew at a slower pace during the period considered after the Vitra Group was found not dumping. The GoT argued that the reduced market share of [4,6 – 4,7] % could not be considered injurious to the Union industry. Similarly, the GoI argued that the import volumes following the exclusion of the Vitra Group were too low to cause injury.

(287) The Commission recalled that the import volumes and their market share must be examined cumulatively for both countries concerned. The Commission considered that the market share of [8,1 – 8,3] %, which reflects dumped imports from the countries concerned, was sufficient to cause injury in the present case, in particular taking into account the structure of the Union industry and its fragmentation.

4.3.3.

Prices of the imports from the countries concerned: price undercutting/price suppression

(288) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat (Comext database). The verified values (at CIF level) and volumes of imports from the Lavish Group and the Vitra Group were deducted from the imports from India and Türkiye respectively for the purpose of this exercise.

(289) The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows:

Table 3

Import prices (EUR/m2)

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producers

201820192020Investigation periodIndia4,354,795,125,49Index (2018=100)100110118126Türkiye6,636,085,975,94Index (2018=100)100929090

Total countries concerned5,865,615,645,75Index (2018=100)100969698

(290) The average import prices from the two countries concerned together remained stable over the period considered. The average import prices from Türkiye dropped by 10 % between 2018 and the investigation period, while the average import prices from India grew continuously and increased by 26 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The import prices from both countries were significantly lower than the prices and the cost of production of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 7).

(291) The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing:

(1) the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and

(2) the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled exporting producers from India and Türkiye to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs.

(292) The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period.

(293) The above comparison showed a weighted average undercutting margin on the Union market of between 42,5 % and 54,7 % for India and 33,8 % and 57,7 % for Türkiye, depending on the exporting producer. Competition for ceramic tiles is largely driven by prices, thus the undercutting margins are very significant. The Commission further noted that a minority of the Union industry’s sales were made through related parties and that, given the level of the SG&A expenses and profit of those related parties, the finding of undercutting for the cumulated imports would not be undermined even if the calculations had to be adjusted for those factors. Moreover, when excluding from that calculation the Union industry sales through related parties, which amounted to less than 25%, there was still significant undercutting, between 36 % and 54,7 % for India and 19,9 % to 61,7 % for Türkiye. Indeed, all Indian sampled cooperating exporters sold directly to the Union, and almost half of the imports made by the sampled cooperating exporters in Türkiye were also direct sales. Thus, under any alternative method, undercutting would remain significant.

(294) In addition, regardless of the findings about significant undercutting, the Commission found that because of the price suppression caused by the volumes and low prices of imports from India and Türkiye, the Union industry was unable to increase their prices to a level that would generate reasonable profits. The average price of imports from the countries concerned was below the cost of the sampled Union producers throughout the period considered (see table 3 in recital (289) and table 7 in recital (320)). Although the average sale price of the Union producers on the Union market increased by 19 % between 2018 and the IP, it remained below the cost of production throughout the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)).

(295) The price suppression found at macro level was further confirmed by findings at company level. The injury elimination levels were determined per product type thus taking into account any potential differences between the product mix of imports and domestic sales of the Union industry. In the investigation period, the imports from the sampled exporting producers were underselling the domestic sales prices of the sampled Union producers by 92,7% to 168,7% with regard to India and by 80,8% to 150,6 % with regard to Türkiye (for details see section 6.1).

(296) Following final disclosure, the GoT pointed out that not only the import prices from Türkiye were below the cost of production of the Union producers but also the Union producers’ own prices in the Union market were lower than the cost of production. In addition, while the Turkish import price decreased during the period considered, the Union producers’ domestic price increased leading to improved profitability. In this respect, the GoT repeated its

accusations of the Commission having manipulated the sample of Union producers towards companies with higher cost and worse financial indicators. Moreover, the GoT argued that companies included in the small producer category were boutique firms serving high-end market and working on tailor-made basis.

(297) The GoT reiterated its issues with the representativity of the Union producers’ sample and its effect on the comparison of prices after the additional partial disclosure.

(298) First, the Commission noted that the import prices from countries concerned must be examined on a cumulative basis, not individually. The average import price established on such basis remained rather stable, and significantly below the Union industry’s cost of production, over the period considered. The Union industry was pressured to navigate between extremely low import prices from the countries concerned and increasing cost of production. Although its domestic prices increased, the Union industry was not able to achieve a sustainable level of profit, barely breaking even in the IP.

(299) Second, the Commission recalled that the sample was selected based on objective criteria as described in recital (72) and (73). Producers sampled in the small producer category were companies offering collections of ceramic tiles to a wide range of customers, including to general public.

(300) Consequently, the Commission rejected all claims concerning price undercutting and price suppression.

4.4.

Economic situation of the Union industry

4.4.1.

General remarks

(301) In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered.

(302) As mentioned in section 1.4.1, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry from the imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye.

(303) For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire reply of CET relating to all Union producers, crosschecked where necessary with trade statistics available in Eurostat and the questionnaires from the sampled Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the six sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were duly verified or remotely crosschecked and found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry.

(304) The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity, magnitude of the dumping margin, and recovery from past dumping.

(305) The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit cost, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital.

(306) Taking into account the fragmentation of the Union industry and the practice established in previous investigations concerning the same product, certain micro-economic indicators in each of the producers’ categories as defined in recital (59) were weighted using their share on the total Union production. As mentioned in recital (60), the structure of the industry has shifted towards large producers. Therefore, the relevant micro-indicators for large, medium-sized and small producers were weighted based on the ratio of 53:19:28, respectively. The weighting of results was used for sales prices, cost of production, profitability and return on investments, i.e. indicators that are not determined by simply adding up the results of the individual sampled Union producers but rather as a percentage or an average unit value, as well as for the average export price to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers. The weighting ensured that the results of large producers were not overrepresented in the findings on injury and that the situation of small and medium-sized producers was properly accounted for.

4.4.2.

Macroeconomic indicators

4.4.2.1.

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(307) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 4

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Source: CET

201820192020Investigation periodProduction volume (m2)1229823662119784897010974902461229257050Index (2018=100)1009789100Production capacity (m2)1455493248143823319814415979661440337389Index (2018=100)100999999Capacity utilisation84 %83 %76 %85 %Index (2018=100)1009990101

(308) During the period considered, the production volume, production capacity and capacity utilisation remained rather stable with year 2020 being a single outlier. The drop in production volume and consequently in capacity utilisation in 2020 was caused by the short-term interruptions in production following sanitary measures imposed by the Member States in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

4.4.2.2

Sales volume and market share

(309) The sales of the Union industry were established by subtracting export volumes from production volumes as provided by CET and applying an adjustment accounting for the stock variation. The stock variation adjustment was based on the complaint for years 2018 – 2020. For the investigation period, it was based on company-specific data collected by CET. Production volume was determined as explained in recital (264). The information on export volumes was sourced from Eurostat, and adjusted following evidence provided by CET

Corrected regarding volumes for the investigation period for Spain following evidence provided by the complainant upon verification of the macro-indicators questionnaire.

.

(310) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 5

Sales volume and market share

Source: CET

201820192020Investigation periodSales volume on the Union market (m2)707146016724457535717890003726565367Index (2018=100)100102102103Market share90,1 %89,2 %88,1 %87,1 %Index (2018=100)100999897

(311) The Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased between 2018 and 2019. It remained stable in 2020 in spite of the reduction in the Union industry’s production volume due to sales from stocks (traditionally high in the ceramics industry). Following a recovery in the construction sector in 2021

The European construction market to 2024. Available at https://www.ceramicworldweb.com/index.php/en/economics-and-markets/european-construction-market-2024 (last viewed 20 September 2022).

, Union industry’s sales volume slightly increased in the investigation period compared to 2020.

(312) The market share of the Union industry decreased in the period considered, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period. The Union industry was not able to take full advantage of the expansion in Union consumption (see recital (268)).

4.4.2.3.

Growth

(313) The Union industry was not able to realise the full potential from growth in the context of a growing Union consumption of ceramic tiles and the post-Covid-19 recovery of the construction market. It retained a rather stable level of production volume and booked only a slight increase in sales on the Union market.

4.4.2.4.

Employment and productivity

(314) Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Employment and productivity

Source: CET

201820192020Investigation periodNumber of employees55544550895447054412Index (2018=100)100999898Productivity (m2/employee)22141217442014822592Index (2018=100)1009891102

(315) Union employment in the ceramic tiles sector had a slightly decreasing trend throughout the whole period considered. The number of employees involved in the ceramic tiles production was reduced by 2 % between 2018 and the investigation period.

(316) Productivity slightly decreased between 2018 and 2019. It dropped by an additional 7 % in 2020 as a consequence of reduced production due to the Covid-19-related sanitary measures. The recovery of the production volume to its pre-Covid-19 level translated into an increase in productivity by 12 % between 2020 and the investigation period.

4.4.2.5.

Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

(317) With the exception of one sampled Indian exporting producer and one sampled Turkish producer, all dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was not negligible, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned.

(318) Ceramic tiles have already been subject to anti-dumping investigations. The Commission found that, during the period 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010, the situation of the Union industry was significantly affected by dumped imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Provisional measures were imposed on 17 March 2011.

Commission Regulation (EU) No 258/2011 of 16 March 2011 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 70, 17.3.2011, p. 5).

Definitive measures were imposed on 15 September 2011.

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

(319) Following an expiry review, the Commission extended the measures on 23 November 2017

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179.

based on the likelihood of continuation of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury. The investigation established that the Union industry recovered from past dumping from the PRC due to the measures in place. A second expiry review of these measures was initiated on 22 November 2022

Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 442, 22.11.2022, p. 3).

.

4.4.3.

Microeconomic indicators

4.4.3.1.

Prices and factors affecting prices

(320) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union, and its cost of production, developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

Source:

Sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodAverage unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/ m2)8,849,4210,4410,52Index (2018=100)100106118119Unit cost of production (EUR/ m2)9,7911,0811,3110,77Index (2018=100)100113116110

(321) The average unit sales price grew by 19 % between 2018 and the investigation period. The greatest increase was recorded in 2020. The average unit sales price remained below the unit cost of production throughout the period considered.

(322) Unit cost of production increased by 13 % between 2018 and 2019 and by an additional 3 % in 2020. In the investigation period, unit cost of production decreased in comparison to 2020 but remained above the level of 2018 by 10 %.

4.4.3.2.

Labour costs

(323) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Average labour costs per employee

Source: Sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodAverage labour costs per employee (EUR)37923394323731639568Index (2018=100)10010498104

(324) Average labour cost per employee grew between 2018 and 2019 by 4 %. In 2020, following the Covid-19-related short-term interruptions of production, the cost decreased by 6 % compared to 2019 only to return to its 2019 level in the investigation period. In the investigation period, average labour cost per employee increased by 4 % in comparison to 2018.

4.4.3.3.

Inventories

(325) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Inventories

Source: Sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodClosing stocks (m2)28561422270307622436806624436327Index (2018=100)100958586Closing stocks as a percentage of production49%51%44%39%Index (2018=100)1001049179

(326) Closing stock decreased between 2018 and 2019 in absolute terms. Nevertheless, in the same period it increased by 4 % (or 2 percentage points) when expressed as a percentage of production. Due to reduced production volumes and growing demand, the Union industry was able to reduce the volume of closing stock in absolute terms and when expressed as a percentage of production in 2020. As the production volume returned to its 2018 levels and the demand continued growing in the investigation period, closing stock expressed as percentage of production further dropped in the IP.

4.4.3.4.

Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(327) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Source: Sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodProfitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)-5,4 %-8,9 %-5,9 %0,6 %Index (2018=100)-100-166-11010Cash flow (EUR)24347831454717498978180497367062Index (2018=100)100187369400Investments (EUR)68496866274691672252571326179748Index (2018=100)100403338Return on investments1%-9%-10%4%Index (2018=100)100-1600-1832660

(328) The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The Union industry was lossmaking in the first three years of the period considered, and barely broke even in the investigation period. The loss increased between 2018 and 2019 from -5,4 % to -8,9 %. The sales price of the Union industry grew faster than the cost of production in 2020 (see table 7 in recital (320)). This resulted in a reduction of loss to -5,9 % in 2020. In the IP, the Union industry was able book a profit slightly above the breakeven point.

(329) The Union industry was able to achieve a minor profit in the IP although its average sales price to unrelated customers in the Union remained below the average cost of production (see table 7 in recital (320)). This was caused by the differences in product mix produced and product mix sold in the Union during the IP. The differences concerned not only the product types but also the time when the sold goods where produced (that is, whether they were sales from stock).

(330) The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The net cash flow almost doubled between 2018 and 2019. It further considerably increased in 2020, and, at a more moderate pace, in the investigation period. The evolution of cash flow was to a large extent linked to the evolution of sales and therefore stocks. In 2018, one sampled Union producer recorded a large stock variation of finished goods, i.e. the company produced for stock. In 2019, this situation did not repeat thus turning a negative cash flow of this company into a positive one. This explained the majority of the cash flow increase between 2018 and 2019. The value of cash flow in 2020 and in the investigation period was linked to the fact that the sampled Union producers temporarily interrupted their production due to Covid-19-related lockdowns but continued selling from stock, which as shown in table 9 (see recital (325)) historically represented approximately half of their annual production quantity. The closing stock of finished goods decreased in 2020 and in the IP leading to a stock variation, which added value to the decreasing loss (2020) or the slight profit (IP).

(331) Following final disclosure, the GoT argued that since only one company could influence the results of cash flow, the sample was not representative.

(332) The cash flow presented in table 10 was a simple addition of all cash flow values of the sampled Union producers. This means that any events or evolution in one of the sampled companies influenced the final indicator no matter what share of Union production the sample would have represented. In recital (330), the Commission clarified the fluctuations in cash flow. Consequently, the claim made by the GoT was rejected.

(333) Investments decreased by 62 % in the period considered. The largest decrease of 60 % was recorded between 2018 and 2019. The investments further decreased in 2020, to then increase in the investigation period (16 % compared to 2020). Investments were in most cases financed with cash flow and bank credits. The majority of investments were in maintaining capacity and replacement. Investments in research and development and innovation, that made up for 38 % of total investments by the sampled producers in 2018, decreased by 97 % in the period considered and made up for only 3 % of their investments in the investigation period.

(334) The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital was affected by the negative profitability. The sampled Union producers reported that the negative profitability prevented them from financing the necessary investments to exploit the growing market potential. One sampled Union producer reported that it had to downsize capacity due to its problems to raise capital. Some sampled Union producers are part of larger groups, making their ability to raise capital better than that of stand-alone companies in a similar financial situation. Yet their low profitability and prospects influence the decision of the parent companies to provide funds, that may decide to invest elsewhere.

(335) The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. It decreased significantly in 2019 and 2020 to register an increase in the investigation period, following the trend in profitability.

4.5.

Conclusion on injury

(336) In the period considered, the Union industry could not benefit from an expanding market, as shown by macro-indicators presenting negative or rather stable trends in a scenario of increasing demand. Production, production capacity, capacity utilisation or employment remained at the same level throughout the period considered. Union sales increased at a slower pace than consumption (3 % growth of Union sales in a market that grew 6 %). Consequently, the market share of the Union industry decreased from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the IP.

(337) Despite the increase of 19 % in its sales price, the Union industry could not raise prices in the Union to levels high enough to recover its costs during most of the period considered. As a result, throughout the period considered it was either lossmaking (-5,4 % in 2018, -8,9 % in 2019, -5,9 % in 2020) or just breaking even (0,6 % in the investigation period, influenced by the post-Covid-19 economic recovery, including increasing construction output as explained in recital (311), and where the Union industry sold significant quantities from stocks). The level of profitability achieved in the investigation period could not be considered sustainable. The Union industry could not increase their sales prices in the Union to a level that would ensure profitability levels necessary to cover its costs of production for most of the period considered and to exploit the growth in the Union market, for example by making new investments for expansion, research and development and for continuing to be active in developing segments like large slabs. Indeed, in this situation, investments decreased by 62 % and capacity remained constant, showing that the Union industry could not grow with the growing market.

(338) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(339) Following final disclosure, a number of interested parties commented on the injury findings and conclusions.

(340) Ceramika Netto expressed concerns about the validity of data the Commission used for its findings on injury. In particular, the company submitted the financial statements for 2021 of three Polish producers of ceramic tiles and news articles summarising the performance of the ceramics industry in Italy and Spain in 2021.

(341) CGCSA claimed that the Union producers were willing to provide information for the full year 2021 and if the Commission examined that information, it would have found that the injury stemmed solely from the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

(342) The Commission noted that the investigation was conducted on information, that was verified on-spot, submitted by sampled Union producers for the IP and the period considered. Ceramika Netto did not submit any comments on the sample of Union producers within the applicable deadline. Any information concerning the full year 2021 would cover a post-IP period and therefore could not be used for the determination of injury. In addition, the Commission is not aware of any proactive offers by the Union industry to submit post-IP data. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims by Ceramika Netto and GCSCA.

(343) The GoI, GoT, GCSCA, the Turkish company Sogutsen Seramik and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Union industry did not suffer material injury. In this respect, the GoI, GoT, GCSCA and sixteen Indian exporting producers submitted that most macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators remained stable or improved during the period considered.

(344) For example, the sixteen companies pointed out that production volume, capacity utilisation and productivity substantially increased in the IP in comparison to 2020, and that closing stocks substantially decreased in the IP in comparison to 2018. In addition, the Indian exporting producers argued that despite a reduction in market share of the Union industry by 3 percentage points in the period considered, it maintained high market shares over the whole period considered. The companies referred to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt

Judgment of the Court of 4 February 2021, eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt, Case C-324/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:94, paragraphs 49 and 52.

. The Court ruled that the Council committed a manifest error when it concluded that a loss of five percentage points market share was an indicator of material injury as the Union industry maintained high market share and experienced an increase in sales volumes and sales prices.

(345) The GoT submitted that indicators such as profitability, production, sales volume, Union sales price, capacity utilisation, productivity, inventories, cash flow and return on investments experienced a temporary negative evolution in 2020, a year affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, but returned to a positive trend in the IP. Furthermore, the GoT argued that a few indicators showing negative trends over the period considered were not sufficient to conclude on the existence of material injury.

(346) Similarly, the GoI claimed that there was no volume injury as the market share of Indian imports was small throughout the period considered. The GoI also noted that despite losing market share, the Union industry maintained a high market share. In addition, its sales volume increased and its domestic sales price increased at a higher pace than cost of production thus leading to improved profitability.

(347) GCSCA also argued that many macroeconomic indicators, such as production volume and capacity utilisation, sales volume, high market share, maintained neutral or positive trends over the period considered. With regard to microeconomic indicators, the association pointed out that the Union domestic sales price grew at a higher pace than the cost of production of the Union industry.

(348) The Commission noted that the indicators must be examined not only in the light of their evolution but also with regard to the achieved levels. The Commission maintained that the Union industry suffered material injury due to increasing volumes of dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Although the Union domestic price grew faster than the Union industry’s cost of production, the Union industry was lossmaking in almost every year of the period considered, only being able to reach the break even point in the IP. In addition, the Union industry lost market share, despite an increase in consumption.

(349) Furthermore, the parties referred to the Commission’s findings concerning certain indicators (production volume, capacity utilisation) that were negatively affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 but recovered in the IP. The parties must, however, also recognise that the pandemic led to the improvement of certain indicators, e.g. closing stocks volume and cash flow. Subsequently, the Commission could not agree to the parties describing the change in the IP as substantially improved in comparison to the previous period since they already agreed that the especially poor performance in those indicators in 2020 was caused by the pandemic.

(350) With regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court in eurocylinder systems AG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Stadt, the Commission noted that each case must be assessed on its own merits. In the investigation concerned by the Court ruling, the Union industry experienced an increase in sales volume and sales prices while maintaining high market share and double-digit profits over the period considered.

Commission Regulation (EC) No 289/2009 of 7 April 2009 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 48).

The situation in the present case is considerably different. Although the Union producers’ sales price increased and their sales volume also slightly grew, the companies remained lossmaking in almost all years of the period considered.

(351) Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (343) to (347).

1. CAUSATION

(352) In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are imports from other third countries including non-dumped imports from India, the export performance of the Union industry, the evolution of demand, the evolution of the cost of production of the Union industry and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

5.1.

Effects of the dumped imports

(353) The volume of imports from the countries concerned increased by 72 % during the period considered, from [39000000 – 42000000] m2 in 2018, representing a market share of [5 – 5,2] %, to [67000000 – 69000000] m2 in the IP, representing a market share of [8,1 – 8,3 ] % during the IP. The increase of imports from the countries concerned (72 %) significantly outpaced both the increase of consumption in the Union market (6%) and the increase of Union sales (3 %). The more than 3 percentage points increase in the market share of dumped imports paralleled a loss of 3 percentage points in the market share of the Union industry, from 90,1 % in 2018 to 87,1 % in the investigation period.

(354) This gain in market share by the dumped imports was therefore at the expense of the Union industry that could not benefit from the continuously increasing consumption.

(355) The increase in imports was based on dumped, low prices. As established in recital (293), the prices from the sampled exporting producers in the Union market significantly undercut those of the Union industry, at least by 36 % for India and 19,9 % for Türkiye, in the investigation period, and in any event were significantly lower than the Union industry’s costs of production.

(356) In addition to the findings of significant undercutting during the investigation period, the average import prices from the countries concerned were also much lower than those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. The price difference (based on Eurostat average figures) between the dumped imports and the prices of the Union industry was significant, and increased during the period considered, going from 2,98 EUR/m2 in 2018 to 4,77 EUR/m2 in the investigation period, an increase of 60 %.

(357) Due to the dumped imports, whose prices were also below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered, thereby causing significant price suppression, and to avoid further losing market share, the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered (see table 7 in recital (320)). It only barely broke even in the investigation period, which coincided with the post-Covid-19 recovery and with an increase in construction output (see recital (311)). In any event, the Union industry’s level of profit in the investigation period was very low (0,6 %) and cannot be considered sustainable (see recital (337)). The dumped imports also outpaced Union sales in the post-Covid-19 recovery: while the Union industry’s sales increased by 1,2 % in the investigation period compared to 2020, the dumped imports increased by 17,5 %.

(358) It follows from the above that the increase of dumped imports at low prices led to lost sales and prevented the Union industry from reaching reasonable levels of profit. The Commission therefore concluded that there is a causal link between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.

Effects of other factors

5.2.1.

Imports from third countries

(359) The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Imports from third countries

Source: Eurostat, sampled exporting producer

Country201820192020Investigation periodNon-dumped imports from India and TürkiyeVolume (m2)

[8000000 –

10000000]

[10000000 –

12000000]

[13000000 –

15000000]

[14000000 –

16000000]

Index (2018=100)100132160173

Market share[1 – 1,2] %[1,4 – 1,6] %[1,6 – 1,8] %[1,7 – 1,9] %Average price (EUR/ m2)[6,1 – 6,4][6,4 – 6,7][6,5 – 6,8][6,4 – 6,7]Index (2018=100)100105106105UkraineVolume (m2)5641163510465548902655546233Index (2018=100)100908798Market share0,7 %0,6 %0,6 %0,7 %Average price (EUR/m2)4,224,444,374,55Index (2018=100)100105103108ChinaVolume (m2)8534901673921164887664836581Index (2018=100)100797657Market share1,1 %0,8 %0,8 %0,6 %Average price (EUR/m2)5,115,184,814,95Index (2018=100)1001019497United Arab EmiratesVolume (m2)3443921322087734487213194145Index (2018=100)1009410093Market share0,4 %0,4 %0,4 %0,4 %Average price (EUR/m2)9,297,306,576,93Index (2018=100)100787175

Others (excluding Countries concerned)Volume (m2)12091485116711621026342011036430Index (2018=100)100978591Market share1,5 %1,4 %1,3 %1,3 %Average price (EUR/m2)6,686,246,967,15Index (2018=100)100105106107Total of all third countries except the countries concerned, including non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye )Volume (m2)[38000000 – 40000000][37000000 – 39000000][38000000 – 40000000][39000000 – 41000000]Index (2018=100)100100101103Market share[4,8 – 5] %[4,6 – 4,8] %[4,7 – 4,9] %[4,7 – 4,9] %Average price (EUR/m2)[6 – 6,3][5,9 – 6,2][6 – 6,3][6,2 – 6,5]Index (2018=100)10098100103

(360) Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye (hereinafter all third countries) increased by 3 % over the period considered. Imports from other third countries amounted to [36 – 38] % of total imports into the Union in the investigation period (down from [48 – 50] % of imports in 2018). Their share of the Union market decreased year-on-year, going from [4,8 – 5] % in 2018 to [4,7 – 4,9] % in the investigation period. With the exception of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned, and China in year 2018, no other single country achieved a market share of more than 1 % throughout the period considered.

(361) The average price of imports from all third countries first decreased by 2 % from 2018 to 2019, then slowly increased from 2020 to reach a level 3% higher in the investigation period compared to 2018. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. The biggest difference was registered in the IP, when the average price from all third countries was [8-12] % higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned.

(362) Non-dumped imports from the countries concerned increased by 73% over the period considered, from [8000000 – 10000000] square metres in 2018 to [16000000 – 18000000] in the investigation period. Their market share increased from [1 – 1,2] % in 2018 to [1,7 – 1,9] % in the investigation period. The prices of those imports were higher than the import prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned throughout the period considered. In 2019, 2020 and the investigation period they were at least 14% higher than the average import price of dumped imports from the countries concerned. The average import prices were below those of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Therefore, these imports and their increase had a negative impact in the performance of the Union industry.

(363) Imports from all third countries except the countries concerned but including the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye might therefore have contributed to a limited extent to the material injury suffered by the Union industry. However, given that their average prices are higher than those of dumped imports from the countries concerned, that the volumes are smaller and did not gain market share in the period considered, those imports, both collectively and individually, do not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye.

(364) Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT argued that the Commission’s conclusions concerning the effect of non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and from all third countries on the situation of the Union industry were biased as the Commission found that the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned had a negative impact on the performance of the Union industry while the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury only in a limited extent, in particular since the imports form all third countries reached a volume four times higher than non-dumped imports from the countries concerned.

(365) The Commission noted that recitals (362) and (363) had to be read together. Taking into account their volumes and prices, both, the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned and other third country imports, had a negative impact on the Union industry’s performance, but not of a magnitude to attenuate the causal link. As explained in recital (360), the category all third countries includes also the non-dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim.

(366) Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoI argued that the imports from India were in terms of volume and prices similar to the imports from third countries (excluding the non-dumped imports from the countries concerned). The Commission, nevertheless, did not investigate those third countries. According to the GoI, this proved that the Union industry did not suffer injury due to dumped imports from India but due to high cost of production. In addition, the GoI pointed out that since the profitability of the Union industry improved as the Indian imports increased, there was not causal link between the dumped imports from India and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(367) The Commission recalled that it examined the impact of imports from India and Türkiye that were found to be made at dumped prices. The investigation was initiated based on sufficient evidence of dumping provided by the complainant. As no such evidence was submitted with regard to other third countries, the Commission did not investigate those countries and therefore, could not make any findings of dumping in this investigation. The Commission acknowledged that the imports from all third countries contributed to the material injury in a limited manner (see recital (363)). As far as it concerns the import volumes, the Commission analysed the requirements for a cumulative assessment of dumped imports and found that all requirements were met in this investigation. Thus, the imports from India could not be considered as negligible. Finally, as explained in recital (298), although the Union industry was able to increase its prices and by doing so improve its financial performance, it was only able to achieve profitability levels slightly above the breakeven point in the IP. In addition, as explained in recitals (293) to (295), the Commission found substantial undercutting and price suppression caused by the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. Therefore, the claim that the imports from India could not, in terms of volumes and prices, cause material injury to the Union industry was rejected.

5.2.2.

Export performance of the Union industry

(368) The Commission examined the evolution of exports and prices for the whole EU Industry based on Eurostat’s Eurostat data

Corrected regarding volumes for the investigation period for Spain following evidence provided by the complainant upon verification of the macro-indicators questionnaire.

.

Table 12

Exports from the Union

Source: CET, Eurostat

201820192020Investigation periodExport volume (m2)470484212470086762447819312514369625Index (2018=100)10010095109Average price (EUR/m2)8,588,538,788,77Index (2018=100)10099102102

(369) According to Eurostat data, Union exports of ceramic tiles increased by 9 % during the period considered. Exports remained stable the first two years of the period considered to then decrease by 5 % between 2019 and 2020, then increase in the investigation period, namely 15 % year-on-year. The average price of exports remained rather stable throughout the period considered, registering an increase of 2 %.

(370) Interested parties claimed, based on the data in the complaint, that the export performance of the Union industry was a cause of injury, due to the decline in 2020 and the fact that the average export price was lower than the cost of production of the complainants.

(371) Such comparison was incorrect. First, Eurostat data included all Union exports (including those to related customers outside the Union) while the cost of production of the complainants represented only part of Union exports. Second, the investigation period covered a different period than the one used in the complaint.

(372) In any case, the Commission also analysed the export performance of the Union sampled producers, based on verified data. The volume and average price of exports to unrelated customers of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 13

Export performance of the sampled Union producers

Source: Sampled Union producers

201820192020Investigation periodExport volume (m2)6906051748337971053249669741Index (2018=100)100108103140Average price (EUR/m2)13,6013,8111,6311,24Index (2018=100)1001028583

(373) The volume of exports of the sampled Union producers increased by 40 % during the period considered. The biggest increase was registered in the investigation period, namely 36 % year-on-year (i.e. when compared to 2020). The average price of exports from the sampled Union producers decreased by 17 % over the period considered. It first increased slightly, then went down in 2020 and the investigation period. Despite this decrease, the average export price of the sampled Union producers was above their cost of production throughout the investigation period.

(374) Given its positive evolution, the export performance of the sampled Union producers or of the whole Union industry could not have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

(375) Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the loss in market share by Union industry could not be attributed to dumped imports from the countries concerned. The party pointed out the growing export volume of the Union industry and argued that the loss of market share was caused by the Union industry prioritising exports over domestic sales. The GoT reiterated this claim after the additional partial disclosure.

(376) The Commission disagreed. The volume of closing stock and the level of capacity utilisation of the Union industry would have enabled the Union industry to increase its export volumes and domestic sales volumes at the same time. Therefore, the improved export performance of the Union industry over the period considered could not justify the loss of the Union industry’s market share, that was due to the increasing volumes of dumped imports that undercut and suppressed the Union industry’s prices, as concluded in recital (358). The Commission rejected the claim.

5.2.3.

Consumption

(377) Some parties claimed that the global decline in ceramic tiles consumption was a cause of injury to the Union industry. As established in recitals (267) to (269) however, consumption increased steadily in the Union throughout the period considered. Therefore, it cannot have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

5.2.4.

Evolution of the cost of production

(378) Interested parties submitted that increases in costs of raw materials, energy, transport and CO2 emission allowances were a cause of injury for the Union industry.

(379) The cost of production of the Union industry was higher than its sales price, and it increased, for most of the period considered. Therefore, the Union industry registered heavy losses throughout the period considered. However, as explained in recital (357), the Union industry could not increase its prices in the Union above its cost of production during most of the period considered, or made sustainable levels of profit, to avoid losing more market share to the dumped imports at low prices.

(380) Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission failed to examine other factors, such as increasing cost of raw materials, energy, CO2 allowances and labour.

(381) The Commission examined the verified information of the sampled Union producers and found that the cost of raw materials (per m2) increased only slightly (by approximately 4 %) over the period considered. The cost of energy and labour per m2 actually decreased. Compliance cost per m2 remained rather stable over the period considered. In addition, as explained in recital (379), the Union industry suffered losses to its inability to increase prices under the price pressure from imports from India and Türkiye. Consequently, the claim was dismissed.

5.2.5.

Covid-19 effects

(382) Interested parties claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic was a cause of injury for the Union industry due to production shutdowns. They further claimed that this was the reason behind their cost increases, given their reliance on imports of raw materials and the supply chain disruptions created by the Covid-19 pandemic. Finally, some interested parties claimed that the fact that the Union industry did not lay off workforce despite the shutdowns was also a cause for the cost increase and amounted to self-inflicted injury.

(383) On the supply side, during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, in the first half of 2020, most Union producers had to temporarily shut down their production facilities. This was clearly reflected in the production volume, which dropped by 11 % in 2020 when compared to 2018 and by 8 % when compared to 2019. However, production recovered in the IP (see Table 4).

(384) The Commission also analysed the impact on the sampled Union producers. This analysis confirmed the Union-wide findings. The measures taken because of the Covid-19 pandemic varied between producers located in different Member States. Four of the sampled Union producers had to shut down their production facilities in the first half of year 2020 (March and April), while two of them did not close but reduced production. All sampled Union producers reported a decrease in production during the shutdowns when compared to the same period of previous year, but production recovered in the IP.

(385) Despite the closures, the cost of production only went up slightly (+2 %) in 2020 as compared to 2019 (see recital (320)). One sampled Union producer reported that, in the second half of 2020, it benefited from low costs of raw materials and of all production factors, especially energy and transport costs, due to the unusual availability of labour, services and supplies. Any supply chain impact was thus negligible. Regarding the workforce, the measures taken by the sampled producers varied in different Member States, from reducing salaries, putting employees on short time work, use of redundancy funds or vacation time, or protection schemes that led to savings.

(386) On the demand side, as seen in recital (268), the Union market kept growing during the Covid-19 pandemic. The trends of consumption, imports and Union industry sales in the Union increased steadily across the period considered, with imports from the countries concerned growing at much faster paces than the sales of the Union industry and consumption, also in 2020. The Union industry was able to maintain its volume of sales in 2020, despite the temporary factory closures, by selling from stocks, as this particular industry is characterised by very high levels of stocks (around 50 % of production). Accordingly stocks registered a reduction in 2020 and in the IP (see recital (325)).

(387) Therefore, as demand remained stable and the Union industry was able to resume production fast after the closures and use its stock to maintain its sales volume, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry were limited and did not attenuate the causal link established with the dumped imports from India and Türkiye.

(388) Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, CGCSA, Sogutsen Seramik and Yurtbay Seramik reiterated that the inury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and claimed that the Commission did not examine its impact sufficiently. CGCSA submitted that the Commission failed to collect quantitative data to examine the effects of Covid-19.

(389) The claim that injury was caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was already addressed in recitals (383) to (387). The Commission examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the performance of the Union industry both on the supply side and the demand side, both at the level of the whole Union industry and also at the level of the sampled Union producers (see recitals (384) and (385)). The Commission collected data on all injury indicators and examined the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on that basis. It acknowledged that the pandemic had a clear impact on the production volumes of the Union industry, that recovered quickly, and on their level of stocks, but a negligible one on sales volume, costs, imports and consumption. Moreover, the Commission collected additional information on the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic from the sampled Union producers, such as the duration of the closures for those companies that closed or the measures they took regarding the workforce. Interested parties have not provided any new evidence or arguments that could change these conclusions, nor any evidence of what other data the Commission should have collected or analysed. Consequently, the Commission dismissed these claims.

5.3.

Conclusion on causation

(390) The Commission established a causal link between the injury suffered by the Union industry and the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. The increase of dumped imports from the countries concerned coincided with a decrease of the Union industry’s market share in the Union market. Most of the growing demand in the Union was taken up by the imports. The increase of imports from the countries concerned was based on low, dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry, significantly undercut the Union industry sales prices in the Union market and prevented the Union industry from setting prices at sustainable levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins.

(391) The Commission distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. The effect of non-dumped imports, of the export performance of the Union industry, of the evolution of the Union consumption, of the evolution of the Union industry’s cost of production and of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Union industry’s negative performance concerning its market share and profitability was only limited.

(392) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry and that the other factors, considered individually or collectively, did not attenuate the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury.

(393) Following final disclosure, the GoI pointed out with regard to the conclusions on causation that the Union industry experienced losses already in 2018 when Indian imports were negligible. In addition, as the Indian imports grew, the profitability situation of the Union producers improved too. Therefore, according to the GoI, there was no causal link between Indian imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(394) The Commission noted that the impact of imports from India and Türkiye was assessed cumulatively, not individually. In any case, the investigation established that Indian dumped imports more than doubled from 2018 to the investigation period. This increase was based on dumped prices that were below the cost of production of the Union industry throughout the period considered. Faced with this increase, the Union industry both lost sales to the dumped imports and, to avoid losing further sales, could not set its prices at levels necessary to achieve reasonable profit margins. Therefore, there is a clear causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim.

(395) Following the analysis of comments received after final disclosure, the Commission confirmed its findings concerning causation.

1. LEVEL OF MEASURES

(396) To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry.

6.1.

Injury margin

(397) The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(398) In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the countries under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %.

(399) Neither the complainant nor any of the sampled Union producers made any substantiated claim regarding the level of the target profit.

(400) The complaint used a target profit of 6 %, the minimum provided for in Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, and provided no evidence that it should be set at a higher level. The complaint merely stated that the complainant expected the underselling calculation during the investigation to be based on a higher target profit reflecting significantly higher environmental costs expected in the Union during the period of application of the measures. However, future environmental costs are not a factor for the determination of the target profit according to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, these costs are reflected in the final target price according to Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation.

(401) Only two sampled Union producers commented on the appropriate level of the target profit. One of them proposed using a target profit of [6 – 7 %], the profit it achieved in 2018, when the presence of the dumped imports was lower. The second sampled Union producer stated it was unable to provide an answer as it had been competing with imports from India and Türkiye throughout the period considered and even before.

(402) Given the fragmentation of the EU industry, the profit of a single sampled Union producer in a given year is not sufficient basis to establish the target profit for the whole Union industry. Moreover, imports from the countries concerned were already present in the market in 2018 at prices below the Union industry’s cost of production, and the Union industry was loss-making.

(403) Indeed, as shown in Tables 2 and 10, the Union industry was loss-making or barely breaking even throughout the period considered, while the presence of imports from the countries concerned was already significant in 2018 and increased steadily. None of these years would therefore qualify for providing a target profit in line with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation.

(404) No sampled Union producer provided a calculation of the profitability of the product under investigation for ten years before the initiation of the investigation, as asked in the questionnaire. The Commission also took note of the target profit established for this industry in the ceramic tiles investigation against China (3,9 %), that however dates back to 2010

For the original investigation period of the investigation against ceramic tiles from China, see recital (24) of Regulation (EU) No 258/2011. For the target profit of that investigation, see recitals (164) and (197) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011.

, as well as the profitability achieved by the Union industry in the period considered for the expiry review investigation on imports originating in China, throughout which the Union industry was loss-making

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179.

.

(405) Finally, none of the sampled producers made a substantiated claim or provided any evidence that their level of investments, research and development (R&D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition.

(406) In view of the above facts, the Commission resorted to the use of the minimum target profit of 6 % as per Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation. This target profit margin was added to the Union industry’s actual cost of production to establish the non-injurious price.

(407) In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia of the basic Regulation that the Union industry would incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. Based on the evidence available (based on the companies’ accounting systems, their reporting tools and forecasts), the Commission established an additional cost in a range between 0,06 to 0,65 EUR/m2.

(408) This cost comprised the additional future cost to ensure compliance with the Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cornerstone of the Union’s policy to comply with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Such additional cost was calculated on the basis of the estimated price of the Union Allowances (EUAs) which will have to be purchased during the period of the application of the measures. The additional costs also took account of indirect CO2 costs stemming from an increase in electricity prices over the same period linked to the EU ETS and the forecasted prices of EUAs.

(409) On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price for the like product of the Union industry by applying the target profit margin (see recital (406)) to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) on a type-by-type basis.

(410) The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in India and Türkiye, excluding the cooperating exporting producers that were not found to be dumping, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value.

(411) The injury elimination level for other cooperating companies and for all other companies is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies (see recitals (203) to (207) and (256) to (258)).

CountryCompanyDumping marginInjury marginIndiaThe Conor Group8,7 %168,7 %IndiaThe Icon Group6,7 %92,7 %IndiaOther cooperating companies7,3 %115,8 %IndiaAll other companies8,7 %168,7 %TürkiyeHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %150,6 %Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %80,8 %TürkiyeOther cooperating companies9,2 %100,5 %TürkiyeAll other companies20,9 %150,6 %

(412) Following final disclosure, the GoT claimed that the injury elimination margins were distorted by taking into consideration future compliance cost. The GoT enquired about how such cost was reflected in the calculation and whether potential introduction of the carbon border adjustment mechanism was taken into account. In this respect, CGCSA argued that an adjustment for future compliance cost was not compatible with WTO standards.

(413) In addition, CGCSA submitted that high levels of underselling confirmed the inclusion in the sample of Union producers manufacturing artisanal or special design products.

(414) Finally, CGCSA claimed that brand is an important factor in pricing decisions. Therefore, an adjustment for brand should be made when comparing the import prices of Turkish producers with the non-injurious prices of Union producers. To support this claim, CGCSA referred to the average export price of Italian and Spanish producers where the average export price of Italian producers was higher than the average export price of ceramic tiles exported from Spain. The interested party used trade statistics for the comparison.

(415) The GoT’s claim concerning future compliance cost was reiterated after the additional partial disclosure.

(416) The Commission noted that the inclusion of future compliance cost in the calculation of the injury elimination level was in line with the provisions of Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. The parties failed to specify which provisions of WTO ADA the Commission allegedly breached by considering them for the non-injurious price.

(417) To establish the value of such adjustment to the actual cost of production, the Commission compared the unit compliance cost in the IP with the estimated unit compliance cost in the following five years. The average excess value of such unit cost was added to the actual cost of production used in the calculation of non-injurious price. In the present case, the effect of future compliance cost was minor, representing on average approximately 3 % of the non-injurious price. Consequently, the Commission rejected the GoT’s claim that the calculation of the injury elimination level was distorted.

(418) Further, the assertions made by Turkish interested parties with regard to the composition of the sample of Union producers were already addressed in recitals (70) to (74) and (299).

(419) Finally, the Commission noted that neither CGCSA nor any sampled exporting producer requested an adjustment for brand during the investigation. Therefore, the Commission was not able to take position on the respective CGCSA’s claim. In any case, a simple comparison of export prices by Italian and Spanish producers could not be considered as supporting the party’s claim. The differences might have been caused by a number of other factors such as the exported product mix.

(420) Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims concerning the determination of the injury elimination level described in recitals (412) to (414).

6.2.

Conclusion on the level of measures

(421) Following the above assessment, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping dutyIndiaThe Conor Group8,7 %IndiaThe Icon Group6,7 %IndiaOther cooperating companies7,3 %IndiaAll other companies8,7 %TürkiyeHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %TürkiyeOther cooperating companies9,2 %TürkiyeAll other companies20,9 %

1. UNION INTEREST

(422) The Commission examined whether it could clearly conclude that it was not in the Union interest to adopt measures in this case, despite the determination of injurious dumping, in accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of all the various interests involved, including those of the Union industry, importers, users, and consumers.

(423) Following final disclosure, the GoI, GoT, the Turkish companies Seramiksan and Sogutsen Seramik, sixteen Indian exporting producers, and Ceramika Netto claimed that the Commission did not conduct a fair and complete Union interest test. Their claims are addressed in the respective sections below.

7.1.

Interest of the Union industry

(424) The Union industry is composed of more than 300 producers in 24 Member States and employs directly over 54500 people (FTE). The main producing Member States, representing over 85% of total EU production, are Spain, Italy and Poland. As mentioned in recital (59), the Union industry is fragmented; the majority of producers, over 240, are small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As stated in recital (11), over 30% of the total EU production expressly supported the initiation of the investigation and no Union producer expressed opposition or a neutral position. There was also wide support for the investigation by national associations that cooperated with the investigation by providing data to the complainant.

(425) The investigation has shown that the Union industry is suffering material injury due to the dumped imports from India and Türkiye. As concluded in sections 4 and 5, the situation of the whole Union industry deteriorated as a result the increasing quantities of dumped imports from India and Türkiye at low prices. Those imports at such prices have constantly gained market share in the Union at the expense of the Union industry and prevented the Union industry from raising its prices to reasonably profitable levels that would allow it to reach the target profit.

(426) Anti-dumping measures against imports from India and Türkiye are expected to restore fair trade conditions on the Union market. This is expected to enable the Union industry to regain the some of the market share lost to dumped imports and do it at fair prices, improving its profit levels, which in turn would allow the industry to increase their investments. Indeed, investment is critical in this industry not only for maintenance, but also for innovation and investment in developing segments like large slabs. As a result of the measures, Union producers are expected to recover from the injurious situation, further invest and fulfil their commitments, including social and environmental ones.

(427) The non-imposition of measures would worsen the already materially injured situation of the Union industry, which is not strong enough to further withstand an increase of dumped imports at prices even below the Union industry’s costs of production. Should measures not be imposed, it can be expected that the increase of imports of dumped, low-priced ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye would continue. In that situation, the Union industry would be unable to raise its prices to profitable levels and would keep on losing sales to the dumped imports.

(428) The Commission therefore concluded that the imposition of measures is in the interest of the Union Industry.

7.2.

Interest of unrelated importers

(429) On the date of initiation, more than 900 known importers

Complaint, annex 8.

in the Union were contacted and invited to cooperate in the investigation. As explained in recitals (98) and (99), only two unrelated importers cooperated. Both companies replied to the Commission’s deficiency letter following the analysis of their questionnaires, but later stopped cooperating as none of them agreed to an on-spot verification or an RCC. The following analysis is based on their questionnaire replies and their replies to the deficiency letters, and the Commission’s own research

Since the unrelated importers stopped cooperating after the deficiency stage (they did not agree to a verification / RCC), the Commission’s analysis is based on the information they submitted including the supporting evidence (such as financial statements) and publicly available information (financial statements from a company register, financial data published by https://www.romanian-companies.eu/).

.

(430) Those two importers accounted for [3-4] % of the imports from the countries concerned in the investigation period, with India representing the bulk of their imports from the countries concerned. For one of them, the product under investigation was most of its activity in terms of turnover, while for the second, it represented about 1/4. The share of imports from the countries concerned in their total purchases was around 1/4. Both of them purchased significant quantities from Union producers in the investigation period and in 2020, and some smaller quantities from third countries other than the countries concerned. Their weighted average profitability related to the product under investigation, established as explained in recital (429) is in the range of [5-7%].

(431) Based on the above, while from a pure cost perspective any duty would have an impact on the activity of unrelated importers, given the level of the duties, the impact of the duty on the profit margins of the importers, and of those for which trading in ceramic tiles is not their only activity, would be limited, even if they had to absorb it completely. Finally, the investigation has shown that unrelated importers can also source non-dumped imports from other third countries and from the Union, as they did in 2020 and the investigation period. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has sufficient capacity to cover demand in the Union.

(432) On the other hand, not imposing measures would worsen the materially injured situation of the Union industry as explained in recital (427). To be noted that, unlike importers, the Union industry barely made profits during the investigation period. Moreover, as importers rely on both the Union industry and other sources for their purchases, allowing imports to continue entering the Union at dumped prices at the expense of the Union industry would also affect their sources of supply.

(433) On this basis, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on unrelated importers would be limited.

(434) Following final disclosure, Seramiksan submitted that the Union interest test was affected by the fact that the Commission did not receive any information from and examine the interests of approximately 900 importers in the Union.

(435) The Commission noted that it informed all known Union importers about the initiation of the investigation. The Commission analysed and took into account information submitted by all those companies that decided to cooperate or sent submissions. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claim.

(436) Following final disclosure, a number of Union importers indicated that the imposition of measures on imports from Türkiye would cause harm to them as they invested in the development of new collections in cooperation with the Turkish producers.

(437) The Commission noted that those Union importers did not cooperate at an earlier stage of the investigation and did not submit any factual information that would enable the Commission to assess the impact of the measures on those interested parties. In addition, based on comments received from Turkish sampled exporting producers after final disclosure, one Turkish exporting producer was found not to be dumping and the average level of the measures applicable to imports from Türkiye decreased. Thus, the Commission maintained that the effect of the duties on Union importers will be limited.

(438) Ceramika Netto made also several procedural claims following final disclosure.

(439) The company argued that the Commission incorrectly used terms like so-called or labelling themselves as manufacturers. The company submitted that it was recognised as manufacturer under the Union law, in particular under Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 5).

.

(440) The Commission noted that the definitions used in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 305/2011 as per that article were only applicable to matters governed by that regulation. This investigation was conducted under the basic Regulation. Therefore, the definition of a manufacturer laid down by Regulation (EU) 305/2011 did not apply in this proceeding. In fact, according to the information available to the Commission, the company was a Union importer.

(441) Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s statements in recital (461) concerning the price at which it imported to be dumped. In this respect, the company referred to domestic sales invoices and export sales invoices of its Indian suppliers provided to the Commission that, according to the company, proved that its import prices were not dumped.

(442) The Commission recalled that the investigation of dumping behaviour was conducted on a sample of Indian exporting producers. Therefore, any sales invoices submitted by Ceramika Netto were irrelevant for the findings of dumping. In recital (272), the Commission concluded that its findings regarding Conor Group and Icon Group could be extended country-wide. Consequently, those findings applied to imports from Ceramika Netto’s Indian suppliers.

(443) Ceramika Netto disagreed with the Commission’s assessment that it was a non-cooperating company. The company argued that the Notice of Initiation enabled it to submit information not only in the form of a questionnaire reply but also in free format. Ceramika Netto further claimed that the Commission should have informed the company about any information it was missing in the free-format submission.

(444) As noted in recital (440), Ceramika Netto is an importer for the purposes of this investigation. As noted in recitals (75) to (77) the company did not request to be considered as a cooperating importer. The Commission confirmed that, as a Union importer, the company had the option to submit information concerning Union interest in free format. It must be however noted that such information is not subject to deficiency process unlike a full questionnaire reply. The Commission was not obliged to request additional information, in particular as the type of information sought by the Commission was made publicly available via the questionnaires at initiation.

7.3.

Interest of users and consumers

(445) On the date of initiation, the Commission contacted eight associations of users of ceramic tiles in the Union. None of them cooperated in the investigation or sent any submission. Notably, the construction sector, one of the biggest users of ceramic tiles in the Union, did not send any submission. The low level of cooperation from users would suggest that the sector does not rely on imports from the countries concerned or that anti-dumping duties would not have a significant impact on their activities.

(446) The Commission also contacted nine distributors. Only one of them, OBI Group Holding SE & Co, KGaA, agreed to cooperate. For the reasons explained in recital (76), the Commission considered that the company should be investigated as a user/trader of the product under investigation.

(447) The company opposes the imposition of measures and stated that the large production capacities in India and Türkiye cannot be fully replaced by EU producers, but it did not provide any supporting evidence for this statement. As shown in tables 1 and 4, the Union industry has enough capacity to meet EU demand. The company acknowledged the possibility of switching suppliers.

(448) The company purchases ceramic tiles from India and Türkiye mainly from independent importers acting as wholesalers and then resells them via its own large-scale stores and franchising partners. More than half of its purchases of ceramic tiles are Union products. Its profitability deriving from ceramic tiles is [1,5% - 3%], lower than its average profitability. Ceramic tiles represent only a very small part of the total company’s turnover. Therefore, and for the same reasons outlined in recitals (431) and (432), the Commission concluded that the impact on this company would be very limited.

(449) On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on users and traders would be limited.

(450) No association of consumers cooperated in the investigation. In its response to the questionnaire requesting the macro-indicators of the Union industry, CET submitted that it expects the impact on companies operating in the downstream markets – namely distributors and users/consumers – to be very limited, given the alternative sources of supply, and the findings of past investigations on ceramic tiles, that confirmed that ceramic tiles have a marginal bearing on final costs in the construction sector

Regulation (EU) No 258/2011, recital (150).

and that the imposition of measures translates in limited price increases for the final consumer

Regulation (EU) No 258/2011, recital (153); Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011, recital (183); and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2179, recital (206).

.

(451) The current investigation has confirmed the existence of alternative sources of supply other than India and Türkiye, as importers source from the Union and also from third countries other than India and Türkiye (see recitals (430) and (431)). In the absence of any substantiated submission from any consumer association, the Commission cannot accurately assess the impact, if any, that the duties would have on the final consumers, and there is no evidence suggesting that the findings of past investigation would not apply to this one. Also, given the level of the duties, even in case of price increases, these would rather have a limited impact on consumers.

(452) On this basis, and also given the low level of cooperation, the Commission concluded that the effect of the measures on consumers would be limited.

(453) Following final disclosure, sixteen Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission did not take into account the numerous submissions made by Union importers and users. Ceramika Netto also referred to the submissions made by the company on behalf of its customers and trading partners. According to the company, those submissions indicated how harmful the imposition of measures would be to the company, its Indian supplier, Union importers, users and final customers.

(454) The Commission noted that it analysed the numerous submissions referred to by the Indian exporting producers and Ceramika Netto, and those were deficient in several aspects. First, they were made by companies which never registered as interested parties to the investigation. Second, they were submitted to the Commission by Ceramika Netto, an interested party that had not been empowered to act on behalf of those companies. Third, many of the submissions were made after the deadline(s) laid down by the Notice of Initiation. Finally, the submissions were mostly expressing opinions but lacked factual information and evidence that would support the opinions of those companies. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims.

7.4.

Other factors

(455) Besides the cooperating parties mentioned above, a number of interested parties made submissions stating that the imposition of measures would be against the Union interest.

(456) The following recitals analyse the claims, but, at the outset, the Commission notes that none of these interested parties, allegedly importers or users of ceramic tiles, or even so-called Union manufacturers (see recital (266))

For example, GANDALF Pawel Gagorowski (Poland) or ILCOM s.r.l (Italy) identified themselves as importers, VEDMAX s.r.l. (Romania) or Orient Ceramic (Romania) identified themselves as users/importers, Ogrodnik Niemirscy Sp.J (Poland) identified itself as a seller, while Netto & Cortina (Poland) identified themselves throughout the investigation as the manufacturers from Białystok.

, according to their submissions, cooperated with the investigation or sent a questionnaire reply. Their submissions are statements not supported by any evidence. Therefore, the Commission cannot assess how dependent these companies are on imports from the countries concerned or the potential impact of any duty on them.

(457) First, these parties pointed to potential supply chain difficulties, also given the current geopolitical events like the war in Ukraine. These parties stated that any duty would force buyers to rely exclusively on the Union industry. According to them it is necessary to keep all importing options open since the Union industry is struggling to cater Union demand and that users cannot rely on the Union industry.

(458) The claims are dismissed. First, they are unsubstantiated. Second, the investigation revealed that the Union industry has enough capacity to supply the whole Union market. The investigation has also shown that importers and users have recourse to non-dumped imports from third countries other than the countries concerned; in fact, the importers and users that cooperated with the investigation sourced from both the Union industry and third countries other than the countries concerned in 2020 and the investigation period.

(459) The Commission acknowledged that it might be difficult to source from Ukraine (a traditional, if minor, source of supply of ceramic tiles to the Union, see table 11). However, as stated in the previous recital, there are still sources of non-dumped imports and those channels are not affected by the current situation. Brazil, Vietnam, Iran, Indonesia and Egypt were on the top 10 manufacturing countries worldwide in 2020; Iran, Brazil, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates were among the top 10 exporters in the same period

Source: macroquestionnaire, section D.2.1. and complaint, ps 49 and 52.

.

(460) Second, with a focus on imports from India, these parties expressed concern that any potential duty would limit consumer’s choice as well as the possibility to outsource production to India. In their statements, Netto & Cortina attached several letters from their customers expressing satisfaction with their purchases as evidence that it is not in the Union interest to impose measures as it would, also, limit consumer choice by forcing them to buy from the Union industry.

(461) The Commission noted that the allegations were unsubstantiated. These parties did not provide any evidence that the ceramic tiles they import from India could not be produced and sold by the Union industry. In fact, these parties acknowledged that the choice of consumers is driven by price

See for example Netto & Cortina’s Additional statement in the case AD684 pages 8 and 14.

, when they mentioned the right to choose the best offer at the best price. In this case, these prices were found to be dumped. The aim of the anti-dumping duties is to restore the level playing field by counteracting dumping. Consumers, importers and users will still be able to buy the products from the countries concerned, or outsource production to then import them, but at fair prices by paying the anti-dumping duties, and they will also be able to source from the Union industry or other countries.

(462) Third, many of these parties stated that Indian products are not dumped in the Union, and that the enormous increase of international transport costs (allegedly by more than 1000%) made them more expensive in the Union.

(463) The claim also was dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence regarding transport costs. Dumping was found on the basis of the normal value and export price, both at ex-works level, of the sampled exporting producers during the investigation period.

(464) Fourth, these parties alleged that any potential anti-dumping duty would not be in the Union interest as it would lead to high price pressure on consumers on top of the current high level of inflation in the Union, curtail healthy competition and cause many businesses that rely on those imports to close down, especially in the poorer parts of the Union.

(465) The claims were dismissed as unsubstantiated. The parties did not provide any evidence of the potential impact of any duty on consumers or businesses.

(466) The allegations submitted by Netto and Cortina regarding close-downs; bankruptcy: mass reduction of jobs in the Union, and not only those of importers, consumers and traders, but also of other industries, like logistics or design, especially in the poorest regions, referring specifically to Poland; are also unsubstantiated. The investigation established that the impact of the duties on importers, consumers and traders is likely to be limited (see recitals (429) to (431)), and therefore close-downs, bankruptcies or mass reduction of jobs are unlikely. The investigation has also established that manufacture of ceramic tiles takes place across the Union, with Poland being the third manufacturing country in the EU, and that, unlike traders or importers, the Union industry has not been able to recover its costs and steadily lost market share to imports from India and Türkiye.

(467) Regarding the indirect impact on other industries, and while Netto & Cortina submitted no evidence or quantification, the Commission notes the non-imposition of duties would also affect other industries. For example, according to the Spanish association of manufacturers (ASCER) the ceramic tiles industry generated, both direct and indirect, 60000 jobs in Spain, amounting to 2,4 % of industrial employment. Each direct job was estimated to create a further 3,8 indirect jobs

Impacto socioeconómico y fiscal del sector de azulejos y pavimentos cerámicos en España. Available at https://transparencia.ascer.es/media/1039/informe-impacto-socioeco-sector-cer%C3%A1mico_ascer.pdf (last viewed 7 October 2022).

. Regarding impact on regions, in the area of Castellon in Spain ceramic tiles producers are part of a cluster where most of the companies are SMEs and directly or indirectly depend on the ceramic tile production industry.

(468) In sum, the interested parties have not submitted any evidence that the non-imposition of duties would outweigh the positive consequences for the Union industry of imposing measures, as explained in recitals (424) to (428).

(469) Following final disclosure, the GoT and sixteen Indian exporting producers argued that the Commission should have taken into account the effects of the Russian invasion in Ukraine on the Union market of ceramic tiles. In particular, the parties claimed that the war led to increasing energy prices and blocked access to raw materials that might, together with existing barriers such as the anti-dumping measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in China, negatively affect the supply chains and put more pressure on the Union importers and users.

(470) Following the additional partial disclosure, the GoT reiterated that the Covid-19 pandemic proved the importance of well functioning supply chains. The GoT maintained that open channels of supply from Türkiye to the Union remained crucial in energy intensive industries like the production of ceramic tiles, in particular in context of the ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine, the sanctions imposed by the Union and the subsequent increase in energy prices.

(471) With regard to the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Commission noted that it has had a negative effect on the Union producers in the first place. The impact of the war on importers and users is limited as the volume of imports from Ukraine was already negligible during the period considered. In addition, the non-imposition of the measures on two sampled exporting producers (Lavish Group and Vitra Group) will reduce any additional pressure put on supply chains due to the war. Consequently, the Commission dismissed the claims described in recitals (469) and (470).

(472) Following the additional partial disclosure, CGCSA argued that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would be against the interest of the highly integrated ceramic tiles industries in the Union and in Türkiye. In this respect, the association pointed out that the Turkish ceramic tiles producers sourced their raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts from the Union. Total value of such purchases increased from 163 million EUR in 2019, through 188 million EUR in 2020, 233 million EUR in 2021 up to 309 million EUR in the first ten months of 2022. In addition, Turkish companies invested in ceramic tiles manufacturing, logistics and services in the Union. Total value of such investments reached 366 million EUR over the period of 2019 – 2021 and created approximately 1700 jobs. At a hearing with the Commission services, the GoT made similar arguments.

(473) The Commission acknowledged the interdependencies between the Turkish and Union ceramic tiles industry. Nevertheless, the Commission noted that there was no evidence that the procurement of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts was directly linked to the ceramic tiles exports to the Union. For example, the purchase value substantially increased between 2021 (full year) and 2022 (first ten months) although, as confirmed by the GoT (see recital (282)), the volume of ceramic tiles exports from Türkiye to the Union decreased in the first ten months of 2022 as compared to the same period of 2021. In addition, restoring the level playing field should lead to an increased production in the Union thus providing the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts with new business opportunities.

(474) Moreover, the Commission took note of the investment activities by Turkish companies in the ceramic tiles industry in the Union. Those investments increase employment and foster economic development in the respective regions. Restoring a level playing field in the Union will benefit the investments already realised by Turkish producers and may motivate further investments. Finally, the party failed to specify to what extent those purchases and investments were carried out by the Vitra Group, which was found not to be dumping and will thus not be affected by the anti-dumping measures.

(475) In view of the considerations described in recitals (473) and (474), the Commission concluded that the measures may have a very limited impact on the Union suppliers of raw and consumable materials, fixed assets, and spare parts and be in favour of these investments realised by Turkish producer in the Union. Consequently, the Commission rejected the claims presented in recital (472).

7.5.

Conclusion on Union interest

(476) On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of ceramic tiles originating in India and Türkiye.

1. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

(477) On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. Anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule. As mentioned in section 3, anti-dumping duties are not applicable to the Indian exporting producer Lavish Group and to the Turkish exporting producer Vitra Group.

(478) On the basis of the above, the definitive anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping dutyIndiaThe Conor Group8,7 %IndiaThe Icon Group6,7 %IndiaOther cooperating companies7,3 %IndiaAll other companies8,7 %TürkiyeHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.,

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %TürkiyeOther cooperating companies9,2 %TürkiyeAll other companies20,9 %

(479) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under investigation originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to all other companies. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(480) A company, among those specifically mentioned in this Regulation, may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(481) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but also to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

(482) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to all other companies.

(483) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this Regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(484) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(485) Exporting producers that did not export the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period should be able to request the Commission to be made subject to the anti-dumping duty rate for cooperating companies not included in the sample. The Commission should grant such request provided that three conditions are met. The new exporting producer would have to demonstrate that: (i) it did not export the product concerned to the Union during the IP; (ii) it is not related to an exporting producer that did so; and (iii) has exported the product concerned thereafter or has entered into an irrevocable contractual obligation to do so in substantial quantities.

1. FINAL PROVISIONS

(486) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(487) The measures provided for in this regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing; finishing ceramics, currently falling under CN codes 69072100, 69072200, 69072300, 69073000 and 69074000 and originating in India or Türkiye.

1. The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping dutyTARIC additional codeIndiaConor Granito Pvt Ltd.; Corial Ceramic Pvt Ltd.8,7 %C898IndiaAcecon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Avlon Ceramics Pvt Ltd.; Duracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Eracon Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Evershine Vitrified Pvt Ltd.; Icon Granito Pvt Ltd.; Venice Ceramics Pvt Ltd.6,7 %C899IndiaOther cooperating companies listed in Annex I7,3%IndiaAll other companies8,7%C999TürkiyeHitit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.20,9 %C900Türkiye

Qua Granite ve Hayal Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.;

Bien Yapi Ürünleri San. Tic. A.Ş.

4,8 %C901TürkiyeOther cooperating companies listed in Annex II9,2 %TürkiyeAll other companies20,9 %C999

1. Anti-dumping duties are not applicable to the Indian exporting producer the Lavish Group, consisting of Lavish Granito Pvt Ltd., Lavish Ceramics Pvt Ltd., Lakme Vitrified Pvt Ltd. and Liva Ceramics Pvt Ltd. (TARIC additional code C903), and are not applicable to the Turkish exporting producer Vitra Karo Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (TARIC additional code C902).

1. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2, as well as the non-application of any anti-dumping duty rate for the companies mentioned in paragraph 3, shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: I, the undersigned, certify that the [volume] of [product concerned] sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by [company name and address] (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct. If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

1. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

Favourite Plus Ceramic Private Limited

Clayart Granito LLP

Torino Tiles LLP

Astila Ceramic Private Limited

C945India

Commander Vitrified Private Limited

Creanza Ceramic Private Limited

Commander Ceramic Industries

Amora Tiles Private Limited

Amora Ceramics Private Limited

C946IndiaCruso Granito Private LimitedC947IndiaCyber CeramicsC948IndiaDelta CeramicC949IndiaDureza Granito Private LimitedC950India

Emcer Tiles Private Limited

Emcer Granito LLP

Sanford Vitrified Private Limited

Parker Tiles Private Limited

Ascent Ceramica Private Limited

Lenswood Ceramic

C951IndiaExotica Ceramic Private LimitedC952IndiaExxaro Tiles LimitedC953

India

Face Ceramics Private Limited

Fea Ceramics

Cygen Ceramic LLP

Sorento Granito Private Limited

Soriso Ceramic Private Limited

Soriso Granito LLP

Angel Ceramic Pct Limited

Blue Art Granito Private Limited

Face Impex Private Limited

C954IndiaFavourite Plus Ceramic Private LimitedC956India

Flavour Granito LLP

Rex Ceramic Private Limited

C957India

Fusion Granito Private Limited

Vivanta Ceramic Private Limited

C958IndiaGold Cera InternationalC959India

Gryphon Ceramics Private Limited

Cosa Ceramics Pct Limited

RAK Ceramics Private Limited

Gris Ceramic LLP

Grupo Griffin Ceramica LLP

Alpas Cera LLP

C960IndiaHandmada InternationalC961IndiaHilltop CeramicC962India

Ibis Smart Marble Private Limited

Silverpearl Tile Private Limited

C963India

Italica Granito Private Limited

Italica Floor Tiles Private Limited

Soriso Ceramic Private Limited

C964India

Ita Lake Ceramic Private Limited

Itaca Ceramic Private Limited

Sperita Granito LLP

C966India

Itacon Granito Private Limited

U-Con Ceramica LLP

Tecon Tiles Private Limited

Valencia Ceramic Private Limited

Livolla Granito LLP

Velloza Granito LLP

C968India

Italia Ceramics Limited

Piccolo Mosaic Limited

C969IndiaItalus Vitrified LLPC971India

Itcos Granito LLP

Icera Tiles LLP

C972India

Itoli Granito LLP

Imlis Ceramica LLP

C973

IndiaK2D EximC974India

Kag Granito LLP

Rollza Granito LLP

C975India

Kajaria Ceramics Limited

Jaxx Vitrified Private Limited

Cosa Ceramics Private Limited

Kajaria Tiles Private Limited

Vennar Ceramics Limited

C976IndiaKeezia Tiles LLPC977IndiaKitco CeramicC978India

Kripton Granito Private Limited

Kripton Ceramic Private Limited

La Berry Ceramics Private Limited

Nice Ceramic Private Limited

Gresart Ceramica Private Limited

C979India

Latto Tiles LLP

Spinora Tiles Private Limited

C980India

Laxveer Ceramic LLP

Lovato Ceramic Private Limited

C981India

Leopard Vitrified Private Limited

Livon Ceramic

Letoza Granito LLP

C982India

Lexus Granito India Limited

Lioli Ceramica Private Limited

C983India

Lezora Vitrified Private Limited

Lemzon Granito LLP

Lezwin Tiles LLP

Sisam Granito LLP

C984India

Livenza Granito LLP

Livanto Ceramic Private Limited

Lizzart Granito LLP

Linia Ceramic LLP

L Tile Granito LLP

C986India

Lorence Vitrified LLP

Lepono Porcelano LLP

Lanford Ceramic Private Limited

C987India

Lycos Ceramic Private Limited

Livolla Granito LLP

Crevita Granito Private Limited

C988India

Maps Granito Private Limited

Perth Ceramic Private Limited

C989India

Marbilano Tiles LLP

Marbilano Surface LLP

C990India

Max Granito Private Limited

Epos Tiles LLP

C119

India

Metropole Tiles Private Limited

Metro City Tiles Private Limited

Metro Ceramics

Mactile India Private Limited

C120India

Millennium Granito India Private Limited

Lorenzo Vitrified Tiles Private Limited

Millenium Vitrified Tile Private Limited

Millenium Tile LLP

Clan Vitrified Private Limited

Millenium Ceramic LLP

Millenia Ceramica Private Limited

Millenium Cera Tiles Private Limited

C121India

Montana Tiles

Plazma Granito Private Limited

Raykas Ceramic LLP

C122India

Motto Ceramic Private Limited

Motto Tiles Private Limited

Slimtile Private Limited

Monza Granito Private Limited

Rossa Tiles Private Limited

Motto Stone Private Limited

C123India

Mox tiles LLP

Itile LLP

Swell Granito LLP

C124India

Neelson Ceramic LLP

Neelson Porselano LLP

Win Tel Ceramics Private Limited

Theos Tiles LLP

C125India

Nehani Tiles Private Limited

Neha Ceramic Industries

Orinda Granito LLP

Orinda Industries LLP

C126India

Nessa Vitrified LLP

LGF Vitrified Private Limited

C127India

Nexion International Private Limited

Simpolo Vitrified Private Limited

C130IndiaNitco LimitedC131India

Oasis Vitrified Private Limited

Oasis Tiles LLP

Max Ceramics Private Limited

Revenza Ceramics

C132IndiaOlwin Tiles (India) Private LimitedC133IndiaOnery Tiles LLPC134IndiaOscar CeramicsC136India

Pavit Ceramics Private Limited

Victory Ceratech Private Limited

C138

India

Prism Johnson Limited

Antique Marbonite Private Limited

Coral Gold Tiles Private Limited

Sanskar Ceramics Private Limited

Spectrum Johnson Tiles Private Limited

Small Johnson Floor Tiles Private Limited

Sparten Granito Private Limited

C142IndiaQ-BO (Savion Ceramic)C308IndiaQutone Ceramic Private LimitedC631IndiaRange Ceramic Private LimitedC633India

Rey Cera Creation Private Limited

Simbel Ceramic Private Limited

Adoration Ceramica Private Limited

C636India

Scientifica Tiles LLP

Saiwin Ceramic Private Limited

Saimax Ceramic Private Limited

Siscon Tiles LLP

Aland Ceramic Private Limited

C639IndiaSeron Granito Private LimitedC640IndiaSez Vitrified Private LimitedC641IndiaSilon Granito LLPC642India

Simero Vitrified Private Limited

Simero International LLP

C643IndiaSimola Tiles LLPC644India

Skajen Vitrified Private Limited

Spice Ceramic Private Limited

Legend Ceramic Private Limited

C646India

Skytouch Ceramic Private Limited

Icolux Porcelano LLP

C648India

Sober Plus Ceramics

Sober Ceramics

C649IndiaSolizo Vitrified Private LimitedC650India

Somany Ceramics Limited

Vintage Tiles Private Limited

Vicon Ceramic Private Limited

Amora Tiles Private Limited

Amora Ceramics Private Limited

Acer Granito Private Limited

Somany Fine Vitrified Private Limited

Sudha Somany Ceramics Private Limited and

Somany Piastrelle Private Limited

C651IndiaSparron Vitrified LLPC652

India

Square Ceramic Private Limited

Casva Tiles Private Limited

A004IndiaStarco CeramicA005IndiaSunland Ceramic Private LimitedA006India

Sunworld Vitrified Private Limited

Shagun Ceramics

A007India

Swellco Ceramic

Axison Vitrified Private Limited

Axiom Ceramic Private Limited

A008India

Titanium Vitrified Private Limited

Moral Ceramic Private Limited

Onery Tiles LLP

A010India

Varmora Granito Private Limited

Tocco Ceramics Private Limited

Solaris Ceramics Private Limited

Nextile Marbosys Private Limited

Fiorenza GRanito Private Limited

Sentosa Granito Private Limited,

Renite Vitrified LLP

Avalta Granito Private Limited and

Covertek Ceramica Private Limited

A013India

Velsaa Vitrified LLP

Velsaa Enterprises LLP

Boss Ceramics

Magnum Ceramics

A014IndiaVerona Granito Private LimitedA016IndiaWallmark Ceramic IndustryA017IndiaZarko Granito Private LimitedA019IndiaZealtop Granito Private LimitedA020IndiaVita GranitoC926

Annex

ANNEX II

Turkish cooperating exporting producers not sampled

A.Ş. stands for Anonim Şirketi

CountryNameTARIC additional codeTürkiye

Akgün Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

Akgün Toprak Sanayi İnşaat ve Ticaret A.Ş.

Veli Akgün Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

C904TürkiyeAnka Toprak Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C905TürkiyeDecovita Yapi Ürünleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C906TürkiyeEge Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C907TürkiyeEtili Seramik İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C908TürkiyeGraniser Granit Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C909TürkiyeKaleseramik Çanakkale Kalebodur Seramik Sanayi A.Ş.C910TürkiyeKaro Metro Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C911TürkiyeNG Kütahya Seramik Porselen Turizm A.Ş.C912TürkiyeSeramiksan Turgutlu Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C913TürkiyeSeranit Granit Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.C914TürkiyeSöğütsen Seramik Sanayi İnşaat Madencilik İthalat İhracat A.Ş.C915TürkiyeTermal Seramik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.C916TürkiyeUşak Seramik Sanayi A.Ş.C917TürkiyeYurtbay Seramik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.C918