Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1100 of 5 July 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Turkey

(140) To provide a picture of the Union industry that is as complete as possible, the Commission obtained data for the entire production of the product concerned and determined whether the production was destined for captive use or for the free market. For the injury indicators mentioned in recital (82) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission analysed separately data related to the free and the captive market and made a comparative analysis where possible and where justified. As to the economic indicators mentioned in recital (83) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission could only conduct a meaningful assessment by referring to the whole activity of the Union industry. Therefore, the Commission considered its analysis to be in line with case law of the Union courts and the WTO

ECJ, Case C-315/90 Gimelec v Commission, EU:C:1991:447, paragraphs 21 to 29; Report of the WTO Appellate Bodn24.7.2001, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, paragraphs 181 to 215.

.

(141) Following final disclosure, the GOT insisted that the Commission had acted inconsistently with WTO jurisprudence because i) it did not analyse separately data for sales prices, cost of production, growth, export volume and prices, profitability, return on investment and cash flow, ii) nor provided any explanation why it only examined free market data instead of making a separate and comparable examination. The Commission disagreed as, further to what is explained in the recital above, the questionnaire responses submitted by sampled Union producers allowed for an analysis of sales prices, sales volumes and profitability in the free market versus other markets. The fact that table 10 shows sales prices in the free market does not mean that sales prices in the captive market were not examined.

(142) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (78) to (83) of the provisional Regulation.

4.3.

Union consumption

4.3.1.

Free market consumption in the Union

(143) In EU27 the Union consumption on the free market during the period considered developed as follows:

Table 1

Free market consumption on the Union market (tonnes)

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPUnion consumption on the free market33 – 34 million32 – 33 million34 – 35 million33 – 34 millionIndex1009610299

(144) Between 2016 and 2018, the free market consumption went up by 2 % but it consequently went down. Overall, consumption in the free market dropped by 1 % over the period considered.

4.3.2.

Captive consumption on the Union market

(145) In EU27 the Union captive consumption over the period considered developed as follows:

Table 2

Captive consumption on the Union market (tonnes)

Source: Eurofer and sampled Union producers

201620172018IPCaptive Union consumption42,5 – 45,5 million44 – 47 million43,5 – 46,5 million39,5 – 42,5 millionIndex10010310293

(146) Captive market consumption went up slightly in the first part of the investigation period, after which it decreased. Overall captive consumption dropped by 7 percentage points during the period considered.

4.3.3.

Overall consumption

(147) IN EU27, overall consumption – the sum of captive and free market consumption – evolved as follows during the period considered:

Table 3

Overall consumption (free and captive market) (tonnes)

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPOverall Union consumption78 – 81 million78 – 81 million80 – 83 million74 – 77 millionIndex10010010295

(148) The above table shows that overall consumption went up slightly in 2018 but dropped by 5 % overall as compared to 2016. Captive consumption represented 59 % of overall consumption in the investigation period.

4.4.

Imports from Turkey

4.4.1.

Volume and market share of the imports from Turkey

(149) Imports from Turkey into EU27 developed as follows:

Table 4

Import volume and market share

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPVolume of imports from Turkey (tonnes)934651173801727791742767658Index100186297296Market share on free market (%)2,8 – 3,15,3 – 5,67,8 – 8,18,2 – 8,5Index100190 – 220270 -300270 – 300

(150) Imports from Turkey increased by 196 % over the period considered, almost tripling their share on the free market.

(151) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that imports from Turkey did not take the market share of the Union industry but only took certain share from the third countries, which could not have any effect on Union producers.

(152) Following final disclosure, the GOT added that the Commission analysis on import volume from Turkey was end-point to end-point and invited the Commission to analyse rather the evolution on the basis of quarterly data from 2019 and 2020 and drops in imports after the investigation period. The Commission noted that the GOT’s approach cannot put in question the fact that imports from Turkey increased year-on-year between 2016 and 2018, by 196 % over the period considered and that they almost tripled their share on the free market.

(153) Given the nature of these comments, they are addressed in section 5 below.

4.4.2.

Prices of the imports from Turkey and price undercutting

(154) The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. The weighted average price of imports from Turkey into EU27 developed as follows:

Table 5

Import prices (EUR/tonne)

Source: Eurostat

201620172018IPTurkey363490538492Index100135148136

(155) The average prices of the imports from Turkey increased from 363 EUR/tonne in 2016 to 492 EUR/tonne during the investigation period, an increase by 36 %. The difference between the average prices of the dumped imports and the Union industry’s average Union sales prices during the investigation period, as reflected in Table 10, was significant (7,8 %).

(156) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT considered that prices of Turkish imports could have not caused injury to Union producers. Given the nature of these comments, they are addressed in section 5 below.

(157) The undercutting margin calculations have been revised to reflect the situation on an EU27 basis, and the Commission established that the dumped imports of the sampled exporting producers showed weighted average undercutting margins between 1,2 % and 2 %. Since the market for HRFS is very price-sensitive and competition is largely based on price, the Commission considered such undercutting margins to be significant.

(158) Following final disclosure, Eurofer underlined that, given the nature of the market, and the existence of significant price competition, even a comparatively low level of undercutting can be significant. The GOT however stated that to qualify the undercutting margins found as significant was a mere allegation as it lacked a proper evaluation or criteria establishing what margin should be considered significant. The Commission rejected the claim as unfounded. The evolution in the market and the change in import sources observed in Table 14 confirm the importance of price in the HRFS market. Moreover, as the GOT itself had admitted, a small price difference entailed the increase in the market share of Turkish imports

Last paragraph of page 14 of document reference t21.000916 of the non-confidential file (submission made by the Government of Turkey).

.

(159) Following final disclosure, Erdemir and Colakoglu groups claimed that by establishing undercutting for 66,1 % (Colakoglu group) or 69,5 % (Erdemir group) of the sampled Union producer’s sales, the Commission did not establish undercutting for the product as a whole and thereby violated Article 3(3) basic Regulation. In their view, it could not be excluded that the undercutting margins found would have been different if the Commission had examined the price effect on the basis of all of the sampled Union producers’ sales. The Commission rejected this claim as unfounded, as the basic Regulation does not require that a finding of undercutting is based on all of the sampled Union producer’s sales. Rather, a price analysis is based on a comparison between the models exported to the Union and the like product and it is in the nature of comparing export sales of exporting producers with sales of the Union industry that not all models sold by the (three) sampled Union producers are also exported to the Union by each individual exporting producer. In any event, the Commission recalled that the difference between the average prices of the dumped imports and the Union industry’s average Union sales prices during the investigation period, as reflected in Table 10, was significant (7,8 %).

4.5.

Economic situation of the Union industry

4.5.1.

General remarks

(160) The Commission recalls that at the initial stage the complainant had requested the Commission to start the analysis of injury trends as of 2017 on the grounds that 2016 (the first year of the period considered in this investigation) was an unrepresentative year since the Union industry was found to be injured by dumped and subsidised imports from several sources. The Commission acknowledged that the evolution of the injury indicators starting in 2016 was tainted by the fact that the Union industry’s situation was still affected by dumped and subsidised imports in 2016 whilst in 2017 the Union industry clearly showed signs of recovery following the imposition in that year of definitive anti-dumping and countervailing measures against those imports. However, the Commission decided to present the data pursuant to its normal practice, which is to consider in addition to the investigation period the three calendar years prior to the investigation period. Therefore the Commission also included 2016 in the period considered.

(161) After provisional disclosure, ÇİB argued that the certain aspects of the injury analysis appeared to exclude 2016 data and that this had misled the Commission’s injury assessment. After final disclosure, the party clarified that it contested the lack of assessment of indicators from 2016, in particular the ones showing a positive trend after 2016 (e.g. Union industry free market sales volume and market share), which are to be seen a demonstration of lack of material injury to the Union industry. After provisional disclosure, the GOT claimed, in the same vein, that the examination of the alleged injury on the domestic industry should be based on the period 2016-2019, which it claimed was not case for all injury indicators. In particular, the GOT considered that in the recent past it was impossible to link any improvement or deterioration of the industry to an existence or non-existence of trade defence measures. The GOT criticised recital (104) in fine of the provisional Regulation because, in its view, the fact that definitive anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties against China were published in April and June 2017

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 of 5 April 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 92, 6.4.2017, p. 68); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/969 of 8 June 2017 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 146, 9.6.2017, p. 17).

and that definitive anti-dumping measures against Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine were imposed in October 2017

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 of 5 October 2017 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat product of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia (OJ L 258, 6.10.2017, p. 24).

entailed that all injurious effects of dumped imports from these countries were still present in 2017. In support of this claim the GOT underlined that in 2017, imports from these five countries still represented 26 % of HRFS imports.

(162) As to claims relating to the inclusion or not of the year 2016 as concerns some of the injury indicators, the Commission clarified that the relevant tables, section 1.8 and the other findings in the provisional Regulation, covered the period 2016-2019, as stated in the Regulation. The comments under the tables relating to the period considered take stock of trends starting in 2016, no matter whether they are positive or negative. This remains the case even where, as in the present case, the Commission took stock of and considered events occurring in a specific timeframe within the period considered, including trade defence measures.

(163) As regards the anti-dumping measures against Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine, the investigation covered the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. As to the anti-dumping and countervailing measures against China, the investigation of dumping, subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015. The comments by the GOT that the five countries still accounted for 26 % of imports of the product concerned in 2017 and that therefore they still injured the Union industry is misleading. As Table 14 in the provisional Regulation demonstrates, the volume of imports from the five countries concerned dropped by 68 % (i.e. from 5724303 tonnes to 1810518 tonnes) between 2016 and 2017 and their combined market share from 16,1 % to 5,2 %. These trends are confirmed on an EU27 basis. Table 14 in this Regulation demonstrates that the volume of imports from the five countries concerned dropped significantly (i.e. from 5611020 tonnes to 1565303 tonnes) between 2016 and 2019, similar to their combined market share (i.e. from 16 – 17 % to 4 – 5 %). The Commission thus considered as unfounded the claim that previous investigations had revealed that all injurious effects of dumped imports from China, Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine were still present in 2017.

(164) Following final disclosure the GOT recalled its comments regarding the timing of the definitive anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties against China and the definitive anti-dumping measures against Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine. It alleged that the decrease in imports from these countries does not change the fact that these imports still constituted a significant part of the EU27 imports and were injurious in 2017. In the GOT’s views the Commission tried to avoid the examination of such injurious effects by relying on figures showing an absolute decrease. The Commission considered the claim unfounded. The investigation periods of the previous investigations did not establish injurious dumping in 2017, at which point, as already recalled, the market shares of the subject countries had already dramatically decreased. In addition, the section 5.2.1 of the present regulation includes an analysis of the evolution in the market and of the market shares of the different import sources.

4.5.2.

Macroeconomic indicators

4.5.2.1.

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

(165) The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 6

Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPProduction volume (tonnes)74 – 77,5 million77 – 80,5 million76 – 79,5 million71 – 74,5 millionIndex10010410296Production capacity (tonnes)88 – 93 million89 – 94,5 million90 – 95,5 million91 – 96 millionIndex100102103104Capacity utilisation (%)84868478Index1001029993

(166) During the period considered, the Union industry’s production volume decreased by 4 %, while the production capacity increased by 4 %. Consequently, the capacity utilisation decreased by 7 %, from 84 % in 2016 to 78 % in the investigation period.

(167) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT considered that the fact that the Union industry increased its capacity every year since 2016 showed that it was in in good condition. The Commission disagreed, noting, as stated in recital (107) of the provisional Regulation, that the increase in capacity between 2016 and 2017 reflects the improvement of the Union market conditions following the imposition of definitive anti-dumping and countervailing measures against imports from five countries and that the capacity increases since 2017 were rather the result of increased efficiencies and debottlenecking.

(168) The GOT criticised the absence of a separate analysis between captive and free market under this paragraph, an absence that would not allow the identification of the origin of the overall decrease in production. The Commission considered that a split of table 6 between captive and free market would be meaningless. Indeed Union producers use the same production equipment and lines for the production of the product under investigation, no matter whether it is for captive use or not. However, more details with regard to the captive market volume are provided in Table 8 below.

4.5.2.2.

Sales volume and market share

(169) The Union industry’s sales volume and market share on the free market in EU27 developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 7

Free market sales volume and market share

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPUnion industry EU sales (tonnes)24 – 27 million24 – 27,5 million25 – 28,4 million24,5 – 27,5 millionIndex100101103103

Market share (%)75 – 7679 – 8076 – 7778 – 79Index100105102104

(170) The Union industry’s sales volume on the free market increased by 3 % over the period considered and its market share by 4 %.

(171) In EU27, the Union industry’s captive volume and market share on the Union market developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 8

Captive volume and market share

Source: Eurofer, sampled Union producers and Eurostat

201620172018IPCaptive Union market volume (tonnes)42,5 – 45,5 million44 – 47 million43,5 – 46,5 million39,5 – 42,5 millionIndex10010310293Total production of Union industry (tonnes)73 – 76 million76 – 79 million75 – 78 million70 – 73 millionIndex10010410296Share of captive market over the total Union production (%)61616159Index100999996

(172) The captive market of the Union industry (composed of HRFS kept by the Union industry for downstream use) in the Union decreased by 7 %, or about 3 million tonnes, over the period considered. The Union industry’s captive market share (expressed as a percentage of total Union production) decreased from 61 % in 2016 to 59 % in the investigation period.

(173) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT criticized the fact that the Commission, in recital (109) of the provisional Regulation, explained the increase of free market share by the Union industry between 2018 and 2019 by the fact that significant sales volumes shifted from the captive market to the free market due to divestment. It considered that this explanation demonstrated a biased approach by the Commission in distinguishing between these markets as it sees fit. The GOT reiterated its claim after final disclosure and questioned the objectivity of the way the evolution of the Union industry’s market share was established. The Commission rejected the allegation of a biased approach. The Commission deems legitimate, and indeed, necessary, to re-characterise captive production as free market in the event of a divestment. Even if, as stated by the GOT, the free market share of Union producers increased over the period considered, the Commission noted that such increase was of a significantly lower magnitude than the increase of the market share of Turkish imports during the same period. In a context of a rather stable consumption in the Union, Turkish imports filled the gap left by some other third countries subject to trade anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties since 2017.

(174) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that there was no analysis regarding the production volume of the production lines that were sold as explained in recital (111) of the provisional Regulation. ÇİB submitted that this sale was due to strategic and commercial reasons. The Commission noted that the sale concerned a change of ownership between Union producers which has no impact on table 6. The Commission found no link between the sale in question and Turkish imports.

(175) Following provisional disclosure, ÇİB stated that key injury indicators like sales volume and market share in the free market showed that the Union industry was not performing poorly. The Commission found the statement unfounded because recitals (109) and (150) of the provisional Regulation already explained that the Union industry’s market share increased due to a divestment which resulted in an important number of transactions that would previously have been considered as captive became transactions in the free market. Also, the determination of injury is based on an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry considered together, as provided for in Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

(176) Following final disclosure, ÇİB said that the Commission’s comments under this section did not explain why the Union industry grew nor why an increase in market sales volume and share lack importance in this particular case. Given their nature, these comments are addressed in recital (217) below.

4.5.2.3.

Growth

(177) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that recital (112) of the provisional Regulation consisted of unsupported allegations and criticised some of the wording. The Commission found the claims unfounded as the recital in question makes explicit reference to data and findings in the provisional Regulation.

(178) Figures for the EU27 in respect of production show a strongly decreasing trend as from 2017, while sales and market share were stable against a slight increase in free market consumption over the same period. The Union industry in the EU27 only grew, and very modestly, if 2016, a year in which it had been found injured by dumped imports from other countries, is taken as a starting point.

(179) Following final disclosure, the GOT wondered whether certain conclusions on growth were objective as the Commission had previously qualified the decrease in production as strong but the increase in free market sales as slight. The Commission noted first, that the percentages cited in by the GOT in its claim were not those for EU27, and hence outdated; and second, that in any event, a comparative discussion of how to qualify a percentage change must factor in the relative size of the underlying value subject to that change.

4.5.2.4.

Employment and productivity

(180) For EU27, employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 9

Employment and productivity

Source: Eurofer and sampled Union producers

201620172018IPNumber of employees38 – 40 thousand42 – 44 thousand38 – 40 thousand37 – 39 thousandIndex100112103100Productivity (tonnes per staff)1900 – 20001700 – 18001900 – 20001800 – 1900Index100929996

(181) The level of Union industry employment related to the production of HRFS fluctuated over the period considered but remained stable overall. In view of the decrease in production, productivity of the Union industry’s workforce, measured as tonnes per employee produced per year, decreased by 4 % over the period considered.

(182) Following provisional and final disclosure, ÇİB stated that key injury indicators like employment showed that the Union industry was not performing poorly. The Commission noted however, that, despite the stability in the number of employees over the period considered, the number of employees decreased strongly between 2017 and 2019. The material injury suffered by the Union industry was in any case patent, as demonstrated in section 4.5.4 of the provisional Regulation and section 4.6 below.

(183) Following provisional disclosure, ÇİB stated that a finding on material injury attributed to the sole fact of a decrease in the number of employees is inconsistent with WTO case law and that the decrease in the number of employees from 2017 could not be attributed to dumped imports from Turkey. The Commission rejected the claims. Nowhere did the Commission attribute a finding on material injury to the sole fact of a decrease in the number of employees. As to the evolution in the number of employees, it closely followed production.

(184) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that productivity should not be examined single-handedly as productivity dropped in 2017 due to the significant increase in employment between 2016 and 2017. Productivity being one of the factors accounted for in the injury analysis, the Commission confirmed that no factor was considered single-handedly.

(185) Following final disclosure, the GOT considered that the last sentence in the recital above was tantamount to confirming that the decrease in productivity is caused by the increase in employment in 2017. The Commission disagreed with the GOT, although it acknowledged that the increase in employment between 2016 and 2017 played a role in the decrease in productivity between 2016 and 2017. It is nevertheless notable that productivity again decreased between 2018 and the investigation period at a time when employment was also decreasing, leading to an overall 4 % loss in productivity over the period considered as pointed out in recital (181).

4.5.2.5.

Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping

(186) For the EU27, all dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from Turkey.

(187) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT contested the Commission’s comments regarding the recovery of the Union industry in 2017 as a result of trade remedies. As this section covers recovery from past dumping, the Commission found it justified to recall that, given the findings of previous investigations on the same product, the Union industry’s situation was affected by dumping practices in 2016, showed signs of recovery as of 2017 and that the healthier profitability levels achieved disappeared in the investigation period.

(188) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (115) to (117) of the provisional Regulation.

4.5.3.

Microeconomic indicators

4.5.3.1.

Prices and factors affecting prices

(189) The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 10

Sales prices and cost of production in the Union

Source: Sampled Union producers

201620172018IPAverage unit sales price on free market (EUR/tonne)393532574534Index100135146136Unit cost of production (EUR/tonne)413497540560Index100121131136

(190) Average unit sales prices increased significantly in 2017 as compared to 2016, and then again in 2018. However, the average unit sales price of the Union industry fell from 574 EUR/tonne in 2018 to 534 EUR/tonne in the investigation period, while its cost of production increased from 540 EUR/tonne in 2018 to 560 EUR/tonne in the investigation period. Therefore, whereas in 2017 and 2018 the Union industry had been able to pass on the cost increases which it incurred to its customers and remain profitable, it could no longer do so in the investigation period. The information about cost of production in this table and in table 10 of the provisional Regulation is identical.

(191) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT noted that both the unit cost of production and the unit average sales prices of the Union industry on the free market had increased to the same extent (+36 %) over the period considered, so that the Union industry could reflect raw material price increases in its prices. The Commission notes that the GOT’s assessment is a mere end-point to end-point analysis without considering the yearly evolutions, and does not account for the fact that the anti-dumping investigation that led to measures against Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine in 2017 found injury during the period running from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. Indeed, whereas sales prices in the Union were depressed still in 2016

See, inter alia, tables 3 and 7 and recital (339) of the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine and terminating the investigation on imports of certain hot-rolled flat product of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in Serbia.

by dumped imports from Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine, the Union industry could only restore its sales prices to normal levels in 2017

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 (see footnote 10 above). Since October 2016, Union producers could benefit from protection via the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1778 of 6 October 2016 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot-rolled flat products of iron, non-alloy or other alloy steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 272, 7.10.2016, p. 33).

. The Commission also notes that the sales prices of the Union industry fell from 574 EUR/tonne in 2018 to 534 EUR/tonne in the investigation period, while unit costs increased by from 540 EUR/tonne to 560 EUR/tonne in the same period. Therefore, whereas in 2017 and 2018 the Union industry had been able to pass on cost increases incurred to its customers and remain profitable, it could no longer do so in the investigation period.

(192) Following final disclosure, the GOT stated that the Commission failed to demonstrate how the Union industry was able to reflect the cost increases incurred in 2017 in its sales prices. The Commission disagreed. The remote cross-checks of the questionnaire responses of the sampled Union producers and Table 10 above confirmed that the cost increases between 2016 and 2017 translated into higher selling prices on the free market in EU27 between 2016 and 2017.

4.5.3.2.

Labour costs

(193) The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 11

Average labour costs per employee

Source: Sampled Union producers

201620172018IP(EUR)74295781017924183187Index100105107112

(194) During the period considered, the average labour costs per employee went up by 12 %. This table is identical to table 11 in the provisional Regulation.

(195) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that the increase of labour costs could not be single-handedly linked to imports from Turkey. The party complained that the provisional Regulation lacked an examination of the reasons behind the evolution of labour costs. The Commission reassured the GOT that, labour costs being one of the factors accounted for in the injury analysis, the Commission did not consider any factor in isolation. The reasons for the increase in labour costs were manifold, including commitments incurred with trade unions representing labour. However, the Commission recalled that the important issue in this analysis is to what extent the Union industry could pass on costs increases, as examined in the section before.

4.5.3.3.

Inventories

(196) Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 12

Inventories

Source: Sampled Union producers

201620172018IPClosing stocks (tonnes)10333641207363843448862918Index1001178284Closing stocks as a percentage of production (%)4,5 – 5,55 – 64 – 54 – 5Index1001108185

(197) During the period considered the level of closing stocks decreased by 16 %. As to the evolution of the closing stocks as a percentage of production, this indicator remained relatively stable over the period considered at around 5 % of the production volume. This table is identical to table 12 of the provisional Regulation.

(198) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT considered the Commission’s duly elaborated findings in recital (125) of the provisional Regulation that stocks were not considered to be an important injury indicator biased. The Commission disagreed. As explained in the provisional Regulation, most types of the like products are produced based on specific orders, and are therefore supplied after production and not held in stock. The Commission came to a similar conclusion on stocks in previous investigations concerning the same product

See, inter alia, recital (292) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1795 (see footnote 10 above).

. In addition, the present investigation confirmed that most types of the like product are indeed produced based on specific orders of users.

(199) Following final disclosure, the GOT questioned the Commission’s comments on the decrease in closing stocks as a percentage of production. The Commission recalled that closing stocks as a percentage of production volume remained relatively stable at around 5 % over the period considered and that this factor is not deemed an important indicator. For the Commission, as most types of the like product are produced based on specific orders of users, it would be unjustified to consider stable stocks (as a percentage of production volume) tantamount to a lack of injury on the Union industry’s side.

4.5.3.4.

Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

(200) Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed as follows over the period considered:

Table 13

Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments

Source: Sampled Union producers

201620172018IPProfitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)-3,46,86,7-6,1Index-100197197-178Cash flow (EUR)-140233454441132791621327297-308067291Index-100315443-220Investments (EUR)144626230234309366210822274156161956Index100162146108Return on investments (%)-3,19,710,2-13,0Index-100317331-424

(201) Profitability developed negatively over the period considered, despite the initial increase of profits in 2017 and 2018. Profitability went down from 6,8 % in 2017 to -6,1 % in the investigation period.

(202) The net cash flow was positive from 2017 to 2018, with a peak in 2018, and turned negative in the investigation period, when profitability was at the lowest point in the period considered. The ability to raise capital was hindered by the drop in profits.

(203) The level of yearly investments increased over the period considered by 8 %, but shrank in the investigation period to levels barely above those in 2016. The return on investments followed the same trend as the profitability. This part of table 13 is identical in respect of investments and return of investments to table 13 of the provisional Regulation.

(204) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT claimed that the investment levels in table 13 of the provisional Regulation were huge and a clear proof of lack on injury. The Commission disagreed with the GOT’s conclusion as investments occurred mostly in 2017 and 2018, that is to say, once the Union industry started recovering from past dumping practices. As explained in recital (167) of the provisional Regulation, Union producers could not invest as much as they wished during the period considered. The Union industry being a very capital-intensive business, investments were not huge in relative terms. The ability to raise capital was hindered by the drop in profits.

(205) Following final disclosure, the GOT asked for an explanation of the 62 % increase in investments between 2016 and 2017 as measures on HRFS against five third countries came into force in October 2017. At the outset, the Commission noted that, as a matter of principle, the fact that there are dumped imports on the market that injure the Union industry cannot be used to disqualify investment decisions by the Union industry as that would implicitly reward the unfair trade practice in question. On substance, the Commission recalled that the provisional anti-dumping measures against one of the main sources of HRFS imports at the time, China, were published on 7 October 2016

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1778.

, while the definitive measures followed early April 2017

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/649.

. In addition, table 14 of this Regulation shows a clear decrease of dumped imports from China, Russia, Brazil, Ukraine and Iran between 2016 and 2017, which favoured the implementation of delayed investments in 2017.

(206) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that certain investments linked to health, safety and environmental matters do not result in profit or return on investment. The Commission considered that the Union industry should have been able to make profit even when complying with its health, safety and environmental commitments. Investments linked to health, safety and environmental matters do not prevent businesses from making healthy profits in normal market circumstances. While agreeing with this conclusion, following final disclosure the GOT deemed that the Commission had failed to make an objective examination on profitability and return on investments as investments linked to health, safety and environmental matters cost dearly in the year when the investments take place and no company expects a return on these investments. The Commission disagreed as a healthy Union industry should show solid levels of profitability and return on investments that allow for expenses absent of a pecuniary return on investment but completely necessary for health, safety and environmental reasons.

(207) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (126) to (131) of the provisional Regulation.

4.6.

Conclusion on injury

(208) Although consumption in the free market slightly decreased during the period considered (-1 %), the Union industry’s sales volumes in the free market increased with its market share going from [75 – 76 %] to [78 – 79 %]. However, these small improvements in terms of sales volumes and market share can only be observed when compared with 2016, when the Union industry was suffering injury from dumping caused by imports from other countries. Yet, the Union industry’s production output and capacity utilisation decreased respectively by 4 % and 7 % over the period considered. Between 2018 and the investigation period there were more pronounced drops in production and capacity utilisation, and sales in the free market also decreased. The Union industry grew as of 2017, recovering from the unfair imports subject to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, but its situation deteriorated during the investigation period.

(209) The cost of production of the Union industry went up significantly during the period considered (+36 %), mainly because of a strong increase in the raw material prices.

(210) The Union industry’s sales prices increased more than costs in 2017 and 2018, which allowed Union producers to recover from previous injurious dumping practices and reach a profitability of 6,7 %. However, between 2018 and the investigation period, to preserve its market share when faced with dumped Turkish imports, the Union industry had to decrease its sales prices in spite of increasing costs (+4 %). This had a devastating effect on the Union industry’s profitability, which dropped from +6,7 % in 2018 to -6,1 % in the investigation period.

(211) Other financial indicators (cash flow, return on investments) followed a similar trend, especially during the investigation period, and consequently the level of investments decreased strongly in the investigation period as compared to the previous years.

(212) As explained in recital (16) above, the UK withdrawal entailed a revision of macroeconomic indicators and a few other data. The differences between tables 1-13 of the provisional Regulation and tables 1-13 this Regulation are however insignificant, both in terms of units and trends. The undercutting levels remained significant. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the UK withdrawal does not alter the conclusion on injury reached in the provisional Regulation.

(213) On the basis of the above, the Commission definitely concluded that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation.

1. CAUSATION

5.1.

Effects of the dumped imports

(214) Following provisional disclosure, ÇİB and the GOT disagreed with the conclusions in section 5.1 of the provisional Regulation. The GOT submitted that the explanations therein could not justify a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury between 2018 and 2019 on the grounds that Turkish import volumes were stable and that both the prices of Turkish imports and the Union industry cost of production dropped in that period. The Commission noted the inaccuracy of the GOT’s statements. On the one hand, the Union industry’s cost of production did not go down in that period. Rather, it increased from 540 EUR/tonne in 2018 to 560 EUR/tonne in 2019, as shown in table 10 of the provisional Regulation and Table 10 of this Regulation. On the other hand, between 2018 and 2019 Turkish import volumes remained rather stable (although at higher levels compared to 2016 and 2017), while their prices dropped by 8,5 % as shown in tables 4 and 5 of this Regulation. The Commission noted that the GOT deemed the undercutting levels found in the provisional Regulation insignificant but did not dispute, however, that HRFS is a very price-sensitive product. Indeed, the GOT itself admitted that a small price difference explained the increase in the market share of Turkish imports

Last paragraph of page 14 of t21.000916.

. The claims are thus rejected. In any event, regardless of the existence of undercutting, during the investigation period the Union industry had to keep its prices well below its costs of production in order to preserve its market share due to the price depression exerted by the volumes of Turkish imports at lower prices.

(215) The GOT also stated that imports from Turkey did not take the market share of the Union industry but only took certain share from the third countries, which could not have any effect on Union producers. In the same vein, ÇİB claimed that the Commission had overlooked that imports from Turkey filled the gap left by other supplying countries. The party alleged as well a lack of correlation in time between the Union industry’s performance and the evolution of Turkish imports, because, when the Union producers’ situation deteriorated between the second and third quarters of 2019, as claimed by the complainant, Turkish imports dropped and their prices did not change. Following final disclosure, the GOT stated that a quarterly analysis showed that imports from Turkey started to decrease significantly since the beginning of 2019. In the same vein, following provisional and final disclosure ÇİB stated that the Commission had not explained why some key economic indicators of the Union industry improved or remained stable in the period of 2016-2019 while imports from Turkey were gradually increasing. Following final disclosure, ÇİB stated that material injury was to be attributed to factors other than imports from Turkey as between 2016 and 2018 Turkish import volumes grew but also their prices.

(216) The Commission agreed that Turkish imports filling in a gap would have been unproblematic; however, such imports arrived into the Union at unfair dumped prices. As to the lack of correlation in time, the Commission disagreed. Indeed, ÇİB ignored in its analysis the effects of the price pressure exerted by Turkish imports. The fact that injury is patent rather in price-related indicators does not undermine an overall conclusion on injurious dumping. As stated in recital (139) of the provisional Regulation, it was in 2019 that the Union industry was driven to set its prices well below costs in order to keep its market share due to the price pressure exerted by the Turkish imports at lower prices. There is thus a clear correlation between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry.

(217) Following final disclosure, the GOT noted that it is essentially in the free market that the Union industry competes with imports. The GOT alleged that the increase in the market share of the Union industry in the free market proves the absence of injury derived from imports from Turkey. ÇİB said that the increase in sales of the Union industry on the free market and the increase of their market share despite the presence of Turkish imports does not support the conclusion that the Union industry suffered material injury over the period considered. In the Commission’ view, the claims made by both parties neglect the effects of the price pressure exerted by Turkish imports and that the price-related indicators show clear and demonstrable injury. In the investigation period the Union industry gained some of the market shares left by certain import sources. However, this was done with selling prices well below costs as a result of the price pressure exerted by the Turkish imports and their lower prices.

(218) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (138) to (139) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.

Effects of other factors

5.2.1.

Imports from third countries

(219) The volume of imports from other third countries developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 14

Imports from third countries

Source: Eurostat

Country201620172018IPRussian FederationVolume (tonnes)193526972033915877401340462Index100378269Market share (%)5 – 62 – 34 – 53- 4Index100398170

Average price

(EUR/tonne)

335468496443Index100140148132SerbiaVolume (tonnes)348619465158733711860953Index100133210247Market share (%)0 – 11 – 22- 32- 3Index100139207249Average price (EUR/tonne)386498547479Index100129142124IndiaVolume (tonnes)4307131098632884455847584Index100255205197Market share (%)1 – 23- 42- 32 – 3Index100266202199Average price (EUR/tonne)403494531464Index100122132115

BrazilVolume (tonnes)654633369251266555114142Index100564117Market share (%)1- 21- 20 – 10- 1Index100594018Average price (EUR/tonne)362494531485Index100136147134UkraineVolume (tonnes)1078716606830131928106797Index100561210Market share (%)3 – 41- 20 – 10 – 1Index100591210Average price (EUR/tonne)331466472424Index100141142128IranVolume (tonnes)91778376707560263377Index100860Market share (%)2- 30 – 10 – 10 – 1Index100960Average price (EUR/tonne)305428489504Index100140160165ChinaVolume (tonnes)10246198456579525Index1000,830,060,05Market share (%)2 – 30 – 10 – 10 – 1Index100100Average price (EUR/tonne)32566737603177Index1002051158978Other third countriesVolume (tonnes)935804156015715074141242177Index100167161133Market share (%)2 – 34 – 54 – 53 – 4Index100174159134Average price (EUR/tonne)384493562523Index100128146136Total of all third countries except TurkeyVolume (tonnes)7326155490553151684084516016Index100677162Market share (%)21 – 2215 – 1615 – 1612,5 – 13,5Index100706962Average price (EUR/tonne)344480530477Index100141154139

(220) During the period considered, imports from countries other than Turkey decreased by 38 %; their market share decreased from 21 – 22 % to 12,5 – 13,5 %.

(221) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT considered that the provisional Regulation overlooked the (low) price of imports from certain third countries and that prices of Turkish imports could not have caused injury to Union producers. The GOT based this conclusion on the fact that, first, in view of the data presented in Table 14 of the provisional Regulation, overall import prices decreased more than prices of imports from Turkey alone from 2018 to the investigation period and, second, that there was strong volatility in the prices of HRFS. The GOT stated that the cumulated volume of imports of all third countries except Turkey was almost twofold the volume of Turkish imports. As their prices were lower than the prices of Turkish imports, the GOT submitted that their effect could not be ignored. In this respect, ÇİB stated that the rapid drop in price of Indian imports coincided with the decrease of profitability of Union producers.

(222) The Commission analysed the volumes, values and trends of imports from other third countries, but found that their impact did not attenuate the causal link between dumped Turkish imports and material injury suffered by Union producers. As to the price comparison made by the GOT between import prices from Turkey and import prices from other sources, the Commission notes that the latter are understated as the GOT disregarded the fact that Eurostat data on prices do not include anti-dumping and countervailing duties paid. As far as Indian imports are concerned, as noted in recital (144) of the provisional Regulation, the exact product mix of these imports and hence whether they in fact undercut the Union industry prices cannot be established based on Eurostat average prices only. No party provided evidence per product type suggesting significant undercutting from Indian imports. More importantly, no party contested that the volumes of Indian imports amounted to one quarter of that of the Turkish imports and, thus, were not capable of attenuating the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury found in this case. Following provisional disclosure, the complainant claimed to be unaware of any information that would suggest the imports from India were sold at dumped prices in the Union or causing any injury to Union producers. Thus, bearing in mind the relatively modest market share of Indian imports, these imports could not exert pressure on Union producers to the same extent as dumped imports from Turkey.

(223) Following final disclosure, the ÇİB contested the analysis and the conclusions made under this section and the GOT stated that the Commission chose not to examine the effects of imports from other third countries and failed to show that these imports did not cause any injury to Union producers. The Commission disagreed with the parties as it did examine all the relevant information on the matter on file. For instance, no party, not even the GOT or the ÇİB, provided at any stage of the investigation evidence per product type suggesting significant undercutting by Indian imports (or by Serbian imports, as claimed by ÇİB). The Commission concluded that the evidence on file did not support the claim concerning the alleged effects of imports from other third countries. That conclusion does not undermine the finding about the extent of the pressure of such imports on Union producers in parallel with dumped imports from Turkey. The finding that imports from third countries could not attenuate the causal between dumped imports from Turkey and the injury suffered by the Union industry was confirmed. Based on these considerations, the overall conclusion on causation was also confirmed.

(224) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (140) to (146) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.2.

Export performance of the Union industry

(225) The volume and prices of exports of the Union industry to unrelated parties developed over the period considered as follows:

Table 15

Export sales

Source: Eurofer (volumes) and sampled Union producers (average prices)

201620172018IPExport volume (tonnes)1 – 2 million1 – 2 million1 – 2 million1 – 2 millionIndex100102102121

Average price (Euro/tonne)376502554468Index100133147124

(226) Union producers increased export volumes by 21 % over the period considered to remain below 2 million tonnes in 2019. Overall, the volumes exported by the Union industry represented less than 6 % of its sales volume on the Union free market.

(227) In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (147) to (149) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.3.

Captive consumption

(228) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT asked the Commission to collect more data and further examine demand in the captive market. The GOT noted certain breakdowns in the complainant’s publication European Steel in Figures 2020 and the bad results published by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association in its 2019 report.

(229) There are two main uses of the hot-rolled flat steel products. First, they are the primary material for the production of various value-added downstream steel products, starting with cold-rolled flat and coated steel products. Second, they are used as an industrial input purchased by end-users for a variety of applications, including in construction (production of steel tubes), shipbuilding, gas containers, cars, pressure vessels and energy pipelines. Data put forward by the GOT did not allow for an assessment of demand in the wide range of consuming sectors concerned. The Commission found that total production activity in the steel-using sectors in the Union fell by 0,2 % in 2019 – further to an increase of 2,9 % in 2018 – which was the first drop in output since 2013. The 2019 negative growth was the result of an increase in construction output and a drop in all other steel-using sectors (the most pronounced being recorded by the automotive sector)

Economic Report, Economic and Steel Market Outlook 2020-2021, Second quarter report – Data up to, and including, full year 2019, 12 May 2020, Eurofer, downloadable via https://www.eurofer.eu/assets/Uploads/REPORT-Economic-and-Steel-Market-Outlook-Quarter-2-2020.pdf, and Worldsteel Short Range Outlook October 2019, 14 October 2019, World Steel Association, available at https://www.worldsteel.org/media-centre/press-releases/2019/worldsteel-short-range-outlook-2019.html

. The Commission conceded that the negative growth in numerous steel-using sectors in 2019 entailed a challenge for HRFS producers. However, this situation was not found to attenuate the causal link between dumped imports from Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period, in view of the increase in volumes of those imports, their effect on the Union Industry’s prices and other injurious factors identified above.

(230) Following final disclosure, the GOT alleged a WTO-incompatible lack of examination of the effects of captive consumption. The GOT stated that the Commission chose not to examine the extraordinary deterioration in steel user industries in the EU. The Commission disagreed. The GOT provided no evidence to substantiate its claim. The publications in footnote 16 of the provisional Regulation do not show the alleged extraordinary deterioration in steel user industries in the EU. In the course of the investigation, no users made similar claims. As highlighted in recital (195) of the provisional Regulation, users in major downstream markets, such as the automotive industry, industrial appliances or the construction sector did not come forward.

(231) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (150) to (151) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.4.

Evolution of demand

(232) Following final disclosure, ÇİB attributed injury to an overall decline in Union consumption, while the GOT stated that the decrease in consumption caused a decrease in the Union industry’s production volumes. The Commission noted that, as shown in table 1, free market consumption, i.e. the market where competition with imports essentially takes place, fell by 1 % over the period considered. The Commission does not consider that the magnitude of the drop in Union consumption attenuated the causal link between dumped imports from Turkey and the injurious situation of the Union industry in the investigation period.

(233) In light of the considerations in the section above and in the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (152) to (153) of the provisional Regulation. The evolution of demand on the basis of EU27 data does not change these conclusions.

5.2.5.

Raw material prices

(234) In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (154) to (155) of the provisional Regulation.

5.2.6.

Other factors

(235) Following final disclosure, ÇİB argued that material injury was to be attributed to changes in the Union market, restructuring and rationalisation efforts made by Union producers, a certain purchase policy and low-priced imports from other third countries. The claims were unsupported and thus dismissed.

(236) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (147) to (149) of the provisional Regulation.

5.3.

Conclusion on causation

(237) On the basis of the above and in the absence of any other comments, the Commission concluded that none of the factors, analysed either individually or collectively, attenuated the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury suffered by the Union industry to the effect that such link would no longer be genuine and substantial, confirming the conclusion in recitals (159) to (161) of the provisional Regulation.

1. LEVEL OF MEASURES

6.1.

Underselling margin

(238) Following provisional disclosure, the complainant opposed the Commission’s use of the average profit achieved over the year 2017, namely 6,8 %, as a basis for the target profit used for calculating the underselling margin. The complainant argued that in 2017 the Union industry was still suffering from dumped imports from other origins, that the Commission had failed to follow its standard practice and that even ÇİB had proposed a higher profit margin. The complainant insisted that the target profit should be in the range 10-15 %, like the 12,9 % used in an earlier investigation concerning imports of the same product

Commission Decision No 284/2000/ECSC of 4 February 2000 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of certain flat rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, of a width of 600 mm or more, not clad, plated or coated, in coils, not further worked than hot-rolled, originating in India and Taiwan and accepting undertakings offered by certain exporting producers and terminating the proceeding concerning imports originating in South Africa (OJ L 31, 5.2.2000, p. 44).

, although conceded that the minimum basis for the target profit could also be 7,9 %, which was the target profit used in the latest investigation on this product.

(239) The Commission assessed the claim. As explained in recitals (164) and (166) of the provisional Regulation, the Commission based the determination of the target profit on the provisions of Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, although a year with normal conditions of competition prior to the increase of imports from Turkey could not be identified within a reasonable time-span. In addition, as already pointed out in section 4.5.1 above, the Commission

was unable to conclude that in 2017 the Union industry was still suffering from dumped imports as claimed by the complainant. In the anti-dumping investigation against Brazil, Iran, Russia and Ukraine, the investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. The fact that definitive protective measures against imports from those origins were imposed in October 2017 does not mean that injurious dumping practices continued to exist in 2017. This is corroborated by the sharp fall of imports from those five countries in 2017, as already mentioned in recital (163) above. Consequently, the Commission confirmed that the year 2017 was the best basis to establish the target profit in the context of the current investigation. In any event, in view of the dumping margins found in this case, even accepting the claim to use a higher target profit would not have any impact on the level of the measures.

(240) At the provisional stage, the Commission used data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance to establish projected EU’s emission trading system (ETS) allowance prices to calculate future environmental costs. These prices have been updated at the definitive stage with data extracted on 15 February 2020.

(241) Recital (216) of the provisional Regulation refers to comments regarding the injury calculations received from one sampled Union producer in the context of Article 19a of the basic Regulation. The party claimed that the average of future quantity of HRFS to be produced should be used instead of the average of future upstream products used in HRFS production to assess the future compliance costs of the Union Industry to adhere to the environmental and social costs of production resulting from multilateral environmental agreements or social obligations. In this proceeding, considering the information available provided by the three sampled Union producers and verified by the Commission, the Commission found that it was the upstream products that directly generated the emission of pollutants and therefore that was the proper level to assess the future compliance costs. These costs were subsequently applied to the production of the product under investigation based on the consumption ratio of the downstream product generating the emissions in the production of the product under investigation.

(242) As explained in section 1.8 above, the composition of the Union changed in 2021, a fact that also entailed a change in the dataset used to establish the underselling margin. The injury elimination level for EU27 is shown in the table below:

CountryCompanyDumping marginUnderselling marginTurkeyÇolakoğlu Metalurji A.Ş.7,3 %19,5 %

Erdemir group:

Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikalari T.A.S.

İskenderun Demir ve Çelik A.Ş.

5,0 %21 %Habaş Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar İstihsal Endüstrisi A.Ş.4,7 %20,5 %Ağir Haddecilik A.Ş.5,7 %20,3 %Borçelik Çelik Sanayii Ticaret A.Ş.5,7 %20,3 %All other companies7,3 %21 %

(243) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (163) to (170) of the provisional Regulation as modified in the table above.

6.2.

Examination of the margin adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry

(244) In the absence of any comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (171) to (172) of the provisional Regulation.

6.3.

Conclusion

(245) Following the above assessment, the Commission concluded that it is appropriate to determine the amount of definitive duties in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) and Article 9(4), second paragraph, of the basic Regulation. As a consequence, definitive anti-dumping duties should be set as below:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping dutyTurkeyÇolakoğlu Metalurji A.Ş.7,3 %

Erdemir group:

Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikalari T.A.S.

İskenderun Demir ve Çelik A.Ş.

5,0 %Habaş Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar İstihsal Endüstrisi A.Ş.4,7 %Ağir Haddecilik A.Ş.5,7 %Borçelik Çelik Sanayii Ticaret A.Ş.5,7 %All other companies7,3 %

1. UNION INTEREST

7.1.

Interest of the Union industry

(246) Following provisional disclosure, the complainant stated that the recently announced expansion plans of Turkish exporters were an additional reason why anti-dumping measures were in the Union interest. No party contested that the measures would be in the interest of the Union industry. The conclusions set out in recitals (175) to (179) of the provisional Regulation were thus confirmed.

7.2.

Interest of unrelated importers

(247) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT and ÇİB stated that Union producers were already protected from imports. ÇİB argued that Turkish imports had dropped significantly in the last quarter of 2019 as compared to the first quarter of that year. In this respect, the GOT pointed at the definitive safeguard measures with quantitative ceilings (quotas or Tariff Rate Quotas/TRQ’s) and the additional duties of 25 % to be paid once the quota is exhausted. The GOT recalled that importers and users had stated before provisional measures that trade remedies heavily affected security of supply and made the importers’ activities more challenging. The GOT added that, due to the provisional anti-dumping measures and the country-specific quotas within the context of safeguard measures in force until the end of June 2021, importers and users would not be able to find a new import source to meet demand in the Union.

(248) The Commission considered that recitals (188) to (193) of the provisional Regulation abundantly rebut claims related to any alleged shortages of supply, including the ones above made by the GOT following provisional disclosure. The Commission also noted that safeguard and anti-dumping measures address different situations. In this case, safeguard measures have indeed been imposed under the form of a TRQ, but that does not prevent the imposition measures to remove unfair trade practises, in particular within the limits of the TRQ, i.e. before any safeguard duty would apply.

(249) Also, as explained in recital (192) of the provisional Regulation, the imposition of anti-dumping measures does not mean that imports from Turkey will cease, or even that they will decrease in a meaningful way. The findings of the investigation support this conclusion. Following provisional disclosure no importer submitted quantitative data that would show that the anti-dumping measures stemming for the current proceeding would have a disproportionate impact on their activities. The level of the measures should not prevent Turkish steelmakers from selling their HRFS in the Union and to the Union importers. Indeed, a 2021 press report by Steel Business Briefing highlighted that in 2020 the Union remains Turkey’s main hot rolled coil export market

t21.000701, Annex 2.

. The same source reports on additional HRFS capacity in Turkey

t21.000701, Annex 1 and Annex 3.

.

(250) In the absence of any other comments regarding the interest of unrelated importers, the conclusions set out in recitals (180) to (182) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

7.3.

Interest of users

(251) The GOT’s comments following provisional disclosure relating to users were common to comments relating to unrelated importers and they have been already addressed in section 7.2.

(252) Following provisional disclosure, ÇİB expressed concern about a drop of quality and innovation in the Union market as a result of the measures. The Commission deemed the claim, which was very general and unsupported by any evidence, unfounded. The Commission found that, despite the difficult market circumstances, Union producers had kept offering high quality products during the whole period considered. The Commission expects anti-dumping measures to create a level playing field that allows the Union industry to offer more high quality and innovative products to the benefit of all actors.

(253) The Consortium of users and importers of HRFS (the Consortium) submitted comments on the provisional regulation

t21.000721.

. First, the Consortium argued that following the investigation period, Union producers allegedly reduced the production volume that they make available in the Union free market. The Consortium pointed that this alleged practice, together with the trade defence measures currently in place against other origins, led to an unprecedented price increase in the Union market. The Consortium claimed that independent users in the Union were thus not in a position to source an essential raw material (HRFS) from Union producers. In turn, the price increase would have allowed the Union producers to improve their margins of profit to a point where they would have recovered from any alleged injury suffered in the investigation period. The Consortium considered that EU Courts’ jurisprudence allowed the Commission to assess post-IP developments in the framework of the Union interest analysis, and that in this case, such developments would call for the termination of the measure. In connection to this argument, the Consortium further argued that, as a result of the alleged scarcity of supply from Union producers and the ensuing increased prices, independent users in the Union had no choice but to rely on imports in relevant amounts. In this respect, the Consortium stated that trade defence measures in place against certain origins, and the provisional measure against Turkish imports, threaten the ability to obtain HRFS from third countries. The Consortium pointed that other third countries could not replace Turkey as the most reliable supplying country. The Consortium also contested the Commission’s finding regarding the ability of users to adjust to regulatory changes and to switch suppliers. The Consortium claimed that, in practice, this is rarely possible and that purchasing limited volumes from other third country producers cannot be seen as a sign that users can swiftly change suppliers. The Consortium cast doubts on the ability, and even willingness, of the Union industry to supply any additional relevant volumes to independent downstream users in the Union and the ability of countries, other than Turkey, to supply meaningful amounts of HRFS into the Union. All these elements, the Consortium argued, would lead to an unsustainable increase in costs of a key raw material for users, affecting them disproportionally.

(254) Following provisional disclosure, ÇİB expressed concern about an increase in HRFS prices in the Union market as a result of the measures and contested recital (191) of the provisional Regulation, according to which Union producers could use their spare capacity to satisfy the demand of unrelated users.

(255) The complainant contested these claims

t21.000931.

. In particular, it referred to sources pointing to increased production capacity in 2021, including by restarting certain furnaces and to the existence of sufficient sources of supply, both within the Union and from third countries. The complainant acknowledged that any supply chain imbalance in the market would have been only of temporary nature and caused by the disruptive effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the shutdown of some furnaces. The complainant further submitted that there are plenty of alternative sources in the Union and elsewhere to satisfy any increases in Union demand, including the existence of abundant spare capacity in the Union and worldwide. It also argued that Turkey is likely to continue its supplies to the Union market given the moderate anti-dumping duties imposed. Lastly, the complainant reiterated that the anti-dumping duty would not have any significant impact on users’ costs, referring to simulations it had provided at an earlier stage of the proceeding.

(256) Following final disclosure, the GOT claimed that if the Commission imposed a definitive safeguard measure, on top of the existing safeguard measure and other anti-dumping and countervailing duties in place against other origins for imports of the product concerned, there was a possibility of shortage in supply. The GOT further claimed that its imports started decreasing in 2019 as a result of the safeguard measure in place and that it believed that any further measure will cause the imports from Turkey to cease and asked how the Commission would be certain that imports from Turkey would not cease.

(257) The Commission first addressed the claims on scarcity of supply, availability of other sources and ability to adjust to regulatory changes and switch suppliers. Subsequently, it addressed the claim on the use of post-IP data.

(258) The Commission found that the Consortium’s and the GOT’s argument of scarcity of supply is at odds with the figures and trends that the investigation established. This is the case both at general level and at the level of the data shown by cooperating users. On a general level, the Commission first noted that under the steel safeguard measure

In July 2018, the Commission imposed a provisional safeguard measure, which became definitive in February 2019 and which was in place throughout the whole investigation period. Under this measure, HRFS largely corresponds in scope to product category 1. Therefore, the evolution of TRQ use under the safeguard measure is relevant for the purpose of this investigation.

there have been very large amounts of free-of-duty TRQ consistently, and increasingly, available during the investigation period

Recitals (45) to (50) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/894 of 29 June 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel product (OJ L 206, 30.6.2020, p. 27).

. Therefore, had demand for larger volumes of imports existed in the Union, it could have been met free-of-duty. Second, the investigation confirmed that the Union industry has sufficient spare capacity

Table 6 of the Regulation imposing provisional anti-dumping measures.

that would allow it to increase further its output in the Union. There is no economic justification for Union producers not to use their (spare) capacities to satisfy demand in the Union, whether the users are related or not, notably when it finds itself in a less than optimal economic situation. Third, the Commission reiterated its findings at provisional stage

Recitals (188) and (189) of the Regulation imposing provisional anti-dumping measures.

regarding the ability of third countries to supply HRFS in relevant amounts and recalled that they could increase their presence in the Union market further, as some of them had already, if demand exists. Lastly, the Commission referred to its finding in recital (192) of the provisional Regulation concerning the unfounded assumption that Turkey’s imports would disappear from the Union market if the Commission imposed a defensive duty. The Commission recalled in this regard that some of the countries subject to measures continued exporting to the Union, and in certain cases, in substantial amounts

Recitals (21) to (23) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1590 of 26 September 2019 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ L 248, 27.9.2019, p. 28).

.

(259) Moreover, the Consortium’s claim is also at odds with the data supplied by independent users themselves in the framework of the investigation. First, the share of Turkish imports in these users’ portfolio is rather limited (below 15 % overall). Turkish purchases account for less than half the share of imports from other origins, and they are nearly five times smaller than their purchases from Union producers, the users’ main supplier by far. Furthermore, the Commission confirmed that the figures available in the questionnaire replies from unrelated users clearly show, not only that they can (and in fact have), from one year to another, significantly changed the configuration of their sources of supply, but also that they can do that in substantial volumes. In this regard, the Commission noted that the cooperating users doubled and even tripled the imports from certain origins in the investigation period

(increasing overall, by 40 % the imports from these third countries). Users also started purchasing in the investigation period from origins they did not purchase from in the year prior to the investigation period, while they stopped purchasing from certain origins that they used to in 2018. The data available in the file thus contradicts the Consortium’s statement that users are only able to purchase limited volumes of HRFS from other third countries, and that in practice switching to other suppliers is rarely possible.

(260) With regard to the other claims brought forward by the GOT, the Commission noted that regarding the decline in imports in 2019, Turkey was unable to fulfil the global TRQ that was available until 1 July 2020

This statement is valid for both periods, i.e. when Turkey was subject to a global TRQ (2 February to 30 September 2019, and when Turkey was subject to a 30 % cap under a global TRQ as of 1 October 2019.

. Furthermore, the Commission did not see any link between, and the GOT has not supplied any evidence in support of, a reduction in imports in a given year and the claim that these imports will cease as a result of the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty. In addition, the Commission noted that Turkey’s level of imports since the imposition of a provisional anti-dumping duty show that these imports did not cease. Rather, Turkey made a very large use (92 %) of its country-specific TRQ in the period January-March 2021, and it continued exporting relevant volumes in the quarter April-June 2021. These data show that despite a provisional anti-dumping duty in place, Turkey continued supplying volumes commensurate with the in quota volumes allocated to it under the safeguard measure.

(261) In reaction to the claim of the ÇİB, the Commission again noted, in connection to the alleged reduction in imports that the Association referred to (first quarter in 2019 versus fourth quarter in 2019), that Turkey could have supplied additional volumes under the free-of-duty in quota regime

In the last quarter of 2019, Turkey had used 73 % of the overall TRQ volume it was entitled to supply free-of-duty, leaving around 170,000 tonnes unused in that quarter.

in the last quarter of 2019. The Commission nevertheless failed to see how a reduction of imports from Turkey would, on its own, amount to a shortage of supply in the market. The Commission recalled that the Union market has shown its capability of adjusting to different sources of supply depending on the regulatory changes, such as the imposition of trade defence measures.

(262) Therefore, in view of the above facts, the Commission rejected the Consortium’s, the GOT’s and the ÇİBs claims.

(263) With regard to the request that the Commission extends its findings to take into account post-IP developments, in its submission the Consortium pointed to an unprecedented increase in prices that would have taken place between the end of 2020 and during the first quarter of 2021. The Consortium added that such an increase in prices threatened their operations in the Union and that at these prices, Union producers would have increased their profits and hence, they would have recovered from any injury suffered in the investigation period.

(264) Following final disclosure, the ÇİB and the GOT criticised the Commission’s finding in this respect. For its part, the complainant argued that the Commission should not assess post-IP developments, as the circumstances present in this case are not of exceptional nature and in any event, they would be only of a short-term and not of structural nature.

(265) The Commission considered that an allegation that a price increase may have taken place at a certain point in time after the investigation period, cannot by itself put into question the findings established by the investigation at the provisional and definitive stage. The Commission noted that the claim made by the Consortium lacks any meaningful context and supporting evidence that would clearly demonstrate that the findings on the investigation based on IP data are invalidated by such a development alone. Furthermore, the allegation that the Union industry would have recovered from its injurious situation is unfounded and not supported by any evidence whatsoever. The Commission recalled that Article 6(1) of the basic Regulation notes that information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period shall, normally, not be taken into account.

(266) Regarding the comments received following final disclosure, the Commission notes that neither party provided any additional evidence regarding how the price increase that took place after the investigation period would, in itself, render the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties unwarranted under the Union interest test.

(267) The Commission thus confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (183) to (198) of the provisional Regulation.

7.4.

Other factors

(268) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that Union steelmakers were consistently trying to keep their oligopoly in the Union market and remove international competition. The GOT noted that Union producers served already 79 % of the sales in free market and that such a percentage did not include captive volumes, which were significant. ÇİB referred as well to the high market share of Union producers and feared a monopoly.

(269) The Commission found the oligopoly claim unjustified, as already explained in recital (200) of the provisional Regulation. Following provisional disclosure, no party disputed that, as stated in recitals (75) and (200) of the provisional Regulation, there are over 20 known producers belonging to 14 different groups that show healthy competition amongst them and with imports from third countries. In the absence of evidence of uncompetitive practices, the market share they currently hold is irrelevant to support these claims of oligopoly, let alone a monopoly.

(270) Following final disclosure, ÇİB submitted that the above did not assess in a detailed, sufficient and transparent manner the claim of enhanced oligopoly by the Union industry in the Union market nor that the claim of such enhanced oligopoly was unjustified. For ÇİB, the claim should have been assessed taking into account other factors such as existing measures, shortage of supply, reduction of quality and innovations, etc. According to the party, the General Court requires that, for the purpose of Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation, special consideration is given to restore effective competition. The party repeated, without adding any new evidence, its claim that the Union industry holds an enhanced oligopoly in the Union market.

(271) The Commission refers to its recent Staff Working Document

Commission’s Staff Working Document Towards Competitive and Clean European Steel, SWD(2021) 353 final, 5.5.2021, p. 4-5.

, where it noted that [i]n the recent consolidation wave, merger control enforcement contributed to keeping vibrant competition in the European steel markets to the benefit of the many downstream industries that use steel, rely on affordable materials to compete globally and employ millions of Europeans. By prohibiting anti-competitive mergers (e.g. Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp) or approving mergers subject to conditions, such as structural divestitures (e.g. ArcelorMittal/Ilva), merger enforcement ensured that European steel customers are not left with less choice, higher prices, or less innovation. The Commission found ÇİB s claims unfounded, including as regards shortages in HRFS supply, as explained in section 7.3. Therefore the Commission confirmed its findings at provisional stage.

(272) In the absence of any other comments with respect to this section, the Commission confirmed its conclusions set out in recitals (199) to (200) of the provisional Regulation.

7.5.

Conclusion on Union interest

(273) Following provisional disclosure, the GOT stated that in its view anti-dumping duties were both unnecessary and detrimental for the Union market and that they would play a negative role against the Union interest as a whole. Following final disclosure, ÇİB submitted that the Commission had not balanced the different interests at stake in a transparent manner nor justified its findings. The Commission found those statements to be unfounded in light of the findings of the investigation, namely the existence of dumping, of resulting material injury to the Union industry and the result of balancing the different interests at stake.

(274) On the basis of the above and in the absence of any other comments, the conclusions set out in recital (201) of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.

1. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES

8.1.

Definitive measures

(275) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed in order to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports of the product concerned. For the reasons set out in section 6, and in particular sub-section 6.3, of this Regulation, anti-dumping duties should be set in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

(276) On the basis of the above, the rates at which such duties will be imposed are set as follows:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping dutyTurkeyÇolakoğlu Metalurji A.Ş.7,3 %

Erdemir group:

Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikalari T.A.S.

İskenderun Demir ve Çelik A.Ş.

5,0 %Habaş Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar İstihsal Endüstrisi A.Ş.4,7 %Ağir Haddecilik A.Ş.5,7 %Borçelik Çelik Sanayii Ticaret A.Ş.5,7 %All other companies7,3 %

(277) The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the country concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to all other companies. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates.

(278) A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission

European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Wetstraat 170 Rue de la Loi, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

. The request must contain all the relevant information enabling to demonstrate that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(279) To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to all other companies.

(280) While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this

regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law.

(281) Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty.

(282) To ensure a proper enforcement of the anti-dumping duties, the anti-dumping duty for all other companies should apply not only to the non-cooperating exporting producers in this investigation, but to the producers which did not have exports to the Union during the investigation period.

8.2.

Definitive collection of the provisional duties

(283) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed by the provisional Regulation should be definitively collected.

(284) The definitive duty rates being lower than the provisional duty rates, the amounts secured in excess of the definitive anti-dumping duty rates should be released.

8.3.

Retroactivity

(285) As mentioned in section 1.2, following a request by the complainant, the Commission made imports of the product under investigation subject to registration pursuant to Article 14(5) of the basic Regulation.

(286) During the definitive stage of the investigation, the data collected in the context of the registration was assessed. The Commission analysed whether the criteria under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation were met for the retroactive collection of definitive duties.

(287) The Commission’s analysis showed no further substantial rise in imports in addition to the level of imports which caused injury during the investigation period, as prescribed by Article 10(4d) of the basic Regulation. For this analysis, the Commission compared the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation until the last full month preceding the imposition of provisional measures. Also when comparing the monthly average import volumes of the product concerned during the investigation period with the monthly average import volumes during the period from the month following the initiation of this investigation up to and including the month in which provisional measures were imposed, no further substantial increase could be observed:

Source: Eurostat (EU 27)

IPJune 2020 to December 2020June 2020 to January 2021tonnestonnes/monthtonnestonnes/monthtonnestonnes/monthHRFS imports from Turkey276765823063810311861473121194329149291

(288) The Commission therefore concluded that the retroactive collection of the definitive duties for the period during which imports were registered was not justified in this case.

1. UNDERTAKING OFFER

(289) Following final disclosure, one of the exporting producers submitted a price undertaking offer in accordance with Article 8 of the basic Regulation.

(290) The Commission evaluated this offer and concluded that the acceptance of such undertaking would be impractical within the meaning of Article 8 of the basic Regulation. This is mainly because of the multitude of indistinguishable product types covered by the offer, the fact that some product types falling into the same CN/TARIC code have different minimum import prices, the fact that the minimum import prices offered would not be sufficient to remove the injurious effects of dumping for the majority of product types, and the inappropriateness of the offered indexation to incorporate fluctuations in the price of raw materials.

(291) In its comments on the price undertaking proposed by the exporting producer, the complainant gave arguments in favour of its rejection, which supported the Commission’s own analysis.

(292) The Commission sent the exporting producer a letter setting out the reasons to reject the undertaking offer and giving the company the opportunity to comment.

(293) The Commission did not receive any comments from the exporting producer concerning its conclusion that the proposed undertaking would be inadequate and impracticable.

(294) Therefore, for the reasons set out in recitals (290) to (293) above, the price undertaking offer was rejected.

1. FINAL PROVISIONS

(295) In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1).

, when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month.

(296) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of flat-rolled products of iron, non-alloy steel or other alloy steel, whether or not in coils (including cut-to-length and narrow strip products), not further worked than hot-rolled, not clad, plated or coated, originating in Turkey, currently falling under CN codes 72081000, 72082500, 72082600, 72082700, 72083600, 72083700, 72083800, 72083900, 72084000, 72085210, 72085299, 72085300, 72085400, ex72111300 (TARIC code 7211130019), ex72111400 (TARIC code 7211140095), ex72111900 (TARIC code 7211190095), ex72251910 (TARIC code 7225191090), 72253090, ex72254060 (TARIC code 7225406090), 72254090, ex72261910 (TARIC code 7226191095), ex72269191 (TARIC code 7226919119) and 72269199.

The following products are excluded:

(i) products of stainless steel and grain-oriented silicon electrical steel;

(ii) products of tool steel and high-speed steel;

(iii) products, not in coils, without patterns in relief, of a thickness exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 600 mm or more; and

(iv) products, not in coils, without patterns in relief, of a thickness of 4,75 mm or more but not exceeding 10 mm and of a width of 2050 mm or more;

(v) products whose (a) width is 350 mm or less, and (b) whose thickness is 50 mm or more, regardless of the length of the product.

1. The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

CountryCompanyDefinitive anti-dumping duty rateTARIC additional codeTurkeyÇolakoğlu Metalurji A.Ş.7,3 %C602

Erdemir group:

Ereğli Demir ve Çelik Fabrikalari T.A.S.

İskenderun Demir ve Çelik A.Ş.

5,0 %C603Habaş Sinai ve Tibbi Gazlar İstihsal Endüstrisi A.Ş.4,7 %C604Ağir Haddecilik A.Ş.5,7 %C605Borçelik Çelik Sanayii Ticaret A.Ş.5,7 %C606All other companies7,3 %C999

1. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in [country concerned]. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct. If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other companies shall apply.

1. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/9 shall be definitively collected. The amounts secured in excess of the definitive rates of the anti-dumping duty shall be released.

Article 3

No definitive anti-dumping duty will be levied retroactively for registered imports. Data collected in accordance with Article 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1686 shall no longer be kept.